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ABSTRACT 
 
 “WE WERE THE EYES AND EARS…”: NURSING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE UNITS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1982.  
 
Briana Ralston, MS, RN 
Julie Fairman, PhD, RN, FAAN 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) became the standard of care for 
critically ill newborns in hospitals across the United States. Though work has been done to 
examine how nurses participated in the development of ICU’s for adult populations, scholarship 
related to the formation of NICUs is sparse. Using historical methodology to examine hospital 
archival data, oral history interviews, and scholarly literature, this work examines the roles nurses 
played in the development of NICUs as technological systems between 1955 and 1982 in the 
United States. By using the lenses of the history of nursing, the history of technology, and the 
history of children’s healthcare, this work contributes to our understanding of the nuanced ways 
nurses participated in the formation of the NICU - a complex technological system of care - for a 
vulnerable and medically complicated newborn patient population. The value of newborns as a 
unique and valued medical population, seen as early the Progressive Era, contributed to the 
formation of premature infant units and particular nursing care for premature newborns during the 
first half of the 20th century. This premature infant care in turn influenced the development of 
later neonatal intensive care units and the ways nurses cared for a broader cadre of sick newborns. 
Hospitals valued the particular care they gave and made decisions about the dedication of spaces 
where newborns could be grouped together to receive nursing care. Two case studies of east coast 
children’s hospitals – The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia and Boston Children’s Medical 
Center – shed light on how particular hospitals chose to allocate resources, group patients, and 
how they made those decisions based on their value of specifically trained nursing staff. The 
history of NICUs speaks to broader contemporary healthcare themes and issues as we ask 
questions about who should receive care and precious healthcare resources.  
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Chapter 1: 
 
Nursing as a part of the Technological System of Neonatal Intensive Care: 
Introduction, theoretical framework, and review of literature 
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Nursing as a part of the Technological System of Neonatal Intensive Care 
 Leigh weighed 960 grams at birth. Born prematurely, she spent the first three 
months of her life in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). She was placed on a 
ventilator and given intravenous fluids and medications. Machines to monitor her heart 
rate and blood oxygen levels were attached to probes placed on her skin in addition to a 
probe that measured her skin temperature. She was fed through a tube placed into her 
stomach. Nurses took her vital signs, including heart rate, respiratory rate, and blood 
pressures every few hours. The isolette that provided the warm and slightly humid 
environment she needed was carefully monitored by the physicians and nurses who 
worked in the NICU. Her mother remembered: “We were taken to the neonatal intensive 
care unit to see our little girl. She was so tiny and hooked up to a lot of machines – 
frightening in a way but at least we got to touch her….Elizabeth (the nurse on duty 
Monday and Tuesday) was great. She explained each tube, medication, and treatment.”1 
The nurses played a crucial role in the way this infant’s family experienced and 
remembered their experience with the NICU. Neonatal intensive care units, as Leigh’s 
mother remembered, can be incredibly complex and intimidating places where machines 
can seem to dominate and good nursing care of the patient is directly associated with 
tubes, medications, and treatments.  
 Babies, like Leigh, required intensely complex systems of care to survive the 
effects of prematurity, but they also required nurses who had the skills and knowledge to 
expertly observe, navigate highly technological medical environments, and incorporate a 
                                                            
1 Carol Ralston. Diary kept by the author: September-October 1984. (unpublished manuscript in the 
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plethora of tools and technologies in the process of delivering care to patients and their 
families. Though the development of neonatal intensive care involved a constantly 
evolving network, nurses practiced at the bedside made this increasingly complex system 
work for their patients through their unique role in patient care. Nurses monitored the 
patients, knew when some method of treatment did or did not work, communicated with 
other healthcare providers, and when necessary improvised oversized equipment to fit 
their small patients. Historians must examine how nurses practiced and delivered care 
between 1955 and 1982, during the transition from premature infant units into the early 
years of the neonatal intensive care units. The story of the development of the NICU and 
care delivered there challenges us to better understand how clinicians, specifically nurses, 
participated in the dynamically changing system of care and provided critical skills that 
made these systems work. This analysis will also inform our appreciation of the intended 
and unintended consequences of these systems and the complex decisions and outcomes 
involved. 
 Premature infants have been clustered together in premature infant units in 
hospitals since the 1920s, but it was not until the 1960s that hospitals transitioned from 
these premature infant units to NICUs; these new NICUs served as reorganized spaces 
where hospitals grouped together critically ill newborns to receive very specific care 
unique to their medical, nursing, and developmental needs. The push for better surgical 
treatments and care of newborn congenital conditions as well as better understanding of 
newborn medical problems meant a growing number of sick newborns needed a place to 
receive the intensive care premature infants had been privileged to receive for decades. 
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 Premature infants, grouped together generally by gestational age or weight, 
formed the dominant patient populations in the early premature infant units; NICUs 
patient populations included a broader cadre of sick neonates born both prematurely and 
full term in need of medical and surgical care.2 NICUs incorporated a framework of 
intensive nursing care previously seen in premature infant care that incorporated 
increasingly complex and new medical equipment, treatments and procedures for 
different populations.3 Hospitals formed neonatal intensive care units as the need for a 
special group of nurses to care for these increasingly complex babies, to understand and 
better treat dominant causes of infant mortality, and attempts to allocate resources for 
critically ill newborns merged. 
 These units reflected a growing need for hospitals and healthcare providers to 
medically define an increasingly vulnerable patient population, a strong desire to 
decrease infant mortality within a post-war social context that valued children as central 
to the American dream4 as the new norm, and a growing fascination fueled by a vastly 
                                                            
2 While this statement is true speaking broadly of NICUs, each hospital and unit did have its own patient 
makeup influenced by a number of factors including community needs and resources, whether or 
not the hospital had a surgical team on site, and the personalities and strengths of the hospital 
administration, physicians, and nurses involved in the unit.  
3 I recognize that while broader impacts on children’s health absolutely affected the changing nature of the 
need to address infant mortality and the creative ways healthcare workers and activists sought to 
do so. Many things tangentially impacted newborn medicine – the story is complicated! New 
funding streams for hospitals in the post-war era, the baby boom that many scholars argue 
influenced the post-war “child-centered” society, and the creating of medical subspecialties all 
impacted newborn medicine and the developments of units where sick newborns received care. I 
will speak more to this in chapter 2. For now, I will seek to formulate a framework that, while 
taking children’s healthcare into account, will situate neonates and the nurses that cared for them 
in particular times and places as forms of technology.  
4 Elaine Tyler May. Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 2008).; Steven Mintz. Huck’s Raft: A History of American Childhood (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).  
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expanding post-war technological boom that included new and more complex medical 
equipment.5 Analysis of the story of neonatal intensive care units in the United States is 
important to consider as we continue to face many similar themes today: vulnerable 
patient populations, increasingly sick patients, and questions concerning limited resource 
allocation relating to finances, space, and healthcare workforce. In order to fully 
understand the story, we must understand the role nurses played as they practiced at the 
bedside with a changing scenario of medical therapeutics, public expectations and the 
reality of resource allocation; this story is not told in current scholarly literature. We must 
ask these questions as this analysis will form and influence how we think about current 
issues in healthcare today.  
 
I raise three particular questions:  
1. What was the particular social, medical and nursing context that supported the 
transition from premature infant units to the establishment and development of 
neonatal intensive care units?  
2. What needs did these NICUs meet that necessitated the establishment of 
intensive care particularly for neonates? 
3. What role did nurses play in the formation and shaping of the NICUs, the 
                                                            
5 William Silverman. Retrolental Fibroplasia: A Modern Parable (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1980).; 
Thomas Cone. History of the Care and Feeding of the Premature Infant (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1985).; Murdina MacFarquhar Desmond. Newborn Medicine and Society: 
European Background and American Practice (1750-1975) (Austin: Eakin Press, 1998). 
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services and care provided there, and their subsequent early development?   
 
 In this study I analyze historical data that sits at the intersection of the history of 
nursing, the history of children’s health particularly as it played out for neonates, and the 
history of technology. By examining the NICU and considering the neonatal population 
specifically through the lenses of a history of technology and nursing, I am able to ask 
broader questions in relation to technology and care, how systems of care develop for 
particular populations and how nurses play a role in the success and failure of 
technologies and methods of healthcare delivery; but this story is about more than what 
worked and what did not, but looks to the underlying political, economic, and cultural 
context in which decisions about care for particular populations are made.  
 The historical story will explore how nurses contributed to the development of 
technological systems in particular times and places. The Institute of Medicine’s report 
on the Future of Nursing emphasizes the need to analyze the ways in which technologies 
are implemented by nursing staff in patient care, and the processes by which those 
technologies are tested, developed, and adopted into practice.6 To adequately address 
these research recommendations as we move forward, historical analysis is a critical path 
                                                            
6 Committee on the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Initiative on the Future of Nursing, at the Institute of 
Medicine, Institute of Medicine. "7 Recommendations and Research Priorities." The Future of 
Nursing: Leading Change, Advancing Health. (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 
2011), 275: Specifically, the recommendations include research that addresses: 1. Identification 
and testing of new and existing technologies intended to support nurses’ decision making and care 
delivery. 2. Capture of the costs and benefits of a range of care technologies intended to support 
nurses’ decision making and care delivery.  3. Identification of the contributions of various health 
professionals to the design and development, purchase, implementation, and evaluation of devices 
and information technology products. 
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for understanding how nurses have been involved in the adoption, standardization, and 
use of technologies across time and place. This historical work challenges us, within the 
context of current clinical research priorities, to think about the ways in which nurses are 
involved/situated in the development of healthcare systems in the United States today, 
and how the systems, in turn, shape our understanding of the use of technology as well as 
the value of those whose lives depend upon it. 
For the purposes of this study, and to provide clarity for why technology is an 
important lens, I consider technology to be more than a particular machine, but will use a 
broader systems approach; I consider technology to be the system of both object and user 
as well as the social, cultural, and political influences that converge to produce a 
particular result.7 With this framework, I propose the neonatal intensive care unit as a 
technology system, even a technology itself, in which the nurse, the machines and tools 
she used, as well as the medical environment, resources, social values, and cultural 
approach to newborn care are components of the user context. 
I begin by using the comparative analysis of two specific hospital case studies, the 
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia and the Children’s Hospital of Boston. These 
hospitals are two of the major children’s hospitals in the northeast that formed NICUs to 
meet particular needs of newborn care. The political and social environments in which 
each hospital established its unit will allow for a nuanced study of why units and spaces 
are created for particular patient populations. The unit at the Children’s Hospital of 
                                                            
7 This framework will be further outlined and presented later in this chapter to clarify my approach to 
technology and the scholarship that influenced this framework. Please see later chapter section: 
“Technology, Neonates, and Nursing History: An analytical approach.”  
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Philadelphia was established with state and federal grant money specifically for the study 
of neonatal surgical care. Thus, this unit had a post-operative surgical focus spearheaded 
by influential surgeon and former Surgeon General C.E. Koop. Boston’s unit was more 
focused on a medical patient population that arose out of traditional premature infant care 
and institutional funding rather than federally funding.8 By choosing these two places that 
have many similarities and discontinuities, we see how politics, hospital culture and 
specific personalities played roles in the development of these units. Each had a unique 
medical, cultural and political flavor that was revealed in how neonatal therapeutics 
developed within each institution.9 
My study will include the time frame of 1955 to 1982.  By beginning in 1955, I 
will capture the transition from the premature infant units to neonatal intensive care units. 
An analysis of this transition is critical because it will broadly illustrate the development 
of a subspecialty as it related to a particular patient population. This time frame will also 
shed light on how care delivered in NICUs was differentiated into a particularized 
specialty that met the needs of critically ill newborns during this time. My time period of 
interest ends in 1982, when both local and national media began to grapple with cases 
such as Baby Doe as they raised ethical questions concerning the consequences – both 
positive as well as unintended – of the care developed in NICUs and the social 
                                                            
8 These two units were early units, and I acknowledge that units opened across the country during this time 
period and existed with unique and nuanced contexts. These two units share many similarities that 
allow for a starting point in my research. My future research trajectory, and one I hope to 
contribute to establishing for other scholars, will involve understanding how these units formed in 
the South, in rural areas of the country, and on the West coast.   
9 Historians must also go where the records are kept, and as two very large institutions with significant 
pasts both had archives with rich data.  
 
 
	  
9	  
expectations that accompanied progressions in such technology.10, 11 During this time 
period, major challenges and issues in neonatal medicine prompted debates about the 
development and use of technology.12 National organizations related to neonatal nursing 
and medical care also emerged in the 1980s and reflected a progression and shift in 
neonatal medicine beyond the scope of this work. 
Technology, Neonates, and Nursing History: An analytical approach 
 
 To properly examine the role nurses played in the development of neonatal 
intensive care units, data analysis must occur at the point where the lenses of the history 
of nursing and the history of technology intersect with a particular focus on the neonatal 
patient population. In this analysis, technology is more than just a machine, but framed as 
a complex system encompassing tools and the people who use them, and also the social, 
political, economic, racial, and gendered context in which the worker uses the tool.13 A 
                                                            
10 The surgeon general at the time, C. E. Koop, condemned the failure to treat a newborn infant with 
Down’s syndrome in this case. The case prompted legislation that was passed in 1984, known as 
the Baby Doe Law that dictates specific criteria and guidelines for the treatment of seriously ill 
newborns.  
11 C. Everett Koop, Koop: The Memoirs of America’s Family Doctor (New York: Harper Collins, 1993).;  
n.a., “Charges Weighed for Parents Who Let Baby Die Untreated.” The New York Times. New 
York, April 17, 1982, sec. 1: Baby Doe was a baby born in Bloomington, Indiana in 1982 with 
Down’s Syndrome, esophageal atresia and a tracheoespohageal fistula. The latter two conditions 
could be fixed via surgery that was withheld due to the judgment that the quality of life for an 
infant with Down’s Syndrome did not warrant the correction of the life threatening congenital 
conditions. Without the surgery, the infant died. The case eventually reached governmental 
officials, particularly the Surgeon General at the time, C.E. Koop, and began national debate over 
withholding lifesaving interventions and who could make those decisions. The case and 
subsequent legislation is still controversial today.  
12 Though I acknowledge these aspects as consistently present throughout the 20th century as well as being 
vital to any consideration of neonatal critical care, they are beyond the scope of this work.  
13 The scholarly literature in the history of technology uses multiple words to label the tools that people use. 
For the purposes of this proposal, and for clarity, I will consistently use the terms tool and 
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system is more complex than just the tool; we must ask questions of the social and 
political influences that have an impact on why a worker/user makes decisions regarding 
the tools he or she uses. This approach is derived from the secondary literature (addressed 
below) in the history of technology, and offers a broader analysis beyond the machine 
and user to understand wider socio-medical implications regarding the formation of 
neonatal intensive care units and ultimately healthcare and nursing practice.  
Technology and Technological Systems 
 
 When we speak of technology, we find ourselves faced with complex and diverse 
understandings of the concept. Newspapers such as The New York Times include sections 
on technology, and typically conceptualize it as machines and tools humans use such as 
smartphones, computer software, and online social media sites.14  We use technological 
terms to describe human characteristics when we describe friends, coworkers, and 
colleagues - ‘She’s hardwired that way!’ Companies sell phones, cars, refrigerators, and 
even clothing to us based on the unique technological qualities of each. Even scholars 
vary in their nuanced approaches to the definitions and conceptualizations of what the 
term ‘technology’ might mean and imply. 
 So how then do we approach technology? What exactly does it mean for 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
equipment when referencing the various tools that clinicians used in the healthcare setting. I 
understand the concept is much broader and the term potentially limiting, but necessary for 
consistency and flow for my audience.  
14 For an example of this, simply go to the NewYorkTimes.com and find their section devoted to 
“Technology.” I do not mean to deeply analyze or reflect broader considerations of this 
categorization, nor do I suggest I have broken down their meaning of the word, but a quick scan of 
the headlines here is pause for thought.  
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technology to be developed, changed, adopted, and used within societies and within 
particular contexts? Historians of technology Weibe Bijker and John Law postulate, “Our 
technologies mirror our societies. They reproduce and embody the complex interplay of 
professional, technical, economic, and political factors.”15 Technology must not be 
reduced to the artifact itself for it is always bound up in decisions; political, economic, 
aesthetic, and theoretic decisions all impact why some artifacts become stable parts of 
systems and others do not. In other words, technologies are shaped. The artifacts, as 
much as the professional, economic, technical, and political contexts in which they are a 
part, are the product of the decisions humans make for an infinite number of reasons. 
Thus, to study the social history of a technology is to use the history of technology as a 
lens to study why humans organize societies the ways they do. In order to do this, 
decisions must be made to focus on particular key players (for example human actors as 
well as contextual factors) in the story and we must be open to who those players might 
be.16  
 Historians of technology Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor Pinch 
instituted a layered understanding of the conceptualization of technology that is rooted in 
                                                            
15 Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law, eds., Shaping Technology / Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical 
Change (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 3. 
16 Wiebe E Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological 
Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1989); Ibid. Bijker and Law, eds. Shaping Technology; Donald MacKenzie and Judy 
Wajcman, eds., The Social Shaping of Technology, (New York: McGraw Hill Education/Open 
University, 1999). 
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contextual and social constructions of meaning.17 They began with the physical object or 
artifact but built on the mere tool by recognizing the process of using a tool to create 
something within social contexts. The tool requires knowledge regarding how to use it 
and for what purpose. The user also utilizes the tool within a system of many tools and 
ways of adopting and making decisions regarding the use of tools.18 Historian Thomas 
Hughes suggested technology might also be understood broadly as both artifact and icon. 
Its tangible characteristics symbolize larger constructs of social value and creativity.19 He 
argued that we must understand it appropriately in a multifaceted way, and within the 
context of the people and societies that shape and use it.20 
As historian of technology Ruth Cowan suggested, this analysis can be very 
complicated. Many different actors can be part of the process of technological 
development and they can change over time.21 Each actor may even enter the process at 
multiple points under different guises. This complication led her to suggest that the 
historian view any study of technology from the vantage point of the user as a consumer 
                                                            
17 Ibid. Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems. Bijker, Hughes, 
and Pinch are social historians of technology and each in his own right have written extensively on 
the understanding of technology within the context of the societies and cultures that shaped it. 
These authors collectively argued that technology was not an external source that exerts power to 
shape people, but that technology is socially shaped by humans who participate in decisions based 
on politics, economics, and culture.   
18 Ibid. Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems.  
19 Thomas P. Hughes, Human-Built World: How to Think About Technology and Culture (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
20 Ruth Schwartz Cowan, A Social History of American Technology (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997). 
21 Ruth Schwartz Cowan, “The Consumption Junction: A Proposal for Research Strategies in the Sociology 
of Technology,” in The Social Construction of Technological Systems, ed. Wiebe Bijker, Thomas 
Hughes and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), 261–280. 
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– at what she labeled the consumption junction.22 But she was also careful to remind her 
readers that within this multitude of possible actors, there may be important actors that 
are silent and not obvious in the current consideration. The nurse, as an actor who is 
generally overlooked in the secondary literature regarding the development of neonatal 
intensive care units between 1955 and 1982, is a non-obvious user that we must consider 
at the consumption junction where decisions about technology use are made. As Cowan 
specified, the user can be present at multiple points in the process of technological 
innovation, adoption, and change and this allows us to consider the nurse not only as a 
user of the tools but also as a developer of the systems in which those tools were used.23   
Historian of technology Harry Braverman urged other historians to consider that 
“the technical is never considered purely in its internal relations, but in relation to the 
worker.”24 Braverman used the model of machinery within a capitalist mode of 
production that centralizes on the creation of a static product by a labor force. Insofar as a 
                                                            
22 The consumption junction is the point at which a user, in this case a consumer, interacts with a piece of 
technology. She asserts that the process of contextualizing a piece of technology can be a very 
complicated process. Many people are involved in a complex matrix of decisions. Her model, the 
consumption junction, allows for a focal point around which to understand how to build the 
system that contextualizes a piece of technology by focusing on the consumer and decisions that 
are made at the point of use. She gives the example of the development of the stove and how 
innovations in home building and social expectations of use affected the stove as people invented, 
innovated, and used the object in everyday life. By focusing on how the stove was used by 
consumers, she addresses the system from a particular vantage point.  
23 Nurses develop the systems in which tools are used, but they also developed the tools. They changed the 
tools to meet their own goals and needs, both developing the machines to work together in patient 
care as well as making the machines workable within the larger hospital and medical 
environments. See: Kathleen Burke. “Trial and Negotiation in a Technological System: Case 
Study of the Swan-Ganz Catheter,” in Nursing as Evidence: Nursing Interventions Through Time, 
eds. Pat D’Antonio and Sandra Lewenson (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 2011), 139–
149. 
24 Harry Braverman. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century 
(New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1998), 186. 
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historian might consider technology to have a social role, that historian must carefully 
consider the labor force that includes the worker. Braverman’s ideas about applying the 
same notions to professional work as to factory work make sense in healthcare settings, 
though differ from his model in key areas. For the purposes of my work, I will consider 
Braverman’s “production system of linked machines to be conceived and redesigned as a 
single, massive, integrated whole” to be a system of machines and tools used in intensive 
care to be integrated into a single, massive, integrated intensive care unit.25 The nurse 
works within this integrated technology, the unit itself, and both physically uses the 
artifacts as well as contributes to the function and development of the technological 
system known as the neonatal intensive care unit.26  
Nurses and the Social Construction of Technological Systems 
 
 Nurses are key actors in the understanding of healthcare and technology because 
they not only use the technologies but are also developers of the systems in which they 
                                                            
25 Ibid. Braverman. Labor and Monopoly Capital. 192. 
26 Braverman made the assumption that the machines are used in a continuous categorical process, namely 
assembly lines, to produce consistent and static objects in large quantities. Braverman’s concept 
fails to transfer to the nursing model in healthcare when we examine differences in the nature of 
the systems. Care within the hospital does not follow the model of an automated plant; the 
products, or end goals, may not always be the same in each situation when a machine is used in 
patient care. In the capitalist mode of production, the ability to guide the machine from an external 
source broadens the possibilities of its use; but there is no way to create a parallel in the ways in 
which clinicians externally guide the machines in an environment to respond to the infinite 
number of human malfunctions and changing dynamics that occur in any moment during any 
given disease process when transferring this model to the healthcare setting. For example, if our 
goal is to keep the patient breathing, we use ventilators to mechanically ventilate the patient. 
Taken to the extreme we could sacrifice other organ functions such as cardiac output for 
respiratory ventilation. If a system is so complexly dynamic, then the workers in the system must 
retain the flexibility to give up certain skills to acquire new ones to achieve dynamically changing 
goals and meet socially shifting standards of care.   
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and others use the tools. When considering the development of healthcare delivery and 
the spaces in which that care is delivered, there are multiple approaches to placing the 
nurse within the understanding of the broader context of the story.  The discourse 
between historians of nursing Margarete Sandelowski and Julie Fairman provides a point 
of reference to begin questioning how nurses might be considered actors in the social 
construction of technology. One way to frame the nurse as an actor is to understand her 
within the nurse-machine dyad. Sandelowski argued that nurses used technology and 
made decisions regarding its adoption and adaptation. 27, 28 The nurse-technology dyad 
focuses on the nurse’s use of tools. Sandelowski defined technology as the “use of 
material objects to achieve human ends.”29 Like David Edgerton, she framed her 
approach to technology as the consideration of the everyday use of seemingly mundane 
things.30 For Edgerton, the consideration of technology as ‘thing’ avoids the 
consideration of technology as an independent force and refutes the idea of technological 
determinism.31 Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, Cowan, and Fairman are correct that this idea is 
                                                            
27 Margaret Sandelowski, “‘Making the Best of Things’: Technology in American Nursing 1870-1940,” 
Nursing History Review 5 (1997): 3–22; Margaret Sandelowski, Devices and Desires: Gender, 
Technology, and American Nursing (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2000). 
28 I also believe that parents and family are part of the technological and social system for newborn care, 
but the history of parental influence and participation (or lack thereof) is beyond the scope of this 
work. Perhaps this would be a fascinating paper for my near future work as it is important to any 
trajectory of historical understanding of newborn infant care.  
29 Ibid. Sandelowski, Making the Best of Things, 4. 
30 David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
31 For more in depth analysis of this concept, see Ruth Schwartz Cowan. “In the beginning.” A Social 
History of American Technology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).; and Ruth Schwartz 
Cowan, “An Introduction: Housework and it’s tools,” More Work For Mother: The Ironies Of 
 
 
	  
16	  
too reductionist to appropriately examine technology historically; the relationships that 
societies have with their technologies is a dynamic relationship in which people make 
decisions regarding the use of technologies and are in turn affected by the technologies 
they use. The street runs both ways. 
 Nurses should be considered key actors and Sandelowski correctly placed them as 
users of tools in the historical study of medical technology; the relationship between 
nursing and the artifacts they used to care for patients was dynamic. A simple tool did not 
mean a simple way of performing a task with that tool; nurses adapted and creatively 
used the tools at their disposal. But Sandelowski’s model was limited in its scope and, 
through its own assumptions, undermined the creativity and ingenuity she ultimately 
credited nurses with practicing. Her understanding of a user with only a limited tacit 
relationship to her tools did not fully engage the layered understanding Bijker, Hughes, 
Pinch, and Cowan formulated where the tool and user function within a system and 
broader context.32 By limiting technological consideration to a nurse and the artifact, 
Sandelowski lacked a multifaceted approach to the way nurses used and developed tools. 
This approach failed to allow for exploration of social construction of technologies, the 
consideration of the technological systems in which an artifact is a part, and the 
possibility that nurses might use technologies to assert autonomy within a changing 
socio-medical environment.33 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Household Technology From The Open Hearth To The Microwave (New York: Basic Books, 
1985). 
32 Ibid. Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems. 
33 Ibid. Sandelowski, Devices and Desires, 28-30.  
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 In contrast to Sandelowski’s focus on the functionality of the tools nurses use, 
Fairman took a much broader approach to the consideration of the nurse-technology 
relationship.34 Fairman agreed that nurses were users of artifacts, but she took 
Sandelowski’s model one step further by asserting that, as users, the nurses had an impact 
on the systems where they used their tools; thus in this way, the nurses became 
developers of the systems. Fairman’s approach allowed for more complex questions and 
investigation of nursing relationships to technology.  She encouraged the exploration of 
context focusing on the social construction of technologies and the multiple processes 
that converge to understand why some technologies become stable parts of systems while 
others do not. Fairman also suggested historians incorporate nurses into the 
understanding of the development of the current technologically oriented system of 
healthcare.  According to Fairman, technology must be defined within the systems 
approach. Technology is, at its simplest conception, a tool; but it also must be understood 
as part of “a political, social, and economic process, influenced by gender, and 
encompassing more than the individual nurse and a particular machine.” 35  
 Ruth Cowan’s analysis of household work demonstrated this idea well when she 
assumed the need for contextualization in her analysis of the adoption of the household 
utility system of indoor plumbing.36 The system itself was made up of more than just 
running water, or a toilet, or even an indoor tub. Communities and their decisions 
                                                            
34 Julie Fairman. “Alternative Visions: The Nurse-Technology Relationship in the Context of the History of 
Technology,” Nursing History Review. 6. (1998): 129–46. 
35 Ibid. Fairman, Alternative Views, 131. 
36 Ibid. Cowan, More Work For Mother. 85-89.  
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regarding the construction of houses, the development of sewer systems, the production 
of sanitary fixtures, and the implementation of indoor plumbing inside the home required 
social changes on a vast scale beyond the mere addition of one or two new ‘bathroom 
tools.’ The understanding of technologies must acknowledge a complex matrix of 
relationships are foundational to their definition – economic relationships, interpersonal 
power relationships, political relationships, and ultimately the decisions bound up in 
these relationships. Ethnographer and philosopher Annemarie Mol concisely stated this 
point in her discussion of the analysis of symbolic interactionism in the social 
interpretation of events. Like sociologists who analyze symbolic interactionism, 
historians must “show that the thing doesn’t exist by itself, but depends on something 
else…your object doesn’t rest on sure foundations...”37 but on the complex relationships 
and decisions that are made around it.  
In his examination of cardiac pacing, historian and cardiologist Jeffrey Kirk 
reminded us that the development of this technology was about the process of pacing the 
heart rather than on about the pacemaker itself. He focused on the tool only within an 
understanding of what it could do for the patient when applied within knowledge and 
social systems such as medical device manufacturing, governmental policies, and medical 
understanding of cardiac disease and dysrhythmia.38 For Kirk, the study of pacemaker 
                                                            
37 Annemarie Mol and Jessica Mesman, “Neonatal Food and the Politics of Theory: Some Questions of 
Method,” Social Studies of Science. 26 (1996): 419–444.; Although Mol’s assertion applies 
specifically to symbolic interactionism rather than historical analysis, her comment is a poignant 
one worthy of application in the understanding of a social history technology.   
38 Jeffrey Kirk, “Pacing the Heart: Growth and Redefinition of a Medical Technology, 1952-1975,” Society 
for the History of Technology 36, (1995): 583–624. 
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technology required a broad approach in which to consider how the tool was developed, 
introduced for use, given social meaning, and eventually emerged as the pivotal tool in 
the subspecialty of cardiac pacing. In order to approach such a broad consideration, Kirk 
contextualized the physicians’ and surgeons’ decisions within the definitions of cardiac 
diseases and the value of pharmacologic and electric treatment modalities that influenced 
the process of pacing and ultimately the tool itself. By broadening his study of the 
pacemaker within the study of a process of pacing, he addressed a complex group of 
users and the ways their decisions converged to influence the development of the artifact.  
 By contrasting how the United States and France used incubators in the care of 
premature infants between 1880 and 1922, physician and historian Jeffrey Baker aptly 
showed how two medical and social cultures interpreted the same machine and made 
decisions about its development and use based on their own cultural assumptions and 
medical approaches to treatment. 39  He did not address how nurses specifically used the 
machines or were involved in their development, but he framed the physicians as the 
leading users and decision makers in this technological development. Based on their 
medical assessments of premature infants, French obstetricians developed the machine to 
prevent fatal hypothermia. In the United States pediatricians were the dominant physician 
group making decisions about these machines and their use in caring for premature 
infants in the United States. Based on their own medical and social values, American 
pediatricians, together with nurses, used the incubator to treat hypothermia in premature 
                                                            
39 Jeffrey Baker, The Machine in the Nursery: Incubator Technology and the Origins of Newborn Intensive 
Care (Baltimore, MA: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
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infants who were brought to them after delivery and already suffering from severely low 
body temperatures. The American pediatricians used the machine as a treatment device 
rather than a prophylactic tool and did not have the same successes their French 
counterparts did and thus the incubator fell out of favor in American medical circles for a 
time.40  
 Baker argued that medical values combined with social approaches to newborn 
infant care resulted in differing uses of the machines, and thus, though the two countries 
used the machines with the same patient population and the same goal of saving lives, 
their uses produced different results which in turn affected how they valued the machine 
and continued to use it. By addressing the social, medical, and political contexts that 
influenced the use of the incubator within each culture, Baker demonstrated the 
complexity and interpretive flexibility we should apply when studying the history of 
technology.  
Baker did not directly address the nurse’s role in his analysis, but hints at the 
nurse’s importance in the conclusion to his work.  He briefly implied the nurse might not 
necessarily have been at odds with the machine. He stated, “Nurses consolidated control 
of the premature infant nursery. Their rise to power within this institution was notable,” 
and he proceeded to suggest further research needs to be done.41 While his work is an 
important example of the ways historians may analyze technologies and their change over 
time, he limited his actors to the masculine physicians, and thus indirectly institutes a 
                                                            
40 Ibid. Baker, The Machine in the Nursery. 50-4, 150-1.  
41 Ibid. Baker, The Machine in the Nursery.  180.  
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gendered approach in his work. Ultimately, the social construction of the technology 
centers on the connection between technology and its user that is also affected by 
gendered, racial, and class based understandings of who used the tool. Baker seemed to 
suggest it was men who used the incubators and does not address the female nurses who 
cared for the infants. If we are to write nurses into the history of technology and the 
system of neonatal intensive care, what role should they play?42 
Medical historian Charles Rosenberg argued that nurses made the hospitals and 
medical practices possible, but historians and nurses Julie Fairman and Pat D’Antonio 
took Rosenberg’s conclusions one step farther. They argued nursing should not be a 
subset of medical history but a lens in and of itself; by using nursing as a lens, historians 
can shed new light on “personal, political, public, and private activities that constitute 
medical experiences.”43 For D’Antonio and Fairman, examining history by considering 
nurses as key participants in systems of care provides a different story. This lens allows 
for the possibility of patient experience as critical to the narrative, the consideration of 
what it took to make new technologies work for the patients, and keeps what D’Antonio 
and Fairman call the ‘human element’ part of the story.44 By telling the story of the 
development of NICUs from the point of intersection of the history of nursing, 
                                                            
42 For the purposes of this proposal, I will use the female pronoun for flow. This decision was made due to 
the dominantly female nursing presence in the early care of premature infants. This does not 
suggest or argue that men were not involved, but acknowledges the feminine presence and 
gendered incidence and consideration in the current secondary literature.   
43 Julie Fairman and Patricia D’Antonio. “Reimagining Nursing’s Place in the History of Clinical Practice,” 
Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 63, no 4 (2008): 2.  
44 Ibid. Fairman and D’Antonio. Reimagining Nursing’s Place. 5.  
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technology, and children’s healthcare, a different story – perhaps a previously untold 
story – might unfold.  
Pediatrics and Age as an Analytical Lens 
 
 In this study I will place age as an important lens of analysis. Historians 
Alexandra Minna and Howard Markel suggest “whether revered or reviled, those who 
have provided medical care to children have always been involved in social, political, and 
cultural questions beyond the domain of the sickbed, clinic, and hospital.”45 For Stern and 
Markel, the history of children is a means to examine American society and analyze 
broader social and cultural concepts, institutions, and medical advances; thus age must be 
a lens by which we engage the historical data. 
 Historians Cynthia Connolly, Janet Golden, and Benjamin Schneider argued that 
we must differentiate between adult and pediatric medical history to adequately analyze 
changes in the development and delivery of healthcare over time. These authors 
examined the introduction of sulfonamides using Syndenham Hospital as a case study to 
illustrate how the development of pharmaceutical sulfa drugs affected children’s 
healthcare. They argued that the development and provision of treatment for 
                                                            
45 Alexandra Stern and Howard Markel, eds. Formative Years: Children’s Health in the United States 
1880-2000 (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2004). 
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meningococcal meningitis and bacterial pneumonia included challenges to both 
physicians and nurses that were unique to the patient populations they served.46 
 Their analysis challenged the assumption that nurses worked the same way with 
different patient populations, were involved in the same ways with the development of 
systems of care, and played the same rolls across healthcare populations. Julie Fairman 
and Joan Lynaugh thoroughly demonstrated an analysis of the ways in which nurses 
actively participated in the development of the technological systems of intensive care, 
but they focused on analysis on nurses who cared for adult populations. 47 In my work, I 
will consider age as an analytical lens through which I might discover the ways in which 
nurses who worked with pediatric patients, specifically with the neonatal patient 
population, might have faced unique challenges in their involvement of technological 
systems to care for their patients. This will challenge the current literature to think about 
nurses and technological systems more specifically, as my work will focus on ways in 
which nurses work with particular patient populations categorized by age.  
 In her work A Sound Mind for the Child’s Body: The mental health of children 
and youth, Kathleen Jones used the history of children’s healthcare as a way to examine 
how society viewed mental health, structured a system to deliver care to mental health 
                                                            
46 Cynthia Connolly, Janet Golden, and Benjamin Schneider. “‘A Startling New Chemotherapeutic Agent’: 
Pediatric Infectious Disease and the Introduction of Sulfonamides at Baltimore’s Syndenham 
Hospital,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 86 (2012): 66–93. 
47 Julie Fairman and Joan Lynaugh. Critical Care Nursing: A History (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1998). 
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patients, and how we define and place value on particular diseases. 48 Jones used age as a 
lens to show how social and medical definitions of mental illness were a product of 
culture in particular times and places. By looking specifically at children, she argued that 
we know more about children’s minds and their emotional needs now than we did in the 
past and that we often fail to consider how our social structures and cultural values affect 
our definitions of mental disorders in children. Jones could only make the claims she did 
by examining children as a particular patient population and recognizing how children, 
their health, and their history might be different from their adult counterparts; this type of 
analysis broadens the kinds of questions we can ask of the data and gives us a better 
picture of the unique ways care is delivered to particular patient populations. 
 Historian Heather Munro Prescott gave a window into historical analysis of 
healthcare delivery to a particular population in her work on the history of adolescent 
medicine.49 Prescott argued that the history and sociology of adolescent medicine as a 
specialty reflected its parent specialty, pediatrics. The existence of adolescent medicine 
as a specialty devoted to an age group, rather than a medical disease process or particular 
technology, set it apart with a low degree of ‘functional autonomy’ insofar as it existed 
without encroachment on or by other medical specialties. She analyzed the changing 
approaches to adolescents as an age group and the subsequent orientations and growth of 
adolescent medicine reflected changing perceptions about adolescents throughout the 20th 
                                                            
48 Kathleen Jones. “A Sound Mind for the Child’s Body: The Mental Health of Children and Youth,” in 
Children and Youth: In Sickness and in Health; A Historical Handbook and Guide, (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 2004). 43-65. 
49 Heather Munro Prescott. A Doctor of Their Own: The History of Adolescent Medicine (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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century. Prescott demonstrated how adolescent medicine has been and continues to be 
shaped by adult attitudes toward adolescents and the roles they play in American 
society.50 Her recognition of the unique qualities of age-related sub-specialization within 
pediatrics allowed for much more nuanced analysis of particular healthcare and social 
trends. As historians move forward with studying children’s healthcare, these kinds of 
nuances and more complex understandings of precisely who we are talking about when 
we use terminology related to childhood need to be applied.  
 I propose to center my work considering age an important aspect to my data 
analysis.  While Connolly, Markel and Stern, and Jones made an excellent case for the 
need to consider children as an analytical category to approach differentiating age groups, 
they group all children together without acknowledging the ways that children might be 
broken down into more nuanced groups. We should consider our analysis of infants the 
same ways Prescott considers adolescents. In what ways might these age groups, both 
pediatric subsets, be similar, and in what ways might our analysis of these groups need to 
differ? Historians such as Martin Pernick and Elizabeth Ann Reedy, who write about 
infants exclusively, did not contextualize the patient populations within the larger context 
of pediatric history in the same ways other historians who deal with children do. Their 
method may be for much more complex reasons than simply age, but does suggests that 
analysis of newborns historically may require the same kind of unique considerations that 
historians of children argue differentiate histories of adults versus children. Newborns, or 
neonates, are considered to be children in many ways and broadly speaking, but they do 
                                                            
50 Ibid. Prescott. A Doctor of Their Own.   
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differ drastically from their older counterparts.51 As both the data and scholarly literature 
delineate the newborn from the general pediatric population, my work will take into 
account how this separation might be important considering them as overlapping, but in 
some cases distinct, categories. Thus, my work will not necessarily provide a complete 
context of the neonatal population within the broader history of pediatrics, but I will 
position my analysis to a certain extent in relation to the nuanced ways newborns 
benefitted from broader trends in children’s healthcare but remained unique.52  
Literature Review of the Histories of Neonatal Intensive Care 
 
 Historians of nursing focus on the ways in which nurses adapted and negotiated 
their roles and skills within the changing environments of hospitals and healthcare in the 
United States. Julie Fairman and Joan Lynaugh argued that nurses adopted new 
knowledge and technologies into their practice during the development of adult intensive 
care units (ICUs) in the 1950s and 1960s.53 Nurses actively adapted to a changing 
healthcare environment, changes in expectations of ability to address more complex 
                                                            
51 For more on this approach, see:  Martin Pernick. The Black Stork: Eugenics and the Death of 
“Defective” Babies in American Medicine and Motion Pictures Since 1915 (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1996).; Elizabeth A. Reedy, American Babies: Their Life and Times in 
the 20th Century (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007); -------. “Ripe too early: The expansion of hospital 
based premature infant care in the United States, 1922--1950,” PhD Diss., University of 
Pennsylvania, 2000. ProQuest (9965552).  
52 I would like to acknowledge up front that because I dealt with a children’s healthcare lens, I did not take 
into account or include any significant data regarding the history of maternal health or perinatal 
trends. This is a limitation to my work, but a required boundary for the purposes of this project. 
Such work would be absolutely necessary to continue the formation of the history of newborn 
health in the United States particularly if future work extends time frame of analysis into the mid 
1980s.  
53 Ibid. Fairman and Lynaugh. Critical Care Nursing: A History. 
 
 
	  
27	  
needs, and the need for more knowledgeable and skilled clinicians.54 Fairman and 
Lynaugh argued nurses functioned in intensive care units and played a role in the 
definition and form of care they delivered, but Fairman and Lynaugh’s work focused on 
nurses who worked with adult patient populations leaving a gap in the consideration of 
the ways the role of neonatal nurses might have been similar or different to their adult 
counterparts. 
 Physician historians comprise the majority of authors who have written about the 
development of neonatal medicine, intensive care, and the units where it was delivered. 
Some histories generally present the development of newborn intensive care as a 
chronological history while others focus on technological advances and disease 
processes. Thomas Cone who wrote The History of the Care and Feeding of the 
Premature Infant combined the two approaches by breaking down his historical analysis 
into general time periods; he then focused on specific diseases and medical issues as well 
as technological advances predominantly between 1945 and the late 1970s.55 While his 
analysis was broad in scope, he focused on events and machines. Cone ignored the social 
contexts and healthcare providers who played key roles in the development and 
advancement of newborn medicine. While his work is important to understanding an 
overall arch in the trends of what would eventually be labeled neonatal medicine and the 
                                                            
54 Ibid., Fairman and Lynaugh. Critical Care Nursing. 5. 
55 Thomas Cone, History of the Care and Feeding of the Premature Infant (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1985): Thomas Cone was the considered by his professional peer William Silverman to 
be the Dean of Pediatric Historians. In addition to “History of the Care and Feeding of the 
Premature Infant” he also authored “The History of American Pediatrics.” As both a pediatrician 
and writer of history, his work on premature infants is seminal in the field of history of neonatal 
intensive care and one of the early syntheses of newborn and premature infant care.  
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development of intensive care during the 20th century, it did not address the units as 
systems in which decisions were made by individuals within social and medical contexts 
to develop and progress the subspecialty of neonatology.  
 In contrast, historian and physician Murdina Desmond utilized a social history in 
her work Newborn Medicine and Society.56 Her history focused on a similar time period 
as Cone, but she contextualized the development of neonatal intensive care within the 
social trends and cultural frameworks of American society and medicine. She oriented 
her work on the physician as a contributing force in the early units, but did not address 
the nurse in her analysis as a potential actor within a changing healthcare system and 
increasingly technological environments. In one sense she addressed the social context in 
which the neonatal intensive care unit as a system could be examined, but overlooked a 
key factor by omitting the nurses and their role in the stabilization of the unit as a system. 
 Using yet another approach, William Silverman wove a thorough and fascinating 
account of a particular period in the development of neonatal care by focusing on a 
particular disease. He focused on the epidemic of Retrolental Fibroplasia in his work 
Retrolental Fibroplasia: A Modern Parable.57 Silverman showed how the focus on a 
particular disease contributed to a shift in focus on research, changes in medical care, the 
development of clinical trials, the power and autonomy of those who delivered care to 
premature infants, and the organization of units themselves between 1950 and the 1970s. 
                                                            
56 Desmond, Newborn Medicine and Society.  
57 William Silverman, Retrolental Fibroplasia: A Modern Parable (New York, NY: Grune & Stratton, 
1980). 
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He considered the social influences and examined a wide range of decisions that were 
made by many different actors in the process of technological development in respiratory 
care and changes to medical treatment during this time period. Silverman’s approach 
allowed for a complex web of actors, decisions, and possibilities, but he was a physician 
during this time period and consequently his history was physician centric. Though he 
commented occasionally on the presence of nurses, his work did not consider the nurses 
as important specifically to the adoption of technologies and the development of the units 
where newborn critical care developed. He shaped his analysis as a physician who 
participated in the events and his time period of analysis.  
 Authors such as Anne Jorgenson58 and Alistair Philip59 authored articles that 
organized the general information regarding the progression of newborn medicine and the 
development of intensive care for neonates in the United States. While their articles are 
highly informative, they lack a deeper analysis of social trends, examinations of how 
gender, race, and class might have played out in the larger story of neonatal medicine. 
They do not address nursing and the complex and varied decisions and events that might 
be examined through a more historic methodology rather than a clinical timeline 
approach.  
 Physician historians with years of clinical background generally focused on the 
mistakes and and times in which technological developments and orientations to patient 
                                                            
58 Anne Jorgensen, “Born in the USA - The History of Neonatology in the United States: A Century of 
Caring,” NICU Currents 1, no. 1 (June 2010): 8–11. 
59 Alistair Philip, “The Evolution of Neonatology,” Pediatric Research 58, no. 4 (October 2005): 799–815. 
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care proved to do more harm than good. 60 While we currently continue to ask questions 
about how we should use technology and knowledge in patient care, this is a question we 
can specifically ask of neonatal medical history. It is worth discussion, but this approach 
must only be a piece of a larger examination of neonatal history. Authors such as 
historian Alex Robertson and historian and physician Jeffrey Baker published histories 
that focused on the mistakes that have been made and the lessons that need to be learned 
from failures over the past century. They spoke of the ways that technology, such as the 
incubator, was not associated with decreases in infant mortality as anticipated by its 
initial users; Robertson and Baker suggested the possible dangers of changing practice 
guidelines in tandem with advances in technology without understanding the possible 
adverse consequences that might later arise.61  This is an important function of history, 
but fails to acknowledge more holistically the aspects of the system that did work, and 
how we might understand both the ‘errors’ and the successes as we seek to make 
decisions and move forward with neonatal intensive care policy and practice.  
 Robertson authored a series of articles that addressed how approaches to care of 
sick newborns during the 20th changed: the ‘hands-off’ years, the heroic years, and the 
                                                            
60 For examples see: Alex Robertson, “Reflections on Errors in Neonatology III. The ‘Experienced’ Years, 
1970 to 2000,” Journal of Perinatology 23, no. 3 (May 2003): 240–249.; ———. “Reflections on 
Errors in Neonatology: I. The ‘Hands-Off’ Years, 1920 to 1950,” Journal of Perinatology 23, no. 
1 (January 2003): 48–55.; ———. “Reflections on Errors in Neonatology: II. The ‘Heroic’ Years, 
1950 to 1970,” Journal of Perinatology 23, no. 2 (March 2003): 154–161.; Alex Robertson, and 
Jeffrey P. Baker. “Lessons from the Past,” Seminars in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine 10 (2005): 
23–30. 
61 Ibid. Robertson and Baker. Lessons from the Past.: Robertson and Baker oriented this piece toward 
medical errors with a focus on cautioning practitioners against quickly adopting new treatments 
and fluid fluctuations in changing medical protocol in neonatal care. They address randomized 
trials and technology and socially contextualize the thermoregulation and the incubator as well as 
oxygen use throughout the 20th century. 
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experienced years.62 These categorizations seem progressive, but his work highlighted the 
ways newborn medicine experienced unintentional, and perhaps unavoidable, errors that 
were influenced by historical developments in medicine and technology; he suggested 
that the errors are a way of examining unique points in medical history. 
These histories focused on definitive understandings of success and failure and 
ignore the voices of nurses. The experiences of nurses who delivered round-the-clock 
care to the families and their infants provide a glimpse into the NICU story not accessible 
via other lenses. By examining what these nurses did, how they provided care, and the 
roles they played in the process, we can see the relationships between disease process, 
machines, and their broader contexts in different ways. The story of neonatal intensive 
care must be more comprehensive than machines and diseases. It must also encompass 
larger social, political, and economic frameworks. Historical analysis must allow for the 
nurses to be considered key actors in the decisions regarding the formation of the units as 
well as identify them as both individuals and a group of people who had dynamic 
relationships with the technologies, healthcare systems, and ultimately the nursing care 
they delivered to the patients and their families.  
 Perhaps the most relevant literature to the nursing role in the development of 
neonatal intensive care has been written by nursing historian Elizabeth Anne Reedy. Her 
dissertation described the development of premature infant care between 1920 and 1940. 
She persuasively argued that nurses were involved in the use of the machines and 
                                                            
62 Ibid. Robertson. The ‘Experienced’ Years, 1970 to 2000. 240.; ———. The ‘Hands-Off’ Years, 1920 to 
1950. 48.; ——.  The ‘Heroic’ Years, 1950 to 1970. 154.  
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technologies used on premature infant care during this time period and that nurses were 
necessary to the care of the premature infant population as that care developed during the 
early decades of the 20th century. For Reedy nurses participated in theses new premature 
infant units, but she did not include them as influencers of the system themselves. While 
her work took a different angle and time period of focus than I propose, it is important for 
understanding in what ways nurses were involved in the care of premature infants in early 
premature infant units. I will take her research a step further by expanding, not only on 
her approach to the data, but also in the time frame by examining the decades following 
her time period of interest. Her work predates the development of NICUs and, though it 
is groundbreaking, I will show how her argument regarding the importance of nursing in 
the development of premature infant care also holds true beyond her time period of focus. 
The kind of influence nursing had on premature infant units and the development of 
premature infant care extended into the context of the development of the specialty of 
neonatal medicine and neonatal intensive care units in the 1960s and 1970s.63 
 Overall, what these historical analyses lack is a focus on the nurse as an important 
actor in the development of a larger system of acute medical care for the newborn infant, 
or neonatal population.  Many of these authors, physicians who lived through some of the 
time periods of analysis, highlighted the mistakes and failures that occurred in each 
                                                            
63 Elizabeth Reedy, From Weakling to Fighter: Changing the Image of Premature Infants,” Nursing History 
Review 11 (2003): 109–127.; Ibid. Reedy. Ripe too early.; Ibid. Reedy. Infant Incubators Turned 
‘Weaklings’ into ‘Fighters,’ 64a. 
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period.64 Others failed to tie the broader picture together and see how the early years of 
the 20th century provide a very poignant foundation for the care that developed in the 
1950s and 1960s; these histories are written to communicate the big moments and 
important events and people over the course of time but fail to examine the development 
of neonatal intensive care as a specific and complex technological system. They lack an 
in-depth analysis of the kinds of healthcare providers that developed the care given, and 
whose roles were developed within the system that arose as a result of social and 
technological advances.  
 Physicians wrote histories through their own lenses and thus put themselves as 
key actors, failing to consider how nurses might have played important roles in the 
development of NICUs in the United States during the 20th century. This is one way of 
examining NICU history.  In many ways this approach limits their analysis but it also 
provides insight regarding how they viewed the development of this specialty and their 
role in it, as well as how they viewed other important historical actors and the dominance 
of medicine and science. Their work can be considered data that becomes both a primary 
as well as a secondary source depending on how we choose to engage it. While their 
accounts should be critiqued as secondary sources that give accounts and analysis of a 
particular historical event, their work may also be analyzed as primary sources written by 
people who wish to communicate a story based on how they remember a story or event. 
                                                            
64 Ibid. Robertson. The ‘Experienced’ Years, 1970 to 2000.; ———. The ‘Hands-Off’ Years, 1920 to 1950.; 
——.  The ‘Heroic’ Years, 1950 to 1970.; Robertson & Baker, “Lessons from the Past”; 
Silverman, Retrolental Fibroplasia.  
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Significance of this work 
 
 Nurses’ accounts need to be combined with the analysis we already have to 
reframe the and enrich our understanding of how NICUs developed. While the history of 
the development of neonatal intensive care units is scarce in the scholarly literature, this 
narrative is important for us to understand as we continue to progress in with neonatal 
intensive care. This story informs more than just our considerations for acute care for 
newborns. This work is significant because it speaks to our understanding of how and 
why we allocate resources to particular patient populations and how we develop and 
adopt technologies for those populations that we value. This work is significant because 
we continue to invest incredible financial resources in newborn medicine and intensive 
are amidst current debates surrounding high healthcare expenditures today; this work is 
an excellent example of how hospitals and local governments allocated resources and 
organized care to provide highly costly care to highly valued newborns. The ways nurses 
participated in the formation of NICUs in the 1960s and 1970s is an excellent case study 
to challenge how we currently think about nurses today who comprise the largest single 
workforce in our contemporary healthcare system. Thus, my questions particularly focus 
on nursing’s role in the development of NICUs and their transition from previous models 
of care, developed in premature infant units, helps us understand broader themes 
regarding healthcare, nursing and technology, and resource allocation for particular 
populations. 
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A Tale of Two Units 
 
As there has been little work done examining the development of neonatal intensive care 
in the United States this work must begin more particularized before I broaden scope. For 
the purposes of this dissertation, I have chosen to develop a case study comparison 
between two particular hospitals that have many similarities and developed around the 
same time period. Using hospital archives, oral histories, and newspapers and city 
publications from the Children’s Hospital of Boston and the Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia, I will tell the story of these two units who shared characteristics as well 
differed in key points. By comparing and contrasting these two units, my analysis will 
note similarities and differences and begin to formulate themes as I construct the story 
within a broader national context of sick newborn healthcare and developing trends 
related to resource allocation and social values.  
 The use of case studies in the historical research allows for in depth examination 
of change over time in a particular time period and place. While this approach might not 
allow for broad generalizations, it does allow for in depth analysis. Historians build the 
answers to their questions by discovering, and perhaps creating, context and developing 
an understanding of how that context shapes particular understandings of growth and 
development in a focused way. By using these separate institutions, I am able to dive into 
particular cases as well as push this work forward and understand further possible 
trajectories that will be pursued as I grow and expand this research. This dissertation is 
only the beginning and requires definite boundaries.  
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 I will start by outlining the ways newborns were delineated as a unique patient 
population in need of resources tracing that progression from the Progressive Era through 
the post war years when premature infant units, and later NICUs, were established. I will 
then argue that the social value and medical understanding of the newborn as a unique 
patient in need of particular resources and care influenced the formation of spaces where 
that care could be delivered.  My third chapter will focus on the ways NICU nurses 
functioned in the early NICUs and participated in the care of newborns requiring 
advanced ventilator support before and during a time when mechanical ventilation was 
still being developed.  I begin by articulating briefly some of the aspects of care nurses 
who practiced in premature infant units as a foundation for understanding how NICU 
nurses built on those models of care (as well as others) in their practice.  
 The fourth and fifth chapters hone in on two units that formed at the Children’s 
Hospital of Philadelphia and the Children’s Hospital of Boston. The stories of these units 
illustrate the importance of recognizing how these units did not form out nowhere, but 
were built on established models of care, and how hospital administrators and leaders 
specifically made decisions too allocate resources for sick newborns, and how the early 
units met the needs of broader newborn populations than just premature infants as nurses 
continued to work at the bedside and participate in patient care. My last chapter will bring 
this context and these stories together for synthetic analysis. I will also suggest both 
limitations to this research as well as suggestions regarding how this work has provided a 
foundation to move forward as a scholar.  
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Chapter 2: 
 
Puny waifs as untold treasures: 
The value of newborn patient populations as a conceptual foundation 
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 Puny waifs as untold treasures:  
The value of newborn patient populations as a conceptual foundation 
 
 Newborns, or neonates, are considered to be children in many ways, but they do 
differ drastically from their older counterparts and thus must be understood as unique in 
order to understand the nuanced ways the consideration of newborns as unique influences 
how we analyze nurses’ role in the formation of technological systems. I will use the lens 
adopted by historians of children’s healthcare to consider newborns as a subset of the 
pediatric population. Over the course of the 20th century, the delineation of newborns as a 
distinctive patient population allowed for the rise of premature infants as a subset of sick 
newborns that, in turn, laid important foundations for the ways newborns broadly 
speaking received care in the early neonatal intensive care units.  
 Newborns as unique patients valued by society and in need for particularized 
medical and nursing care is a constant theme throughout the 20th century, but how 
newborns are valued changes in nuanced ways between the Progressive Era into the early 
1960s when NICUs begin to appear in hospitals. The newborn emerges as a unique and 
separate entity from children at the turn of the century and into the heyday of the 
Progressive Era’s child saving oriented years. By the 1920s, premature infants were 
considered a particular subset of newborns for whom mortality rates continued to remain 
high despite decreases in infant mortality related to other causes. By the post-WWII years 
premature infants constituted a population with their own units and nursing staff. Such 
recognition of newborns (and subsequently premature infants) reflected particular 
nuances in the ways the child saving mentalities begun in the Progressive Era grew and 
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changed throughout the 20th century. In this chapter, I will provide a context for the 
delineation of newborns as a particular population of children affected by the foci on 
‘child saving’ begun during the Progressive Era. I argue that beginning in the Progressive 
Era, newborns emerged as a unique population for whom social value manifested in 
Progressive Era activism that impacted the reduction of infant mortality rates. Amidst the 
decreases in infant mortality statistics, premature infants emerged as a subset of 
newborns that required additional resources and social and medical infrastructures to 
reduce mortality rates unique to them. Out of the framework of care for premature infants 
arose practices and policies that were later adapted for newborns broadly, including 
surgical newborn patients and newborns requiring intensive skilled care.   
Newborns are needed: The value of newborns and the Progressive Era movement 
 
 Premature infants did not suddenly emerge as a unique patient population. “Child 
saving” programs were established as early as the 1850s, and Progressive Era reform 
continued focusing such programs (as part of broader child welfare programming) with 
initiatives that pinpointed newborns as a valued population worthy of investment and 
resources. Progressive Era reformers incorporated their efforts into a series of campaigns 
aimed at improving health, education, and urban living conditions more broadly as 
impetus for child saving programs grew.65 Historian Richard Meckel argues Progressive 
                                                            
65 Janet Golden, Richard Meckel, and Heather Munro Prescott. Children and Youth: In Sickness and in 
Health; A Historical Handbook and Guide, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004).; Richard Meckel. 
Classrooms and Clinics: Urban School and the Protection and Promotion of Child Health, 1870-
1930 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2013).; ———. Save the Babies: American 
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Era reformers recognized that a healthy and functioning society required healthy children 
to grow into functioning and contributing adults. 66  During this time, “children became 
the symbol of a resurgent reform spirit, the magnet that pulled a diverse collection of 
causes and their champions into a loose, informal – but very effective – coalition.”67 
While children’s health and welfare became highly valued and the focal point for many 
aspects of social change at the turn of the century, some reformers and activists chose to 
focus particularly on the plight of newborns as a further extension of the child saving 
programs of the time. Though statistics did not carry the reliability they have today due to 
incomplete reporting and even lack of reporting in areas of the country, infant mortality 
was high and the reformers knew they needed to decrease the numbers of infants and 
newborns dying.  
 Attendees at the American Association for the Study and Prevention of Infant 
Mortality’s (AASPIM) first meeting in 1910 recognized the need to focus on newborns 
specifically. Dr. Abraham Jacobi, the father of American Pediatrics, addressed his fellow 
physicians:  
The watchfulness of a parent over a child is not more justified than the 
watchfulness of society over its members…I want no…newborn babies to be lost 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Public Health Reform and the Prevention of Infant Mortality, 1850-1929 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1990). 
66 Richard Meckel argues two convictions laid the foundation for the focus on children’s health during the 
Progressive Era: the first was the conviction that children suffered as the chief victims of broader 
social problems related to familial and social disintegration. The second conviction, and perhaps 
the more poignant of the time, was the realization that when children were exposed to harmful 
conditions, they would grow up to become a nation of damaged, dependent adults requiring 
immense aid to function in society. For further reading see: Meckel. Classrooms and Clinics, 38-
40.   
67 Ibid. Meckel. Classrooms and Clinics. 2013. 94.  
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that can be saved, And many, most of them, can now be saved. To give up on the 
newborn baby merely because it seems feeble and uncompromising is 
preposterous. Kant, Goeth, and Helmholtz were puny waifs whose lives were 
despaired of. Being saved, they added untold treasures to the intellectual capital of 
the human race.68,69 
 
Jacobi’s address followed an opening session entitled “Duty of a Nation to its Potential 
Citizens” that identified newborns, especially those born requiring extra support, as 
citizens worthy of resources and investment. While children grew to be healthy adults, 
healthy babies were needed to grow healthy children and garnered their own focus and 
value as potential citizens should they survive the newborn period that some considered 
the most dangerous period of life.70 
 The first president of the AASPIM, physician J.H. Mason Knox, initially 
proposed the collection of accurate data as the first step to attaining preventative welfare 
to decrease infant mortality. The data pointed to infantile diarrhea, death due to disease 
and poor hygiene, and prematurity as some of the highest causes of mortality. During the 
organization’s early years, the AASPIM advised that reform activity focus on addressing 
                                                            
68 Abraham Jacobi. “Address by Abraham Jacobi, MD at the First Annual Meeting of the American 
Association for the Study and Prevention of Infant Mortality,” (Opening Session, Johns Hopkins 
University, Baltimore MD: November 9-11, 1910): 43–50.  
69 While beyond the scope of this paper and my focused time period, we must understand Jacobi’s context 
for this comment was not only within a broad infant welfare movement but also dialogues of 
eugenics and affirmations of infanticide based on the possibility that for some infants, “medical 
science indicates, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that it is impossible for them ever to become 
useful members of society…” For more on this see: Martin Pernick. The Black Stork: Eugenics 
and the Death of “Defective” Babies in American Medicine and Motion Pictures since 1915 (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
70 Dr. Clement Smith, physician and expert on newborn care, would later label the time period of transition 
from uterine to extra-uterine life “The Valley of the Shadow of Birth.” See: Clement Smith. 
“Progress in Pediatrics: The Valley of The Shadow of Birth,” American Journal of Diseases of 
Children 82 (1951): 171–201. 
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infantile diarrhea, hygiene, and disease prevention as they believed they could make a 
difference in these areas though they ended up pointing to infants and children rather than 
neonates. 
 While improving children’s health stood as a major rallying point for Progressive 
activists, Jacobi urged the medical community to remember the unique place newborn 
infants occupied in medicine and social value: “Your dealings are not with children but 
with infants; not with infants only but with the newborn that is just terminating his 
embryonic and fetal development…”71 Newborn infant mortality72 did overlap with 
broader children’s issues and reaped the rewards of the Progressive activists’ milk 
campaigns and maternal education programs,73 but newborns within the first few weeks 
of life existed as another subset of the general pediatric population. Healthy newborns 
that survived the first few weeks of life became a litmus test for national strength and, 
“conservation of natural resources naturally [began] with the protection of infancy.”74 
Most of the attention on curbing infant mortality stressed maternal education and 
                                                            
71 Abraham Jacobi. “The Best Means of Combating Infant Mortality,” JAMA 58, no. 23 (June 8, 1912): 
1735–44. 
72 While birth rates were taken in national statistics and data well prior to the turn of the century, they did 
not give reliable results until the 1920s. Despite lack of ‘reliable’ data, physicians and public 
health workers would have known first hand the incredible mortality rates in their own cities.  
73 During the Progressive Era, healthcare activists established stations in urban cities to provide tenement 
mothers with free or subsidized pasteurized milk as a place where “the poor could buy clean milk 
at a fair price,” in an effort to curb the rates of infantile diarrhea that often reached epidemic 
proportions during the hot summer months and proved fatal for many infants in the cities’ poorest 
neighborhoods. Many of these stations coincided with maternal education initiatives to teach 
tenement mothers how to hygienically care for their infants. For more on this topic, see: Richard 
Meckel. Save the Babies: American Public Health Reform and the Prevention of Infant Mortality, 
1850-1929 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). 
74 Ibid. Meckel. Save the Babies. 103. 
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environmental sanitation75 and newborn issues drew the focus of a few important 
reformers and activists such as Jacobi.  
 As the AASIM began their quest to determine the scope of the problem of infant 
mortality in 1910, The Children’s Bureau began by needing to attain appropriate and 
reliable statistics of newborn and infant mortality rates. As the medical community and 
activists shifted their efforts to address prematurity as a significant contributor to 
mortality rates the need to define and attain reliable statistics became a significant issue. 
Prematurity needed to be more precisely defined for the national reported numbers to be 
trusted. Though both national statistics (as they were reported)76 and social publications 
at the turn of the century recognized prematurity as a cause of infant mortality, it was far 
less understood than other major causes of death in newborns and infants.77 Physicians 
and public health activists did not yet readily understand prematurity – it’s causes and 
complications - and thus standards of practice and consistent ways to measure the 
numbers of premature infants did not exist at that time.78 Some physicians began to 
observe infants in tandem with the new incubator technology introduced to the United 
States in the late 19th century, but these doctors and their published observations were the 
                                                            
75 Ibid. Meckel. Save the Babies. 
76 Prematurity was listed among important causes of death in many large cities in national statistics as early 
as 1890. See: Report on Vital and Social Statistics in the United States at the Eleventh Census: 
1890. National Census. (Washington D.C.: Department of the Interior Census Office, 1896). 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsushistorical/vsush_1890_1.pdf.; Joseph DeLee. “Infant 
Incubation, with the Presentation of a New Incubator and a Description of the System at the 
Chicago Lying-In Hospital,” Chicago Medical Recorder 22 (1902): 22–40. 
77 Ibid. Meckel, Save the Babies.; For an example of a pop culture publication regarding premature infants, 
see: Ellis Parker Butler. The Incubator Baby, by Ellis Parker Butler, Illustrations by May Wilson 
Preston (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1906). 
78 Ibid. Baker. The Machine in the Nursery. 
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exception at this time, not the norm.79 Incubator technology had yet to be used to greatest 
effect in the United States and very little progress was made for premature newborns 
during this time period.80 By 1910, infant mortality related to prematurity had yet to gain 
significant footing, as the focus remained strong on children and post-neonatal infants 
into the war years; but even though premature infants as a subset of newborns might not 
have yet been center-stage, the recognition of a need to focus on the newborn separately 
from older infants and children broadly speaking was ingrained into medical and social 
values in the years leading to the First World War.  
 With the invention of the incubator and subsequent incubator baby stations that 
appeared in World’s Fairs during the early years of the 20th century, both social 
fascination and hope in the changing survival rates of premature infants when they 
received particular care strengthened the hope that these infants could be saved. 
According to historian Jeffrey Baker, incubator technology in the United States did not 
immediately change medical outcomes for infants as American physicians did not use 
them as they had been intended to be used, but medical fervor surrounding incubator 
technology still continued to progress and gained traction in later years leading up to 
                                                            
79 Ibid. Baker. The Machine in the Nursery; For examples of such publications, see: Henry Chapin. “The 
Babies’ Wards of the New York Post-Graduate Hospital,” Archives of Pediatrics 14 (1897): 329.; 
Adriance Vanderpoel. “Premature Infants,” American Journal of the Medical Sciences 121 (1901): 
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80 Jeffrey Baker. “The Incubator and the Medical Discovery of the Premature Infant,” Journal of 
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1920.81 From as early as the 1908 national statistics analysis, experts estimated that 40 
out of every 100 deaths related to premature births could be prevented thus reflecting a 
significant hope that death rates related to prematurity could be significantly changed. 
Though hope might have been present, healthcare workers and the medical community 
still had a great deal to learn about prematurity, its causes, and how to treat common 
complications that occurred when babies entered the world too soon.  
Newborns as “National Assets”: The War Years and Infant Mortality 
 
During the early years of the 20th century, social activists, healthcare workers, and 
government leaders banded together to decrease the incredibly high infant mortality rates 
that plagued the nation.82 As the country entered World War I, the nation’s focus on 
curbing infant mortality became even more important as broad social movements 
reflected more intensified value of newborns, infants, and children.  In his book, Save the 
Babies, historian Richard Meckel argued that the casualties of World War I heightened 
American concern for the high infant mortality rates. By 1920, the reported neonatal 
mortality rate was 41.5 per 1000 live births, a number considered deplorable by 
government and healthcare leaders.83 The value of infants was reinforced when, in 1921, 
President Warren G. Harding signed the Sheppard Towner Maternal and Infancy 
                                                            
81 Jeffrey Baker. “The Incubator and the Medical Discovery of the Premature Infant,” Journal of 
Perinatology 20, no. 5 (2000): 321–28.; Ibid. Baker. The Machine in the Nursery.  
82 Ibid. Meckel. Save the Babies.; Murdina MacFarguhar Desmond. Newborn Medicine and Society: 
European Background and American Practice (1750-1975) (Austin: Eakin Press, 1998). 
83 Public Health Service. Vital Statics of the United States, 1920-1940. Washington D.C.: US Department 
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Protection Act (known as the Sheppard-Towner Act) that allocated federal funds to states 
for maternal-child health activities dedicated to lowering the incredibly high mortality 
rates. Though states’ rights and government intrusion in private medical practices 
permeated debate over the law, the Act nonetheless proved to be a major landmark in the 
American infant welfare movement. With the passing of the Sheppard-Towner Act, the 
government became actively involved in maternal and infant care.84  
Like the initiatives of the AASPIM just a decade earlier, this piece of legislation 
chose to focus more intensely on maternal education and access to healthcare for mothers 
and infants. The Act provided public health care in the form of public primary care 
clinics and encouraged education for mothers about how to best care for their babies and 
children. Nursing historian Beth Anne Reedy notes that though the Sheppard-Towner Act 
contributed great strides in reducing infant mortality it did not directly affect the plight of 
premature infants. The Act’s programs lowered many post-neonatal causes of infant 
mortality and illuminated the reported higher rates of prematurity, as those rates changed 
far less drastically during this time period.85  
Nonetheless infant mortality did decline quite rapidly due to better sanitation, 
widespread milk campaigns, and maternal education.86 General newborn mortality rates 
did drop making the slower or stagnant mortality rates of premature infants more 
compelling.  While infant mortality overall decreased, premature births and the need for 
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85 Elizabeth A. Reedy. “Ripe too early: The expansion of hospital based premature infant care in the United 
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intense care for those infants born prematurely declined at a much less drastic rate. The 
Children’s Bureau, one of the fastest growing federal public health agencies during the 
first half of the 20th century, administered federal matching grants for maternal and child 
health as part of the initiative to decrease infant mortality rates as part of Social Security 
Act’s Title V passed in 1935.87 With a significant decreases in mortality related to 
infantile diarrhea and better nutrition for infants, prematurity moved up the list as 
reformers and healthcare activists shifted to allocate resources to premature infants. The 
Children’s Bureau’s grant matching contributed to local initiatives to open units where 
premature infants could receive care in hospitals as early as the 1920s.88 Units called 
premature infant units opened in many hospitals across the country as larger, better-
funded hospitals could establish them.  
“Child-saving”: Premature infants as a focal point 
 
 As reform movements related to maternal, infant, and children’s health continued 
to improve quality of life for women and children across the country, newborns did 
benefitted from such generalized efforts. But reform movements were not the only 
driving force behind the recognition of premature infants as a particular patient 
population; the intersection of child saving reforms, the shift from giving birth at home to 
giving birth in hospitals, increase trust in and use of incubator technology, and the quest 
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for a clearer understanding of the scope of prematurity contributed to the premature 
infant as a distinct patient population for whom the formation of specialized care and the 
creation of unique spaces where that care could be delivered formed.89  
A perfect storm: Child-saving reform, technology, hospitals, and premature birth 
 
 Premature infants gained a footing as a medically unique newborn patient 
population in need of particularized care and resources by the mid-1930s.90 Nursing 
historian Elizabeth Ann Reedy argues that premature infants received increased attention 
medically because of a combination of technological advances and public awareness of 
the number of premature births. While other causes of infant mortality decreased, infant 
mortality related to prematurity remained constant and became more of a focal point. 
Reedy shows how the lay press contributed to increased interest in the premature infant 
by publishing articles that described the premature infant and lauded the types of hospital 
based care given during the time. Premature infants emerged as a particular facet of a 
continued and nuanced value of children and newborns. The emergence of incubator 
technology, increased public awareness, the shift to in hospital birthing processes, and the 
push to develop national definitions of prematurity all coincided with the creation of 
premature infant units as spaces and thus to the focus on premature infants as a separate 
patient population of newborns in need of such space and particularized care.  
                                                            
89 Elizabeth Reedy. “From Weakling to Fighter: Changing the Image of Premature Infants,” Nursing 
History Review 11 (2003): 109–27. 
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Meckel argued the infant mortality movement during the early decades of the 20th 
century was in reality a white middle-class infant mortality movement.1 While 
prematurity did not take center stage in the Progressive Era activists movements to lower 
infant morality, any push to curb newborn deaths, including those related to prematurity, 
would likely have also been a push to save elite white middle class newborns infants as 
well. Those who could not afford or did not have access to incubator technology or 
specialized care, such as the poor or those who fell into certain racial groups, probably 
followed early traditional care techniques related to keeping the infants warm and hoping 
for the best.  
 Perhaps one of the biggest medical shifts of the 20th century was the transition of 
the birthing process from home settings into hospitals that began in the 1920s. With this 
transference of the mother and her baby into the hospital for delivery came a much higher 
population of newborns in hospitals. This also meant that newborns requiring extra 
support and attention were already at the hospital among physicians and nurses who had 
the potential to deliver such care. Certain larger hospitals grouped premature infants 
together in separate units from their general newborn nurseries. As early as 1902, 
physician Joseph DeLee published general care guidelines already in place at the Chicago 
Lying-In Hospital. Such gathering of patients constituted the first time American 
hospitals had delineated spaces for sick infants separate from newborn nurseries where 
healthy babies received care.91 During this time period units in hospitals were rare. While 
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DeLee’s guidelines reflect a vein of medical discourse surrounding premature infant care, 
premature infant units did not become widespread for another two decades, until the shift 
of birth into the hospital setting.  
 Premature infant care involved more than just more mothers and premature 
infants in the hospital setting. The incubator’s invention and subsequent adoption into use 
drastically affected the premature infant survival rates. Historian Jeffrey Baker identifies 
the incubator as a technology that aided physicians and nurses in keeping premature 
infants warm and, when used appropriately, was an invaluable tool. Though the 
equipment did not initially find favor with American pediatricians, the dominant medical 
group initially using the incubator in this country, physicians worked diligently to 
determine how to incorporate incubator technology into general practice and eventually 
learned to use it effectively.92  
 While premature infant units created spaces where any infant born prematurely 
could receive care, the concept of prematurity and who was classified to receive care in 
these units changed and developed over the following decades as premature infants 
garnered increasing attention from both public and medical circles. Debates related to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
‘incubator babies’ received care from trained nursing staff and physicians in the sideshows, but 
not within what we would consider today traditional hospital environments. For more on these 
early medical phenomena, see: William Silverman. “Incubator-Baby Side Shows,” Pediatrics 64, 
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and the Origins of Newborn Intensive Care, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996).; ------- “The Incubator and the Medical Discovery of the Premature Infant.” Journal of 
Perinatology 20, no. 5 (2000): 321–28.; Alex Robertson and Jeffrey P. Baker. “Lessons from the 
Past,” Seminars in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine 10 (2005): 23–30. 
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classification of prematurity reflected continuity in the value of infants and children and 
the search for a better understanding of the scope of prematurity.   
 By 1935, the reported statistics for morbidity and mortality related to prematurity 
showed a decrease as reported at the fifth annual meeting for the American Academy of 
Pediatrics.93 Though these findings initially seemed encouraging, physicians such as 
premature infant specialist Ethel Dunham remained skeptical. Other experts present such 
as physicians Julius Hess, Clifford Stewart, and Emmett Holt understood the dangers to 
infants that came with prematurity. Dunham believed that better delineation of the 
definition of prematurity could provide more accurate statistics that could thus be used to 
better define and describe the scope of this pressing problem, and ultimately be used to 
combat the high mortality rates associated with these specific newborns.94 Dunham 
presented her concern,  
…we are not all really aware of what a problem [prematurity] is. The reduction of 
mortality from prematurity is of the utmost importance in the reduction of the 
high rate of neonatal mortality…reports from hospitals…differ widely. The 
differences may be attributed in part to variability in criteria for the diagnosis of 
prematurity, in part to the differences in the periods of observation at the end of 
which the report is made, and in part to the numbers of infants in high or low 
weight groups.95  
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The concept of prematurity did not hinge on gestation as the defining point for all 
physicians, and weight was the most generally used delineation for premature infant care 
prior to the 1940s and a focal point for debate among physicians and researchers. 
Dunham referenced a report published by a German researcher Dr. A. Ylppo in 1919 that 
delineated prematurity as any infant weighing <2500 grams, and suggested this 
classification be established for their purposes of definition.96 Not all physicians in the 
United States used weight. Physicians such as Joseph DeLee and Julius Hess published 
definitions of prematurity in the early 1920s that used gestational age to delineate 
premature infants from full term infants97 citing premature infants as those, “born three 
weeks or more before the usual termination of pregnancy.”98 While many physicians 
accepted Hess and DeLee’s definitions, not all of them considered gestation as sound as 
the ability to scientifically determine gestation resulted in the reliance on maternal 
reporting. Some physicians and researchers used physical examination as well as weight 
as considerations for grouping of premature infants at a time when no national universal 
definition was available. Overall, the parameters of prematurity varied drastically, but at 
                                                            
96 I did not read the original article as it is in German, but for informational purposes the article can be 
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their fifth annual conference the American Academy of Pediatrics passed a resolution to 
define prematurity by weight in attempts to gather better morbidity and mortality data.99  
During the Progressive Era the foundation for the newborn as a separate patient 
population arose as one facet of the ‘child saving’ mentality as the push for healthy 
children garnered incredible focus and resources from activists and healthcare reformers. 
The value of children, and particularly newborns, continued into the post-war years. 
While premature infants began to receive particular attention prior to World War II, 
interest in this population group gained significant momentum with the advances in 
technology and medicine after the war. By the post-WWII era, premature infants were a 
focal point in the application of technology and medicine and the ways families valued 
saving sick newborns as an extension of continued child-saving values. These child-
saving values continued past the Progressive Era and into the post-war years, but 
presented in different ways as the value of newborns and children changed in nuanced 
ways.  
Sick newborns and the era of the ‘baby boom ideology’ 
 
The prosperity of post-war American society and the focus on healthy families 
and subsequently health children to combat the threat of communism continued to 
provide a fertile context for a more focused attempt to continue to save the babies. Like 
the call to concentrate on newborns as a particular patient population who needed support 
and resources begun during the Progressive Era, premature infants also garnered 
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significant attention in the post-war era. While Jacobi and Progressive Era reformers 
chose to focus on newborns particularly, they lacked the medical knowledge and 
equipment to significantly change mortality rates of premature infants. As children 
became the focal point for the post-war nuclear family, physicians and public health 
workers in the 1950s chose to continue to focus on premature infants as a particular 
newborn patient population. 
“A child centered character:” The social value of the newborn population 
 
With the end of World War II in 1945, American soldiers returned home to the 
United States, their wives, and their families. Subsequently the American birth rate 
increased during the post war years eventually resulting in what would later be labeled as 
the great ‘baby boom.’ The birth rate not only rose in all social groups, but it rose across 
all ages of women. According to historian Elaine Tyler May, “what made the baby boom 
happen was that everyone was doing it [having babies] – and at the same time.“100 The 
rising birthrate was more than a demographic phenomenon; it reflected the widespread 
social belief that having children led to personal fulfillment and that parenthood and 
healthy children were the route to happiness and personal fulfillment as a social and 
nationalistic ideology. Historian Marilyn Irvin Holt argues the importance of child health 
reform and that, “having children was an affirmation of life after the terrible destruction 
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of the war.”101 What May refers to as the ‘baby boom ideology’ permeated Hollywood, 
political culture, and prescriptive literature. The baby boom ideology combined with the 
post war victory to contribute a sense that America was making great technological 
strides coming out of the world wars. The general prosperity contributed to a 
reorientation back on the focus of saving babies, and thus producing healthy children and 
eventually healthy and robust American adults. Thus the concept of the ‘nuclear family’ 
as a bulwark against Communism became a foundation to the American psyche.   
 The maternal child and infant bond became a more intense focus in both child 
rearing and medical diagnosis, as reflected in popular publications such as Dr. Spock’s 
Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care.102, 103 Hollywood reflected society’s value 
of family and the importance of children in films such as Cheaper by the Dozen 
(1950),104 a story of a family who faces the adventures of life in a house with twelve 
children, Disney’s tale of a young boy who was torn between never growing up and the 
need for a mother (family) in Peter Pan (1953),105 and Bob Hope’s classic about a 
widowed father who incorporates his seven children into his vaudeville act to keep the 
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family together in The Seven Little Foys (1955).106 The importance of family reflected in 
Hollywood also played out in the drastic changes taking place in healthcare. Families 
then needed to bear healthy newborns who survived the neonatal period.  
 The 1950s and 1960s were a prosperous post-war time as well as a time that also 
encompassed much turmoil and social frustration. The Cold and Vietnam wars, civil 
rights struggles, changes in nuclear family norms, and assassination of American leaders 
contributed to a chaotic social order that coincided with a technologic revolution and an 
international space race. According to historian Steven Mintz, the era between World 
War II and the 1960s can be defined in part as having a child-centered character that 
reflected deeply ingrained hardships of the Depression years, wartime upheavals, and the 
insecurities of a nation locked in the Cold War.107  
 Suburbs grew, contributing to the isolation of families in their individual housing 
surrounded with grassy yards separating them with their neighbors. As part of the 
increase in federal funding for healthcare and hospital construction, Hill-Burton funds 
generously flowed to subsidize the expansion of community hospitals in suburbs.108 With 
hospitals expanding, new medical advances changing survival rates for many Americans, 
and the technology boom drastically overlapping with medical care, families had higher 
hopes for their children’s medical care, situated as they were within a social system that 
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placed the family at the center of a meaningful American life and as a bulwark against 
communism.   
 Nuanced value: Premature infants, the American family, and medical advances 
 
 The focus on the ways progress in technology and medicine could impact survival 
for newborns who needed particular care reflected the social value of children as the 
center of the nuclear family during the post-war years. According to medical historian 
Paul Starr, the eradication of polio, more than any other disease, poignantly highlights the 
post war acceptance of the scientific method and the willingness of the public to 
participate in scientific and medical trials. Such confidence in medical trials also boosted 
the faith in American medicine. Between 1955 and 1960 congressional support increased 
funding for the medical and research institution, the National Institute of Health (NIH), 
from $81 million to over $400 million.109  With immense funding, researchers developed 
a vaccine to combat polio, a potentially fatal disease for children, and drastically 
decreased morbidity and mortality rates related to the disease.  
 Americans had faith that research, technology, and better medicine could 
eradicate any number of diseases and medical conditions. In the midst of these leaps of 
faith, premature infants and their medical and nursing care appeared in popular 
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magazines aimed at parents and families.110 For example, in 1955 Parents Magazine 
published a spread complete with photographs of a Premature Infant Unit in Chicago. 
The article and photographs described the care physicians and nurses gave, showed the 
unit, and boasted of the vast array of shiny new equipment used in the unit. With 
photographs of parents and their small infants lining the magazine’s pages,111 the hope of 
the miraculous stories of survival that occurred in the premature infant units was 
reinforced by the importance of the work done there to support the value of the family. 
Parents both read about the new techniques and saw photographs of the nurses working 
with small infants and the complex technological equipment used on the unit. This kind 
of article would have contributed to the optimistic hopes in medicine and technology that 
permeated the post war era in general.  
 Historian Marian Irvin Holt stated that as the nation headed into the Cold War 
years, the need for psychologically healthy children and teenagers was vital to what 
Truman called the, “struggle between freedom and communist slavery.”112 This was 
reflected in expansion of dialogue beyond just the survival of premature infants, but their 
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and Past Due,” TIME, April 20, 1959, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,864610,00.html. 
111 It is important to note that premature infant units generally did not admit parents into the unit and this 
was either a unique practice or a public relations (PR) move that put the tiny patients and their 
families at the philosophical center premature infant care. 
112 Ibid. Holt. Cold War Kids. Ch 1, loc 494.  
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ability to function as intact members of society. For example, the ‘blindness epidemics’ 
of the 1950s commonly appeared in the popular magazine Time.113  
 Throughout the 1950s, premature infants maintained a solid footing in American 
medicine. In 1959, premature infant nurse pioneer Evelyn Lundeen referred to changes in 
premature infant care due to ‘increased interest’ in the premature infant.114 She noted the 
many articles published in scholarly medical and nursing journals by physicians and 
nurses relating to the care of premature infants and addressing medical conditions, 
research studies specifically related to premature infant physiology and medicine, and 
nursing care. Lundeen reflected that premature infants garnered increased attention, and 
with that attention came a narrowed focus on how to define the premature infant, 
standardize models of care, and the creation of spaces where that care could be given. 
Conclusion 
 
The consideration of newborns as a unique patient population, that began during 
the Progressive Era and progressed in nuanced ways through the post-war years, 
influenced a social context that valued newborns and sought to apply the particular 
models of care developed for premature infants as sub population of sick newborns to a 
broader newborn population. By the turn of the century, newborns emerged as a patient 
                                                            
113 “Battle in the Dark,” TIME, April 14, 1952. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,857154,00.html.;  “Integrating the Blind.” 
TIME, December 10, 1956. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,808765,00.html.; 
“Too Little & Too Much,” TIME, September 28, 1953. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,818903,00.html.  
114 Evelyn Lundeen. “Newer Trends in the Care of Premature Infants,” Nursing World 133 (1959): 9–11. 
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population separate from children in ways that required particular intervention to 
decrease mortality rates. Though the Progressive reformers addressed some of the most 
common causes of infant mortality, prematurity did not receive the same attention 
infantile diarrhea and disease garnered. By the 1920s, premature infants received 
particular attention separate from sick newborns in general as infants for whom further 
child-saving efforts might be beneficial. Having made significant impact on decreasing 
mortality rates due to infantile diarrhea and disease related to poor hygiene, the medical 
community shifted their attention to the high mortality rates related to prematurity 
believing overall infant mortality rates could be further decreased. The first step in 
determining the scope of the problem of prematurity was defining the disease and the 
recognition that experts needed to have a constant definition (and thus way to report) 
prematurity. While infants in the neonatal period became the first subpopulation of 
children to gain recognition, premature infants then arose as a group of newborns that 
needed unique focus and resources to further decrease mortality. Through the 1940s and 
1950s, premature infants became the largest subpopulation of newborns for whom unique 
advances in technology and medical and nursing models of care were created. 
While the story of neonatal intensive care is not limited to premature infants, 
historians must understand the recognition of premature infants as a patient population 
and the care thy received to inform how we understand the formation for intensive care 
for newborns differed from the development of their adult counterparts. As premature 
infants garnered attention as a unique population, the search began to determine how to 
best care for them and for their particular needs. In conjunction with the recognized need 
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to focus on premature infants, premature infant units arose in hospitals as spaces where 
these infants could receive highly specialized care. As physicians and nurses grouped 
premature infants together in hospital units beginning in the 1920s, nurses delivered 
much of the care these infants needed and models of care specifically for premature 
infants emerged. By the mid-1950s, hospital administrators realized that the nursing care 
applied to premature infants could be applied to newborns in general. These realizations 
provided the impetus for a decrease in premature infant units and the establishment of 
neonatal intensive care units beginning in the early 1960s. Other technological, financial, 
and medical factors contributed to this shift as well. In the next chapter, I will outline the 
roles nurses played in premature infant units as they formed during the first half of the 
20th century. I will then analyze the roles nurses played in early neonatal intensive care 
units and consider the ways models of care established in premature infant units 
influenced the types of care given to newborns more broadly speaking in ICUs.  
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”The nurse still holds an important position”:  
Nursing and the development of neonatal intensive care units 
 
  As of 1967, she would be known as a flying nun when she became involved in 
helicopter transport of premature infants, but just a few years earlier she had come by 
ambulance accompanied only by the ambulance driver. Carrying her portable incubator 
and a small bag of supplies, nurse Shannon Perry, then Sister M. Andre, walked into a 
small hospital to pick up the premature infant waiting for her and transport him back to 
the premature infant center at St Francis Hospital in Peoria, Illinois. Her uniform, a long 
white dress and jacket with a veil, distinguished her as a Franciscan Sister. A doctor 
stood waiting for her, protectively guarding a small baby in an incubator. She 
remembered observing his stance knowing he had been standing guard so no one would 
touch the prematurely born infant until she got there. Only then and to only nurse Perry 
would he relinquish the tiny baby.115 After assessing that the baby was stable for 
transport, Perry then transferred the newborn into her transport incubator for the ride 
home. Once back at the premature infant unit, a cadre of nurses would take over care and 
constantly assess and care for the patient.116  
 The doctor relinquished care only to Perry. He trusted her even though she arrived 
alone without any physician to oversee her. She assessed the patient, knew how to care 
for this premature infant, and independently provided care all the way back to her unit. 
                                                            
115 Shannon Perry, Oral History interview by Briana Ralston, December 12, 2012. 
116 Transport of premature infants among hospitals and from home births to hospital settings was a common 
practice between 1920 and the 1960s as it related to premature infant units. Infant transport would 
later become an important part of sick newborn care known as regionalization associated with 
NICUs, but prior to the NICUs of the 1960s, many premature infant units either transported or 
received transported infants into their care. For more see chapters 4 and 5.  
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Such ingenuity and autonomy were hallmarks of the nurse who worked in the premature 
infant unit. These skills and qualities would later be found in NICU nurses who built on 
the models of care established by Perry and other premature infant nurses.  
  In this chapter, I argue that NICU nurses functioned with expertise, made tools 
work for their small patients, and integrated constantly changing equipment in their units 
to provide intensive care to a broad range of sick newborns. Such care coincided with the 
development of intensive care for adults, but also built on the work of nurses who worked 
in premature infant units. Nurses like Shannon Perry created and worked within the 
systems of premature infant care that laid the foundation for the establishment and 
development of NICUs and the care delivered there. I will outline the themes pertinent to 
the roles nurses played in premature infant units and then analyze how they laid 
foundations for the way nurses influenced the formation and models of care in NICUs of 
the 1960s and 1970s.   
Premature Infant Units: Standards of care  
 
 The changing social landscape of the first half of the 20th century resulted in shifts 
in in how newborns were considered a particular patient population who required unique 
resources and space to receive medical and nursing care. While specialists sought to 
define prematurity and understand more accurately the scope of the problem, hospitals 
opened premature infant units to care specifically for the premature infants they received. 
Nurses influenced the establishment of spaces where they delivered care as well as the 
models of care given sick newborns. Both premature infant unit nurses and NICU nurses 
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provided round-the-clock care, worked with patients grouped by severity of illness or 
need for additional care, practiced with great skill, and learned from and collaborated 
with physicians to deliver the best care possible. As equipment and medical knowledge 
changed, these nurses kept pace by incorporating new knowledge and skills into their 
practice and participating in research to expand that knowledge. They participated in 
important ways that made the intensive care model work as members of a new cadre of 
intensive care nurses forming in hospitals beginning in the 1950s.  
 Adult intensive care units opened in the 1950s as nurses grouped their sickest 
together and worked closely with physicians and each other to provide care for 
increasingly medically complex patients.117  According to nursing historians Julie 
Fairman and Joan Lynaugh, adult intensive care units (ICU’s), though built on similar 
principles as recovery rooms, “emerged as distinctly organized, innovative patient care 
area[s].”118 Adult ICUs were often make-shift spaces that developed organically in 
hospitals where patients received care regardless of gender, class or race. The adult units 
did not initially boast significantly new or complex technology, but Fairman and 
Lynaugh argue they did have technology. They used the same tools and equipment found 
on the general units and functioned on the concept of intensive monitoring of vital signs, 
intake and output, the patient’s level of consciousness and “the nurse’s sense of hearing, 
sight, touch, smell, and sometimes her intuition.”119 Nurses working in new adult ICUs 
                                                            
117 Julie Fairman and Joan Lynaugh. Critical Care Nursing: A History (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1998). 
118 Ibid. Fairman and Lynaugh. Critical Care Nursing. 13.  
119 Ibid. Fairman and Lynaugh. Critical Care Nursing. 16.  
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learned skills related to intensive patient monitoring, developed intensive relationships 
with physicians while each taught the other important skills, and learned how to group 
and care for sick patients requiring round-the-clock care from specially trained nursing 
personnel.  
 While the newborn population followed the adults in their occupation of formally 
labeled ‘intensive care units,’ the models of care delivered by nurses to NICU babies also 
developed out of premature infant units that predated the NICUs by almost 40 years. 
Nurses in the early premature infant units established care models and units that 
resembled what Fairman and Lynaugh would later define as intensive care. To best 
understand the context that provided the foundation for NICU care in the 1960s, 
historians must first understand the role nurses played in the premature infant units as 
early as the 1920s.  
Nursing the premature infant: The role nurses played in premature infant units  
 
 Premature infant units, often sequestered from other patient areas to minimize 
cross infection, provided places where nurses practiced with authority and expertise. 
While many larger hospitals did allocate space for separate premature infant units, other 
hospitals set aside space in their newborn nurseries where they cared for the sickest 
patients, a practice that reflected the ways Fairman and Lynaugh nurses organized 
patients in adult wards while delivering early ICU care.120 Without the presence of 
parents or physicians, the nurses provided the care for infants and inhabited the units 
                                                            
120 Ibid. Fairman and Lynaugh. Critical Care Nursing. 
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making decisions regarding patient management. Dr. William Silverman, a pediatrician 
who specialized in neonatology during the 1950s, remembered the “skilled, highly 
opinionated nurses [that] dominated the scene in hospital [premature] nurseries…the 
specialized nurses [made] detailed minute-by-minute decisions concerning clinical 
management.”121 These nurses gave care in these units, utilized the incubators, scales, 
feeding apparatus, and crude respiratory support. They made executive decisions; the 
units themselves were places where nurses claimed the authority to make decisions in a 
medical environment where physicians “played a minor role.”122 Such descriptions of the 
units draw attention to the nurses as unique in a world where the gendered hierarchy and 
physician-nurse relationships traditionally placed the nurse as the one who carried out 
orders and had little diagnostic and treatment autonomy.  
 Even as hospitals changed, the nurses continued to hold an important position in 
patient care and the development and implementation of models of care for acutely ill 
patients in the premature infant units. The care nurses gave in premature infant units 
encompassed a wide variety of skills and knowledge as evidenced by textbooks, journal 
articles, and publications of the time.123 These nurses worked in a world where hospitals 
                                                            
121 William Silverman. Retrolental Fibroplasia: A Modern Parable (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1980). 
45.   
122 Ibid. Silverman. Retrolental Fibroplasia. 45.  
123 Alan Brown. “The Care and Feeding of the Premature Infant,” Archives of Pediatrics 34 (1917): 609–
17.; Julius Hess. Premature and Congenitally Diseased Infants, (Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 
1922).; Lyla Olson. Improvised Equipment in the Home Care of the Sick (Philadelphia, PA: W.B. 
Saunders Company, 1931).; Christie Brown and Barton Gilbert, Midwifery: Principles and 
Practice for Pupil Midwives, Teacher Midwives, and Obstetric Dressers (London: Edward Arnold 
& Co, 1942).; Ethel Dunham. Standards and Recommendations for Hospital Care of Newborn 
Infants, Full-Term and Premature, United States Dept. of labor, Children’s Bureau, 1943. 
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had grown and were expanding, sicker patients stayed in the hospital for longer amounts 
of time, and new technologies and equipment were constantly introduced. Premature 
infant nurse Evelyn Lundeen argued, “The nurse, however, still holds an important 
position, as she [was] relied upon to establish and maintain aseptic technique in order to 
prevent infections… observe carefully, assist in research projects, and help simplify all 
technics and procedures so that handling of the infant be kept at a minimum.”124 These 
nurses needed to know how to care for basic newborn needs, the intricacies of charting 
and communicating with physicians regarding changes in patient condition, and some 
participated in research and knowledge development that reflected their commitment to 
growing knowledge base in good nursing care of the premature infant.   
Basic Newborn needs 
 
 
Nurses’ knowledge related to the care of premature infants required the nurse to 
understand thermoregulation (maintaining an adequate body temperature), infection 
control, and nutrition. Once the premature infant is born, one of its first needs is 
maintenance of body temperature.125 By the 1920s, incubators became a standard way to 
assist a small infant to maintain his body temperature. Incubators came in different 
models and types, but the primary premise involved monitoring the patient’s body 
temperature and making adjustments to the temperature of his immediate environment 
within the incubator to aid the infant in keeping his body temperature warm enough. 
                                                            
124 Evelyn Lundeen. “Newer Trends in the Care of Premature Infants,” Nursing World 133 (1959): 9–11. 
125 Body temperature goals depended on the fragility of the patient’s condition. Generally infants were kept 
at very warm temperatures with body temperatures reading at or around 98 degrees Fahrenheit.    
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Nurses were expected to know how to take temperatures, provide bathing and weigh the 
babies while not allowing their body temperatures to fall too low, and to understand the 
basic mechanisms used to keep the infant warm.126 Many hospitals used special 
incubators for infants; by the 1930s, a variety of incubators were on the market including 
(but not limited to) Hess beds, Chapple incubators, and the Isolette incubator was also 
developed in the 1930s.127 While some hospitals used individual incubators for babies, 
others built what were called, ‘cabinet cubicles’ consisting of a completely enclosed 
cubicle containing an individual air supply for the infant inside that could be heated and 
humidified as desired.128 Such rooms combined maintenance of thermoregulation with 
the need for infection control.129  Nurses needed to know how this equipment worked, 
how to use it effectively, and how to assess the patient to know if the incubators were 
indeed keeping the patient warm enough.  
While full term newborns are susceptible to infection, their preterm counterparts 
have an even greater risk for severe infection due to underdeveloped organ and immune 
systems. Infection control remained an important aspect of appropriate premature infant 
                                                            
126 Robert McCombs. Diseases of Children for Nurses (Philadelphia, PA: W.B. Saunders Company, 1929).; 
Julius Hess and Evelyn Lundeen. The Premature Infant: Its Medical and Nursing Care 
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1941).; Evelyn Lundeen and Ralph Kunstadter. Care of 
the Premature Infant (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1958). 
127 Julius Hess. “Oxygen Unit for Premature and Very Young Infants,” American Journal of Diseases of 
Children 47, no. 4 (1934): 916–17.; Charles Chapple. “A Cabinet Cubicle for Infants, Combining 
Isolation with Control of Temperature and Humidity,” Journal of Pediatrics 16, no. 2 (February 
1940): 215–19.; ———. “Controlling the External Environment of Premature Infants in an 
Incubator,” American Journal of Diseases of Children 30 (1938): 459–60. 
128 Ibid. Chapple. A Cabinet Cubicle for Infants, 215–19. 
129 For a more thorough analysis of the development of adequate thermoregulation throughout the 20th 
century, see S. B. Korones. “An Encapsulated History of Thermoregulation in the Neonate,” 
NeoReviews 5 (March 1, 2004): 78e–85. doi:10.1542/neo.5-3-e78. 
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care. In their 1941 textbook on premature infant care, Hess and Lundeen listed “special 
training with a thorough understanding of aseptic nursing,” as their first requirement for 
successful nursing in any premature infant nursery.130 Many premature infant units 
included areas at the front where healthcare personnel and visitors were required perform 
extensive hand washing before entering the unit.131  
Feeding and general care also fell under the responsibilities of the nurse. While 
some premature infants could receive milk – breast milk or early types of formulas – 
from a bottle or the breast, others did not have the energy or stamina to feed that way. 
Apparatus such as special feeding spoons and tubing that would be inserted into the 
baby’s stomach directly were involved in feeding in premature infant units. Nurses used 
the feeding apparatus when necessary, recorded the type and amounts of food 
administered, and how well the patient tolerated the feeds.  
Charting and communication 
 
Nurse’s charting for premature infants included documentation of vital signs – 
temperature, heart rate, and respiratory rate – as well as intake and output. Not only did 
the nurses need to record the temperature of their patients but the temperature inside the 
incubator as well. Stool amounts, consistency, color and any other abnormal findings 
                                                            
130 Ibid. Hess and Lundeen. The Premature Infant. 48.  
131 For examples of this, see: Ethel Dunham. Standards and Recommendations for Hospital Care of 
Newborn Infants, Full-Term and Premature, United States Dept. of labor, Children’s bureau, 
1943.; -------. Premature Infants: A Manual for Physicians (New York, N.Y.: Hoeber-Harper, 
1955). 432-444.; Ibid. Lundeen and Kunstadter. Care of the Premature Infant. 
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related to stool or urine output were also meticulously documented, every milliliter 
accounted for. 
Nurses also participated in research and the development of charting records at 
some hospitals as ways of collecting data on their patients. Nurse Rita Petruska who 
worked as nursing supervisor in the premature infant nursery at Mount Sanai Hospital in 
New York City, developed her own nursing form with all the essential information 
needed for her nurses to chart patient data and assessment. She later published the form in 
The American Journal of Nursing in 1963 with elaborate particulars as to the definition of 
each section and how the form should be filled out. Such initiation of the development of 
tools, and thus technology, for patient care shows ingenuity and autonomy many nurses 
experienced in premature infant units. Historian of technology, Joel Howell, argued that 
the development of forms of data reflected who cared for the patient as well as changes in 
organization of hospitals and medical education. Such tools for recording patient 
assessment, medication administration, as well as other details related to the patient’s stay 
allowed for consistent data collection and served as an important piece of technology.132  
Nurses began to publish articles themselves outlining newborn physiology and 
issues related to more in depth knowledge of the newborn infant – premature and full 
                                                            
132 Joel Howell. Technology in the Hospital: Transforming Patient Care in the Early Twentieth Century 
(The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 5, 43-45. ; See quote: “Some of the technology that 
was new to people in 1925 seems by the 1990s to have disappeared. But not all of it has gone 
away. Rather, much of the technology has simply blended into the background of the usual. It has 
been observed that ‘the most profound technologies are those that disappear’: ‘They weave 
themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it.’” (5) 
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term.133 Nurses at Colorado General Hospital’s Premature Infant Center decided that their 
ability to assess the patient and notice when something ‘wasn’t quite right’ needed to be 
better articulated. They shifted from reporting ‘a poor night’ to reporting more detailed 
observations to articulate what they previously considered their impressions.134 
The nurse’s ability to observe small changes that can indicate a pending 
significant change in condition is one of the hallmarks of premature infant nursing. The 
nurses and physicians realized that this type of assessment reporting and communication 
contributed greatly to the overall care, earlier diagnosis, and better treatment when the 
patient’s condition changed. “When the nurses in the Colorado General Hospital nursery 
realized how important articulating their observations were to improving patient care and 
how much responsibility was theirs, they became eager to define these vague 
impressions.”135 While nurses elsewhere in hospitals reported these kinds of in depth 
patient findings, nurses of premature infants learned to communicate the incredibly 
nuanced changes in patient condition to physicians that textbooks and articles generally 
did not address related to particular assessment communication. The nurses learned to 
articulate what had become second nature in their expertise, what might have been 
                                                            
133 Ethel Dunham and Jesse Bierman. “The Care of the Premature Infant,” JAMA 115 (1940): 658–62.; 
Priscilla Parke. “Naso-Gastric Tube Feeding for Premature Infants,” The American Journal of 
Nursing 51, no. 8 (August 1951): 517.; Robert Jackson. “Feeding Healthy Infants,” The American 
Journal of Nursing 55, no. 9 (1955): 1076–79.;; Esther Weidman Ott and Lula Lubchenco. “The 
Premature Infant’s Reaction to Illness,” The American Journal of Nursing 57, no. 11 (1957): 
1431–33. 
134 Ibid. Weidman Ott and Lubchenco. The Premature Infant’s Reaction to Illness. 1431–33. 
135 Ibid. Weidman Ott and Lubchenco. The Premature Infant’s Reaction to Illness. 1431.  
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otherwise referred to as intuition, and functioned with physicians and other healthcare 
providers to use their observational skill to improve diagnosis and treatment.  
Nurses became recognized by physicians in the literature as the gatekeepers to 
their patients as individuals who monitored all aspects of thermoregulation, fed the 
infants multiple times during the day and night, and played key roles in infection control. 
These memories echo similar reflections of physicians and nurses who worked together 
in premature infant units. Such statements coincide with a statement made by physician 
Kenneth Winters to his pediatric residents, “When a premature nursery nurse says a baby 
doesn’t look right, cry right, eat right, or act right, don’t ignore her…Check that baby 
thoroughly because you will usually find something wrong.”136 Another nurse who 
worked in a premature infant unit remembered a bedside encounter where she reported an 
inguinal hernia to the acting resident. Upon arriving at the bedside the resident could not 
find the hernia. When the attending physician arrived, he turned to his resident and stated, 
“…you listen to [the nurse], she knows what she is doing.”137 
One premature infant textbook specifically for physicians specified the 
importance of the presence of an experienced nurse to,  
…be in constant attendance to assist the physician, to carry out certain treatments, 
and to observe the infant for any abnormal symptoms…The nurse should be given 
instructions in regard to her procedure in case the infant has any of these 
symptoms. A complete understanding between physician and nurse as to 
procedures in case of emergency is essential. Optimal environmental temperature 
and humidity should be maintained.138 
                                                            
136 Helen Callon. “The Premature Infant’s Nurse,” AJN 63, no. 2 (February 1963): 103–5. 
137 Ibid. Perry, Oral History interview. 7.  
138 Ethel Dunham. Premature Infants: A Manual for Physicians (New York, N.Y.: Hoeber-Harper, 1955). 
104-105. 
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Such instruction to physicians highlights the prominence of a nurse’s constant presence at 
the bedside, the importance of good communication between the nurse and physician, and 
an expectation that the nurse would be able to react to administer emergency care in the 
immediate absence of the physician.  
 According to typical routines published in a textbook authored by physician Julius 
Hess and nurse Evelyn Lundeen, nurses in these units did everything from bathe the 
babies to hang feedings to clean the units. They maintained linens and administered some 
medications. They were expected to document specific newborn patient care and constant 
patient assessment and condition in addition to performing bedside tasks, unit 
maintenance, medication administration, and training of other nursing personnel when 
required.139 During a time when nurses often nursed all over the hospital with generalized 
knowledge, this recognition of the nurse who could assess the patient and provide 
specialized emergency care meant that these nurses had particular skills. The physician’s 
role included working closely and communicating thoroughly with the premature infant’s 
nurse. 
Nursing, research and knowledge development 
 
Some nurses collected and recorded in the patients’ charts data necessary for the 
investigative projects and research, and worked closely with physicians and researchers 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
139 Ibid. Hess and Lundeen. The Premature Infant. 48-51.  
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to ensure any research procedures and equipment did not interfere with good care.140 
While not common, one nurse developed a research protocol herself. For example, nurse 
consultant with the National Department of Health, Education and Welfare Eileen 
Hasselmeyer, published a research study in 1961 carried out between 1958 and 1960, 
outlining a nurse run research project to study the relationship of nursing practice to 
general improvement of infants in premature infant units.141 The goal of the study was to 
standardize certain aspects of nursing care including patient clothing, temperature 
assessment, techniques of gavage feeding, and skin care. The protocol included forms for 
gathering data, complete screening tools, and charting instructions. The study resulted in 
a general observation that the standards of nursing care in twelve premature infant 
nurseries varied incredibly. While the actual results were important, the study was the 
groundbreaking in that sought the scientific evidence behind what had long been 
considered ‘excellent nursing care.’142    
According to Hasselmeyer, her discussions with nurses in these units revealed a 
desire to know more about specific aspects of good nursing care of the premature infant 
                                                            
140 Marvin Cornblath, Evelyn Lundeen, Mary Morrison, and Lester Wishingrad. “Research and Nursing 
Care in the Premature Nursery,” AJN 62, no. 7 (July 1962): 92–96. 
141 Established premature infant physician Emmett Holt commented of Hasselmeyer’s study: “Segregated 
as [the premature infant] is in an antiseptic environment, often in an incubator, he has been 
relatively inaccessible for study. Even the doctor approaches him as infrequently as possible. His 
closest companion and in consequence his most interested observer is the nurse, who, however, is 
seldom equipped by training to make scientific observations. A notable exception is 
[Hasselmeyer]…skilled in the art of nursing and a meticulous observer, she…has set up a 
study…so carefully thought out and executed as to be a model.” Eileen Hasselmeyer. Behavior 
Patterns of Premature Infants. Washington D.C.: US Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, 1961.  
142 Eileen Hasselmeyer. Behavior Patterns of Premature Infants. Washington D.C.: US Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, 1961. 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/shcgi/pt?id=mdp.39015086810465;view=1up;seq=3.  
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so that better care could be given. Hasselmeyer hoped this study would render solid data, 
but also that it would encourage other nurses, physicians, hospital administrators, and 
researchers to produce their own studies to answer the plethora of questions yet to be 
addressed regarding better standards of premature infant care.143 These nurses knew how 
to care for the basic newborn needs as well as unique needs of medically fragile 
premature infants. These nurses gave constant care through patient assessment and sought 
to communicate changes in patient condition with physicians. Many of these nurses 
wanted more knowledge to provide better care and they actively contributed to shaping 
what that knowledge looked like as they developed research questions, participated in 
research, and contributed to the introduction of new protocols and treatments as 
premature infant units continued to be unique spaces in hospitals well into the late 1950s.  
 No delineated break exists when all premature infant units closed and NICUs 
became the standard of care for sick newborns, but hospitals stopped opening premature 
infant units in the early 1960s and established “intensive care units” for newborns. 
Throughout the 1960s premature units remained in some hospitals while hospitals with 
financial and spatial resources opened intensive care unit for neonates. For a period of 
time both existed in separate forms, but by the 1970s most premature infant units had 
closed and NICUs became the standard in hospitals across the country that could afford 
to give specialized care to newborn populations. Great advances were made in the ability 
to combine newborns requiring additional care in the same space without experiencing 
                                                            
143 [Memo from Eileen Hasselmeyer to Ethel Dunham, March 7, 1958] Dunham, Ethel C. Papers, 1952-
1965. [H MS c158, Box 3: 38]. Harvard Medical Library in the Francis A Countway Library of 
Medicine, Center for the History of Medicine.  
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the drastic spread of disease among all patients.144 Nurses who worked in premature 
infant units understood particular tenets of sick newborn care that laid foundations for the 
ways NICU nurses cared for sick newborns. NICU nurses still needed to know the 
particulars of thermoregulation, infection control, and nutrition, but they also broadened 
their knowledge base as they needed to know how to care for full term medically fragile 
infants, and post-operative neonates, as well as the new methods of diagnosis and 
treatment unique to newborns.   
“We were the eyes and ears…”: Nursing in early NICUs 
 
 Nurses in neonatal intensive care units addressed the familiar issues of 
thermoregulation, perinatal infection, and nutrition as they also incorporated equipment 
related to electronic monitoring and respiratory support into their day-to-day care. With 
the ability to surgically address congenital malformations, surgeons found there was no 
place their tiny patients could receive the kind of care they needed from nurses who knew 
their particular needs and medical conditions. NICUs opened not as ‘new’ places to care 
for premature infants, but units where all newborns who needed a particular kind of care 
could receive it. Prior to the 1960s, uninfected sick infants received treatment and care in 
premature infant nurseries while infants with suspected infections were treated in 
separate rooms if available. Post-operative neonates were sent to regular post-operative 
floors where children and adults received care in beds right next to them.145 NICUs 
                                                            
144 Ibid. Korones. High-Risk Newborn Infants. 
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became places where newborns could be grouped together based on age and unique 
medical needs rather than diagnosis. The importance of such grouping is that it allowed 
for them to receive nursing care from specialized and trained nurses who knew the issues 
these newborns faced.  Nurses who worked in these units had incredible skills and 
provided care in increasingly complex settings with constantly changing technologies and 
medical practices. When interviewed, these nurses remembered particular aspects of what 
these units looked like, what caring meant in these units, and how they interacted with 
parents and physicians.  
 NICU nurses participated in drastically changing environments as hospitals 
established these units and pushed the bounds to deliver care to increasingly sick and 
complex populations of sick newborns. Nurses worked closely with families who often 
were excluded from these environments in the early years of NICU care, they 
collaborated with physicians, and participated in respiratory treatments for newborns.  
“We didn’t know what we know today.”: Nursing and the importance of families 
 
 Though families were not often allowed in the early units, or their time there was 
restricted, nurses worked hard to consider the parents and include them when possible. 
The focus on the ways progress in technology and medicine could impact survival for 
newborns who needed particular care reflected the social value of children as the center 
of the nuclear family during the post-war years. Within the post-war conceptualization of 
the nuclear family, the value of children and newborns supported a medical focus on 
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ways to lower infant mortality and save sick newborns including premature infants.146 As 
hospitals expanded and more critically ill patients survived in hospitals that evidenced the 
post war technology boom, newborns and children also benefitted from the intersection 
of social values and medical technology. Families valued the progression in technology 
that changed treatment and improved survival rates for critically ill newborns and 
children.  
 By the early 1960s scholarly literature reflected the importance of contextualizing 
the newborn within his family. The American Journal of Nursing published articles in the 
1960s and 1970s educating nurses who cared for and worked with families of sick 
newborns.147 Two such articles published the early 1960s took a close look particularly at 
the effects of separation on the family and their newborn during the infant’s hospital stay 
as well as the nurse’s role in supporting parents throughout the process. While units took 
individual approaches with their policies, these articles and textbooks148 concentrated on 
educating nurses who worked with newborns to include the families and provide 
empathetic care that fostered relationships between the parents and newborns despite 
periods of separation.  
                                                            
146 Steven Mintz. Huck’s Raft: A History of American Childhood (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2004). 
147 Helen Callon. “The Premature Infant’s Nurse,” AJN 63, no. 2 (February 1963): 103–5.; C. Owens. 
“Parents’ Response to Premature Birth,” The American Journal of Nursing 60, no. 8 (1960): 
1113–18.; C. Miller. “Working with Parents of High-Risk Infants,” The American Journal of 
Nursing 78, no. 7 (1978): 1228–30. 
148 For example see: Jean Lancaster. “Impact of intensive care on the maternal-infant relationship,” High-
Risk Newborn Infants: The Basis for Intensive Nursing Care. Ed. Sheldon Korones (Saint Louis, 
MO: The C.V. Mosby Company, 1976). 236-243.  
 
 
	  
80	  
 While the articles focused on educating and encouraging nursing staff to 
empathetically care for newborns and their families, they also addressed tensions that 
existed. Nurses functioned as caregivers often in the absence of parents. One article 
encouraging nurses to understand the effects of separation told the story of one nurse’s 
reaction after her patient’s mother called to say she could not take her baby home, 
“Walking over to Kay’s crib, the nurse affectionately looked down at the infant…‘If your 
mother had worked as hard as I did to keep you alive, she would rush right over here to 
get you.’”149 Such sentiments would have contributed to complex attitudes regarding who 
had the authority to make decisions regarding patient care. While any infant belongs to 
his family, nurses who cared for these infants might have experienced attachments and 
tensions when relating to families requiring the types of education made explicit in some 
articles during the time.   
For NICU nurses, the involvement of the parents was an important aspect of their 
approach to care. The nurses who worked in these units all remembered different aspects 
of working with families, but they all remembered working with them whether the 
parents were present in the unit or communicated with the nurses over the phone. Nurses 
reflected the importance of the family in how they spoke of their practice. One nurse 
remembered how much she enjoyed educating the parents about their newborns. Nurse 
Laura Mendell remembered the lack of resources for families back then. In her 
discussions and involvement with families, Ms. Mendell assessed that these parents had 
few resources outside the hospital for learning how to care for their infants and preparing 
                                                            
149 Ibid. Callon. The Premature Infant’s Nurse. 103–5. 
 
 
	  
81	  
to take them home. She remembered doing a great deal of teaching with the families and 
working hard to fill in knowledge gaps for parents whether they came in for the day 
classes or could only come at night. She spoke with intensity regarding the importance of 
educating and including families as a critical aspect to the nursing care she gave.  
 The nurses learned to work with families who experienced separation from their 
newborns during the early weeks of life, a period known to be incredibly important in 
childhood development today. One nurse remembered, “We always worried about 
parents who were disconnecting. That was just an informal thing we did.”150 While no 
formal system was in place, the nurses noticed and monitored familial involvement even 
though there may not have been any formal monitoring policy. Nurses interviewed 
expressed feelings of empathy for parents who were not present to watch the progress 
their babies made. Some nurses talked about wanting the parents to bond with their 
newborns, and did what they could to encourage bonding despite the separation, the 
stress of having a baby in the NICU, and struggles with the sometimes constantly 
changing medical conditions of the patients. The nurses occasionally experienced 
situations where they would not hear from parents for days at a time.151 In these cases, if 
the hospital had adequate social work department, the nursing staff contacted social work 
to get involved to provide support for families facing a range of challenges ranging from 
financial to emotional and sometimes physical.  
                                                            
150 Jane Barnsteiner. Oral History interview by Briana Ralston, January 9, 2014. 
151 Ibid. Barnsteiner. Oral History interview.; Laura Mendel. Oral History interview by Briana Ralston, 
January 9, 2014.; Roxanne Geidel Oellrich. Oral History interview by Briana Ralston August 11, 
2014. 
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 By the 1970s, textbooks included chapters on caring for families and evidenced a 
focus on involvement with parents and a working to include them.152 While the concept 
of family grew and changed by the 1970s, the necessity to focus on the newborn as part 
of a family unit became more nuanced. In May 1974, an interdisciplinary group of 
specialists met to discuss the current ethical issues in neonatal medicine and care. While 
discussion focused on the decision making processes related to congenital malformations 
and the resuscitation of extremely preterm infants, discourse came back to the ultimate 
question of who had the authority to make those decisions and clarity about how to 
navigate tensions when that authority was exercised.153 Nurses faced these tensions and 
had to navigate their role within occasional ambiguity as to who had the authority to 
make decisions about the babies.  
 The unique emphasis placed on the consideration of separation of patient from 
family emerged as an important part of nursing care for the NICU nurses, an aspect not 
considered with the same intensity in adult populations. Nurses consistently valued the 
importance of the effects of separation that resulted in a focus on including the families 
and seeking ways to ensure parents were able to bond with their children. They learned to 
communicate with non-medical terms and took into consideration their patients’ medical 
state and how that affected the family unit during a time referred to by historian Elaine 
                                                            
152 C. Miller. “Working with Parents of High-Risk Infants,” The American Journal of Nursing 78, no. 7 
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153 [Ethical Issues in Newborn Intensive Care: A conference report.] Clement Smith (MC 4) Boston 
Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 1, folder 40. 
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Tyler May as a time with a greater focus on the nuclear family as an important post-war 
concept. These nurses worked closely with the families and they also worked in close 
collaboration with other nurses and physicians when decisions needed to be made 
regarding patient treatment and day-to-day care.  
Highly skilled professionals: Collaboration and trust in the NICU  
 
 During this time, there was no standard education tract for nurses who wanted to 
work in the NICU. While some units allowed nursing students to observe and participate 
in care in the late 1960s and early 1970s, not all nurses who worked in these units had 
received any particular training beyond care of the healthy newborn prior to their first day 
on the job.154 Similar to the nurses in adult ICUs, many nurses in the new ICUs learned 
their skills from NICU nurses already experienced on the units as well as nurse 
managers.155 By 1972, textbooks for the care of medically fragile newborn infants, such 
as High Risk Newborn Infants: The basis for intensive nursing care, authored by Sheldon 
Korones appeared for educational purposes.156 Training programs such as the continuing 
education program at Michael Reese and in Denver did exist at this time and some nurses 
would have attended. Overall, the nurses who either chose the NICU or were assigned 
there needed to be able to learn quickly and creatively as they cared for the medically 
unstable patients. They needed to work well with other nurses and with physicians on the 
                                                            
154	  Ibid. Barnsteiner. Oral History interview, 1-2; Ibid. Oellrich. Oral History interview, Pt 2, 1-3. 	  
155 This reflects the training practices in many premature infant units. Though training programs existed 
particularly at Michael Reese, usually only nurse managers and head nurses were sent from the 
nursing staff. They would then return to the units and educate the nursing personnel.  
156 Ibid. Korones. High-Risk Newborn Infants; A second edition followed just four years later in 1976.  
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units who also taught particular skills pertaining to patient assessment, treatment, and 
equipment.  
 Collaboration among nurses, and between nurses and physicians played a crucial 
role in the day-to-day happenings on the units. Nurses remembered being highly valued 
members of the healthcare team. In interviews, they communicated, “The doctors always 
valued your opinion,”157 and “They had to work with us as team members.”158 One nurse, 
Roxanne Geidel Oellrich, who worked her way up to supervisor in her NICU in the 
1970s, remembered what it was like to function as a “professional,” a term she associated 
with feelings of being valued by her fellow nurses and the physicians who worked on the 
unit. Ms. Oellrich remembered, “a lot of respect between the physicians and the 
nurses.”159 She spoke of the incredible professionalism of the women she worked with. 
Her story contrasts the old traditional nursing caps and hierarchical interactions of her 
nursing school days to her experiences in the NICU where she and her nursing team were 
considered the eyes and ears of the unit. They knew the condition of their patients. The 
physicians recognized that, and both worked in intense collaboration.  
 One such physician, Dr. Don Null who worked in Texas at Wilford Hall, 
Lackland Air Force Base credited the nurses with intense responsibility and dedication 
during his NICU days in the 1960s and 1970s. To Dr. Null, the nurses always wanted to 
see new equipment work for the patient and ultimately they wanted the unit to thrive. He 
                                                            
157 Laura Mendel. Oral History interview by Briana Ralston, January 9, 2014. 4. 
158 Ibid. Barnsteiner. Oral History interview January 9, 2014. 13.  
159 Ibid. Oellrich. Oral History interview August 11, 2014. Pt 2, p 13.  
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remembered, “that is why we were successful because they put their time into it and 
moved forward with it.” While the nurses would not have been the only factor that 
ensured the success of the NICU – the story is far more complex than that – the 
participation of the nurses and the relationships they had with physicians and other 
healthcare staff ensured an environment where risks could be taken and research and new 
methods of treatment and care attempted as these units grew and developed. Such 
relationships were both influential for the patients as well as empowering for the nursing 
staff. NICU nurses, like their premature infant unit predecessors, had expertise in patient 
care and the physicians trusted the nurses to perform assessments and to know when their 
patients’ conditions changed.  
“So we would MacGyver160 things”: Making the system work for their tiny patients 
 
Nurses who worked in these units in the 1960s and 1970s remember the 
drastically changing equipment – monitors, IV set ups, respiratory technologies, and the 
ways these resources coupled with what was considered more traditional equipment such 
as the incubator and feeding tubes. For many, the new monitoring and respiratory 
equipment found in the neonatal intensive care units were what made the units new, 
different, and truly ICUs: “We truly became a NICU in that we had all the kids on 
                                                            
160 The term “MacGyver” references a 1980s TV show staring Richard Dean Anderson as a character 
known only by his last name, MacGyver. He was a jack of all trades and was known not only for 
getting himself out of sticky situations using his knowledge of biology, physics and chemistry, but 
for doing it with everyday common tools such as rubber bands, tube socks, and his pocket knife. 
The nurse’s use of the term “to MacGyver something” reflects the ways she remembered fixing 
complex problems with her knowledge of the situation and the common tools she had on hand.   
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ventilators, oxygen, etcetera.”161 The equipment stood out to them as influential to both 
how they functioned in the space as well as how their care changed during their time in 
the units.  
 Neonatal nursing required ingenuity and a constant learning curve for these 
nurses. Many who worked in these units stepped into worlds where new equipment was 
constantly integrated into practice, methods of diagnosis and treatment constantly 
changed, and where they often lacked supplies appropriate in size for their patient 
population. The 1960s were a time of rapid infusion of new machines and technologies as 
well as incredible amounts of funding to expand and establish units. This meant these 
nurses needed to be able to learn quickly, integrate new policies and knowledge into their 
nursing practice fluidly, and make due with whatever equipment they had on hand. As 
new treatments became available for patients, much of the equipment to deliver the new 
interventions did not come in sizes small enough for newborns. 
 Nurses faced the challenges of trying to make equipment for children and adults 
work for much smaller bodies. As medical equipment and treatment modalities 
developed, companies did not initially produce the equipment in sizes and amounts small 
enough for two to ten pound patients. This meant nurses sometimes needed to devise 
ways to ensure tools, medications, and equipment made for adults worked for their tiny 
infants. One nurse remembered beginning peritoneal dialysis on a neonatal patient using 
adult supplies; she remembered having to measure out very small amounts of the dialysis 
fluid and concocting her own tray system: “I just remember winging it…chest tubes and 
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all that stuff wasn’t really made for the size of the babies. So you would MacGyver 
things.”162 Another nurse described how she and her colleagues used to make their own 
masks to deliver continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP)163 for the infants since they 
did not come in sizes small enough. They took scalpels and sliced pediatric nasal 
cannulas down adding stopcocks and tubing where needed to piece together the 
equipment that would fit their patients. As the nurses constructed the facemasks, they 
literally made their own CPAP setups.164 Such practices show how the nurses not only 
mastered thermoregulation and nutrition, more traditional care practices by that point, 
they tweaked and adapted new methods of treatment and the equipment to make those 
treatments work for patients for whom the companies did not traditionally manufacture 
the equipment. Another nurse remembered using red rubber urethral catheters for chest 
tubes on the small infants as chest tubes for neonates could not be ordered from any 
manufacturing company at the time. She attached the red rubber catheters to corrugated 
oxygen tubing that she connected to a bottle of water with a carefully measured volume 
of water needed to provide the appropriate water pressure for the system. The nurses did 
not have what they needed, so they improvised.  
Nurses were not the only ones who recognized that some of the equipment needed 
to be altered for their patients. Throughout the 1960s, respiratory distress continued to be 
a leading cause of death in premature and sick newborns and the ventilators 
                                                            
162 Ibid. Mendel. Oral History interview. 7.  
163 CPAP is the administration of positive airway pressure to the patient in an attempt to aid in ventilation 
and thus respiration.  
164 Ibid. Oellrich. Oral History interview. Pt 1, pg 5. 
 
 
	  
88	  
manufactured for adults made no significant clinical differences when used with 
newborns. With the establishment of these new neonatal intensive care units, more 
aggressive treatment of newborn diseases and medical problems were used and nurses 
played integral roles in that process as research progressed and researchers and 
physicians sought better treatments for respiratory distress. 
Keep them breathing: Mechanical Ventilation and Nursing Care. 
 
Artificial ventilation for neonates was not a mid-20th century idea but took over a 
century to become the standard of practice. Alexander Graham Bell’s 1889 invention, a 
body-enclosing ventilator for newborn infants provided negative pressure ventilatory 
support. He observed “many children, especially those prematurely born, die from 
inability to expand their lungs sufficiently when they take their first breath…”165 The 
American Association for the Advancement of Science did not accept Bell’s apparatus 
(for reasons unstated in the literature) and the equipment ended up at a museum in 
Baddeck, Nova Scotia.166, 167 Over the next century, physicians and researchers proposed 
many methods of artificial ventilation. Throughout the 1960s, physicians and researchers 
                                                            
165 Leo Stern, Angeles Ramos, Eugene Outerbridge, and Pierre Beaudry. “Negative Pressure Artificial 
Respiration: Use in Treatment of Respiratory Failure of the Newborn,” The Canadian Medical 
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Ibid. Stern, Ramos, Outerbridge, and Beaudry. Negative Pressure Artificial Respiration. 595–601. 
167 Negative pressure ventilation was not accepted as a standard of care. A nurse who worked at the 
Hospital for the University of Pennsylvania in the 1960s remembered an old infant negative 
pressure ventilator she described as a newborn iron lung that had been left along the back wall of 
the storage closet. Her manager told her that “it just never worked.” While beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, the reasons negative pressure ventilation did not work would be an interesting 
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continued to organize meetings with greater frequency to attempt to pool knowledge and 
determine the issues at hand and the best steps to move forward. This led to the 
utilization of many different forms of treatment and a broad range of research done in this 
branch of medicine. While attempts to define and understand respiratory distress 
syndrome continued to be the focus of collaboration, attempts to treat the disease 
continued to be entrepreneurial and independent.  
Clinicians tried many different means to curb the respiratory distress that plagued 
premature infants. Physicians published in scholarly medical journals regarding their 
work on inhaled aerosol mists,168 the Bloxsom Air Lock that altered the atmospheric 
pressure within the incubator environment,169 negative pressure ventilation,170 and 
metabolic intravenous compensation to address the results of insufficient ventilation.171 
Among these approaches, continuous positive airway pressure emerged as the standard of 
care by the mid 1970s.172 The developments required for positive pressure ventilation to 
                                                            
168 Robert Denton and Charles Ross. “Mist-O-Gen Therapy and Postural Drainage for Respiratory 
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emerge as standard included the invention and innovation of such parts as endotracheal 
tubes and facemasks.173 These diverse attempts to treat the problem resulted in varying 
success, but they all arose in tandem with general attempts to improve the administration 
of positive pressure ventilation (PPV).  
Respiratory Distress: Its definition and treatment. 
 
 We know today that respiratory distress syndrome (RDS) occurs when infants are 
born before their lungs have fully developed in utero. Though respiratory distress can be 
seen in full term infants, RDS predominantly occurs in infants born before 28 weeks 
gestation.174 Normally developed lungs produce surfactant, a substance the lungs produce 
to that protects the air sacs from collapsing and help the lungs inflate with air, but infants 
who are born before the lungs begin to produce this substance suffer from difficulty 
breathing. Today, treatments such as the administration of artificial surfactant, the use of 
oxygen and ventilator support, and in severe cases extracorporeal membrane oxygenation 
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(ECMO)175 may be used, but these treatments are relatively recent phenomena. Before 
the early 1970s, RDS was associated with extremely high mortality rates.  
Initially the administration of oxygen to infants showing signs of respiratory 
distress became standard practice, as often the infants often showed great signs of clinical 
improvement with this treatment.176 Oxygen was administered using various forms of 
oxygen tents, adapted bassinets or incubators, or some form of chamber into which 
oxygen would be pumped.177 Unfortunately, by the late 1940s, researchers and clinicians 
noted unanticipated consequence of high oxygen administration called Retrolental 
Fibroplasia (RLF). RLF affected the blood vessels of the eyes in prematurely born 
infants who had received oxygen therapy in relation to respiratory distress.  
Researchers and physicians sought to tease out the etiology and best practices for 
treatment for infants suffering from respiratory issues without predisposing these infants 
to blindness resulting from RLF. Beginning in the 1950s, published studies examining 
hyaline membranes of infants who had died after exhibiting severe respiratory distress 
outlined findings and sought to aid in potential pre-morbid diagnosis.178 Physicians and 
                                                            
175 ECMO is a form of respiratory support in which blood is directly oxygenated using a machine that 
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nurses were torn between the initial respiratory improvement in infants when given 
oxygen and the possibility of eventual blindness later thought to be associated with high 
levels of oxygen administration. Research began internationally and publications ensued 
on the phenomena and how to prevent the blindness epidemic.179 Clearly respiratory 
complications and the best ways to treat babies who suffered from distress also posed a 
paramount threat to the care of prematurely born infants.  
Researchers and clinicians collaborated and came together at conferences, through 
scholarly communities, and via publication of their findings. At the 1951 M&R (Ross) 
Pediatric Research Conference pulmonary hyaline membranes and RDS took center stage 
with research and presentations focused on the issue. The same year a symposium, 
Anoxia of the New-Born Infant, convened under The Council of International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (UNESCO and WHO).180 Researchers and clinicians 
scrambled to find a way to curb the mortality rates and treat respiratory distress in sick 
neonates. In 1959, physician Mary Ellen Avery published her groundbreaking research 
on surfactant. Though surfactant treatment would not become part of standard treatment 
until the 1980s, her pathological discovery introduced new dimensions to the 
contemporary state of the science.  
Avery’s work gave physicians and researchers a cause for RDS, and thus 
contributed to how physicians thought about the problem as well as how research chose 
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to study new treatments. South African Researchers Harrison, Heese, and Klein 
discovered the benefits of  “grunting “in infants who suffered from respiratory distress 
and published findings in 1968.181 Grunting improved infants’ color and oxygenation.182 
Physician George Gregory and his team built on Harrison et al’s research by applying 
continuous positive airway pressure for intubated infants in an attempt to artificially 
recreate the same affect that grunting created for the infants. The development of CPAP 
applied either via a pressure tube or an endotracheal tube resulted in positive effects for 
the infants in the trial.183  
Respiratory treatments: Attempts to provide respiratory support  
 
These new NICUs and the need for advances to treat RDS coincided with the 
post-war increases in research funding, the technology boom, and major medical 
discoveries and advances.184 American society became enamored of moon-landings, 
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computer intelligence, and new understandings of human DNA. Medical discoveries 
littered the evening news shows and popular magazines such as TIME displayed covers 
that gave visual representation to the dynamically changing state of science, medicine, 
and technology in the United States at that time. Even normal newborn nurseries took on 
an altered look as hospitals changed and reconfigured. The development of ‘high tech’ 
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures for pregnant women and their infants changed the 
landscape of labor and delivery and the hospital care newborns received.185, 186 Neonatal 
intensive care units became places where parents could expect the fruit of American 
ingenuity and medical science to save their infants who just decades before would have 
died.  
The physiologic changes NASA observed in their astronauts translated to 
newborn infants as both astronauts and infants traversing the events of birth experienced 
adaptations to gravity and the environment, alterations in blood pressure, blood counts, 
and electrolyte balances, and fluid retention. Technologies used in space travel and 
military realms also took on new applications with the neonatal population such as 
Doppler detection of pulses in newborns and the use of sonar waves as ultrasounds 
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became a standard of maternal care leading up to birth. Early forms of respiratory support 
for fighter pilots became integrated into adult ventilators that were the foundation for 
positive pressure ventilation in the newborn populations. These technologies made their 
way into NICUs in the 1960s and 1970s when groups of researchers and clinicians 
adapted these technologies to their smallest patient populations.  
 
 
“You would know…you could feel.”: Nursing’s role in respiratory support 
 
 Positive pressure ventilators existed for adults, but required modification for the 
smaller infant populations found in the NICUs. Ventilators used for adults often had tidal 
volumes that approached up to 1000mL. A ten mL deviation for an adult might not have 
drastic effects, but ten mL could be a dangerous deviation and damage the lung of a 
three-pound neonate.187 Until physicians and nurses could depend on machines to deliver 
consistently precise volumes of air, they did not fully trust the machines and many found 
alternative ways to provide positive pressure respiratory support. As neonatologist Dr. 
George Gregory remembered, “Because the available mechanical ventilators frequently 
were ineffective, we and others [the nurses] sometimes ventilated neonates who had 
HMD [hyaline membrane disease] by hand for 48 to 72 hours.”188 Other nurses remember 
‘hand bagging,’ a term they used to describe the act of using an apparatus called an 
                                                            
187 Donald Null, Bradley Yoder and Robert Geronimo. “Early Neonatal Research at Wilford Hall US 
Airforce Medical Center,” Pediatrics 129 (2012): S20–S26. 
188 George Gregory, “Continuous Positive Airway Pressure,” NeoReviews S, no. 1 (January 2004): c1–c4. 
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Ambu bag that is shaped like a balloon and when squeezed pushes the air into the patients 
lungs and manually provides breaths for a patient. It took skills to constantly assess the 
patient’s color and condition to know if you were ‘bagging’ correctly as monitors were 
just becoming more commonplace in the units at this time. Nurse Roxanne Oellrich 
remembered,  
We would start bagging them until they went into that diuretic phase, where you 
could feel that they started having increased urine output and you would not have 
to bag as hard. You could feel the compliancy of their lungs change. You would 
know when they were getting better. You could feel when they would blow a 
pneumothorax, just from bagging.189  
 
For Ms. Oellrich, ‘hand bagging’ did not only mean knowing how to work with the 
Ambu bag, but also intimately knowing how that piece of equipment interacted with her 
patient. Ultimately she had the skills and expertise to know how her patient’s condition 
changed based on how she experienced using the Ambu bag. The attending physician on 
the unit taught the nurses to bag, how much pressure to create with the way they bagged, 
and the volume of air they could push into each infant’s small lungs. The nurses did not 
have pulse oximeters to measure oxygen levels in the blood as today’s nurses do, so they 
looked at the baby’s color and assessed the baby while bagging to know if they were 
bagging well. Ms. Oellrich described how she learned to bag with one hand and write 
nursing notes with the other. Medical students provided short breaks for nurses if needed, 
but the nurses learned to prepare all medications and supplies they could anticipate prior 
to starting their shift.  
                                                            
189 Ibid. Oellrich. Oral History interview. Pt 1, pg 5-6. 
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 Another nurse who started her career at a New York City hospital remembered 
when ventilators were eventually introduced on her unit in the 1970s. On her unit, the 
infants were placed on eight hour bagging shifts as the nurses bagged for a set amount of 
time each hour. This meant after bagging for the majority of each hour as little as only 
five to ten minutes out of every hour was left to hang feeds, take vital signs, and perform 
hygiene tasks such as changing diapers. As time progressed, physicians began to 
introduce ventilators to the units. One nurse remembered not necessarily accepting these 
new tools without question:  
[The fellow] began to introduce ventilators into more common practice, not as a 
last resort. And we [the nurses] had to transition into learning…and at first I 
didn’t like them [the ventilators] because I thought ‘That’s my job. I can do it 
better.’190 
 
These skills required the nurse to be incredibly vigilant, have expert assessment 
skills, know how to bag well and whether or not how they bagged was working 
for the patient, and be able to do other jobs accurately and efficiently. They took 
ownership of the practice of bagging only handing it off when absolutely 
necessary. Their ability to incorporate good respiratory support into other nursing 
responsibilities, as Ms. Oellrich remembered bagging while writing notes, shows 
their ingenuity and intense involvement in patient care in early NICUs.  
Mechanical ventilation: Did it work for newborns?   
 
                                                            
190 Carroll Kruger. Personal interview with Briana Ralston, November 19, 2010. 
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 By the 1970s, hospitals began to adopt the ventilator machines in greater 
numbers. During this process, nurses needed to have the skills to both ventilate the 
infants by hand via bagging as well as the skill to use the ventilator machines adapted for 
the neonatal population. Articles meant to educate nurses and physicians also began to 
appear in medical and nursing journals in the 1960s and 1970s that discussed nursing care 
of the ventilated neonate, and suggested the necessity of good nursing care to provide 
appropriate respiratory care to this patient population. The American Journal of Nursing 
published multiple articles addressing the advances in positive pressure ventilator 
technologies and different methods of administering the respiratory support the premature 
infants needed.191 Articles, published in other disciplinary journals addressed the pieces 
of equipment needed to deliver the precise volumes of air and concentrations of oxygen 
as well as the need for adequately trained nursing personnel. Dr. George Brumley, a 
noted pediatrician, commented: 
It is imperative that the physician responsible for such infants be informed as to 
the competence of the [nursing] personnel and the specific coverage to be 
provided for the infant in question. Lucey's assessment of the Intensive Care 
Nursery as a place where "people care intensely" epitomizes this consideration 
and appropriately relegates facilities and equipment to their proper, necessary, but 
subordinate role.192 
 
                                                            
191 Ackerman, Bruce, Michael Stein, Scott Sommer, and Marion Schumacher. “Continuous Positive Airway 
Pressure Applied by Means of a Tight-Fitting Face-Mask,” The Journal of Pediatrics 85, no. 3 
(September 1974): 408–11. ; Dyanne Affonso and Thomas Harris. “Continuous Positive Airway 
Pressure,” American Journal of Nursing 76, no. 4 (1976): 570–73.; Judith Garvey, “Infant 
Respiratory Distress Syndrome,” American Journal of Nursing 75, no. 4 (April 1975): 614–617.; 
Claire Naelpka, “The Oxygen Hood for Newborns in Respiratory Distress,” American Journal of 
Nursing 75, no. 12 (December 1975): 2185–2187. 
192 George Brumley. “The Critically Ill Child: The Respiratory Distress Syndrome of the Newborn,” 
Pediatrics 47, no. 4 (April 1971): 765. 
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Recognizing the need to make headway in treating respiratory distress in 
newborns, leading experts in the field of neonatal care gathered at thee 1968 Ross 
Conference on Pediatric Research.193 This seminal conference assembled the leading 
physicians and researchers in the field as well as the latest research in neonatal medicine 
within the changing scene of neonatal intensive care. The topics included a discussion of 
the evidence that intensive care units changed survival rates, assessment of artificial 
respiration, and evidence for monitoring of blood pressure, among other things. The use 
of artificial ventilation for neonates took center stage at one moderated session as 
physicians and researchers discussed whether or not ventilators used for newborns 
actually did save lives.194, 195   
Dr. Paul Swyer196 moderated a session focused on artificial ventilation for 
critically ill newborns. Physicians present at the conference delineated the hazards, 
                                                            
193 The Ross Conferences were a series of conferences on pediatric research designed to connect leading 
researchers and recent research findings in an effort to stimulate further research by the exchange 
of information. Ross Laboratories, now known as Abbott Laboratories, funded the conferences 
with the ultimate goal of improving the care of infants and children. The conferences did not 
necessarily have the goal of problem solving, but sought to integrate knowledge to stimulate 
discussion and raise questions among a group of interdisciplinary experts in particular fields. The 
topics ranged from international child health (1964) to pediatric surgery (1958) to learning 
disorders in children (1971). Dewey Sehring. “Continuing Physician Education: The Ross 
Conference Approach,” American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 46 (1987): 192–197. 
194 Report of the 59th Ross Conference on Pediatric Research. Problems of Neonatal Intensive Care Units. 
(Address given at the University of Vermont College of Medicine, Stowe, VT: Ross Labratories, 
August 4, 1968). 
195 This seminal conference was the first time these physicians all gathered in the same place to discuss 
issues focused on definition of critical care for newborns. This conversation suggested more 
universal NICU standards be determined regarding what infants received more nationally 
standardized NICU care. It also points to the end of the premature infant era as the need to identify 
definitions of ‘intensive care’ became more important.  
196 Dr. Paul Swyer immigrated to Canada from the UK in 1953 to accept a position at Toronto’s Hospital 
for Sick Children. By 1955 he was the second neonatal fellow employed by the hospital. He 
played an important role in the establishment of the hospital’s neonatal intensive care unit in 1961 
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benefits, and ultimate assessment of the use of artificial respiration in the newborn. 
Ultimately they concluded, in its current state, the use of artificial respiration for neonates 
was relatively limited and did not provide lavish alterations in the mortality rates for 
prematurely born neonates. When ventilators were used,  
…the type of instrument has much less influence on the outcome than the 
organization behind it. I say organization advisedly, because it is perfectly 
obvious that the success of artificial ventilation in the newborn, even more than 
the adult, depends on the service and skills of a team of nurses, physicians, 
laboratory workers, and technicians applied unremittingly for 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week.197 
 
The experts assembled did not yet know the most effective methods of 
implementing ventilator use with the newborn patient population, but they 
recognized the machine was only a small piece of the puzzle. Provider after 
provider highlighted the need for staffing the unit with skilled personnel that 
included nurses. While he called the nurses out specifically, first in order, he also 
affirmed the reality of a team of healthcare providers who worked with those 
nurses each providing specific aspects of care.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
– a unit that consisted of one small cubical referred to by some in the institution as “Swyer’s 
Vegetable Garden” due to a combination of lack of belief that prematurely born infants could be 
saved and the research Swyer was doing to try to save these infants. He went on to have a highly 
successful career both in his medical practice – he trained hundreds of neonatal fellows, in 
establishing and growing the NICU at Sick Kids, and contributing keystone knowledge through 
his research in mechanical ventilator for newborns, premature infant nutrition, and neonatal 
transport and regionalization for newborn services; CN Reese and J Reese. “Reflections on the 
Early Years of Neonataology: Paul R. Swyer, The Beginnings of Canadian Neonatology a the 
Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto and Reflections on His Early Career,” E-Journal of 
Neonatology Research 3, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 47–57. 
197 Paul Swyer, Paul. Report of the 59th Ross Conference on Pediatric Research. Presentation. Problems of 
Neonatal Intensive Care Units. “Assessment of Artificial Respirator of the Newborn,” (Address 
given at the University of Vermont College of Medicine, Stowe, VT: Ross Laboratories, August 4, 
1968). 31.  
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Studies conducted with various methods of mechanical ventilation 
between 1965 and 1968 presented at the 1968 Ross Conference on Pediatric 
Research summarized the general conclusion, “the potential for salvage by 
artificial ventilation [was] relatively limited.”198 According to the studies done at 
that time, the ventilator with the best results in ventilation was a negative-
pressure ventilator.199 Even with comparison studies, the experts assembled did 
not agree the data was solid; populations and studies varied broadly, as did the 
way physicians used ventilators and the requirements for initiating ventilator 
therapy. The studies simply highlighted a, “…general impression from going 
over the literature is that it is not the machine that makes the difference – it is the 
people that run it, and the organization behind it.”200 Up until this point, no piece 
of ventilator equipment used by physicians and nurses had proven to be a 
consistently effective tool.  
Ventilators used at the time, initially developed for adults, did not 
produce significant clinical results and helped only a handful of sick neonates. 
While some used positive pressure ventilation, no universal standard of care 
existed. Many used positive pressure ventilation as a last resort or continued to 
research how to use it to greatest benefit to save lives, and many units had nurses 
                                                            
198 Ibid. Ross Conference, 1968. Assessment of Artificial Respirator. 29. 
199 I have been unable to identify the specific model used as identified in the abstract for the conference 
where this research was presented does not seem to have the information referenced by the 
moderator. This could be an interesting vein to explore more, but I have been unable to determine 
the data. 
200 Ibid. Ross Conference, 1968. Assessment of Artificial Respirator. 29.  
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hand bag the newborns they felt could benefit from such treatment and care. 
Companies such as the Bourns Company produced ventilators they labeled for 
sale as newborn ventilators, but they produced only a certain amount and did not 
invest in the market as these machines were not in high demand due to unclear 
impact on survival rates. The Bourns infant ventilators were cited in studies but 
did not emerge as a leader in newborn ventilator equipment. NICUs continued to 
open and were filled with infants requiring additional respiratory support; 
physicians, researchers, and nurses knew too many infants died and one group, in 
San Antonio, Texas, pushed the bounds to make newborn incubator technology 
effective for infants. 
The Baby Bird Ventilator 
 
In 1969, a group of physicians and a respiratory therapist at Lackland Air Force 
Base in San Antonio, Texas developed a pediatric volume ventilator they believed 
addressed the need for an infant ventilator while taking into consideration the unique 
physiologic issues researchers had identified and outlined over the course of the 
preceding two decades. Under the direction of neonatologist Dr. Robert DeLemos, 
respiratory therapist Jimmy Schultz, and anesthesiologist Dr. Robert Kirby worked 
together on a prototype ventilator they would later call the Baby Bird Ventilator. 
Working with a group of fellows, including Dr. Don Null, they decided to see what they 
could do to address two key limitations of contemporary ventilators: limit of flow only 
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during inspiratory cycle, and need for what we now know as positive end expiratory 
pressure (PEEP).  
During this time period the ventilators available for use only provided airflow 
during inspiration of a preset cycle. When the patient breathed in, the ventilator would 
provide a flow of oxygen-enriched air. What made this problematic for neonates is that 
they breathe irregularly and would often end up breathing between breaths pre-set by the 
ventilator. When the infants did this, they would simply rebreathe the carbon dioxide they 
just exhaled thus impairing oxygenation and ventilation. In addition, the ventilators at this 
time did not include PEEP 201 that keeps the alveoli from collapsing. In newborns without 
the soap-like compound surfactant, their alveoli and consequently their lungs collapsed 
every time they took a breath, causing trauma to already delicate lung tissue.202 Drs. 
DeLemos and Kirby wanted a ventilator that had both constant airflow and PEEP, but 
there was not one available.  
Respiratory Therapist Jimmy Schultz, described by one of DeLemos’s fellows as 
“innovative,” took apart an adult Bird ventilator, the Bird VIII, and reassembled it to the 
specifications the physicians required. The men tried the new ventilator on a few cases 
and it worked. After some initial research supporting the ventilator’s use, the team 
approached The Bourns Company. Bourns, a major respiratory therapy company, already 
                                                            
201 PEEP is positive end expiratory pressure or the air that is left in the lung’s alveoli after the completion 
of an exhaled breath that prevents the lungs from completely collapsing before inhalation can 
occur again.  
202 Donald Null. Oral History interview by Briana Ralston, July 16, 2013.Pt 1, 1-3.; Donald Null, Bradley 
Yoder, and Robert Geronimo. “Early Neonatal Research at Wilford Hall US Airforce Medical 
Center,” Pediatrics 129 (2012): S20–S26. 
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manufactured, marketed, and sold, a series of infant ventilators out at the time, but their 
ventilators failed to provide PEEP and continuous positive pressure. The Bourns 
Company rejected the team’s prototype device citing research they had done and 
subsequent determination that there were enough infant ventilators on the market that 
worked. The Company assumed that since the current devices out on the market worked 
for the number of patients who needed them and reflected an absolute ceiling in the 
ventilator’s usefulness in medical practice for neonates.203 Kirby, DeLee, and Shultz 
refused to believe this was the case; they proved their machine worked for newborns and 
they could save infants that previously did not survive when treated.  
Eventually the team approached Dr. Forrest Bird, a bio-engineer for the United 
States military who developed adult ventilators and had a long-standing history 
developing medical apparatus with the military.  Bird built them a machine that could be 
more easily used on infants by medical personnel. He adapted knobs so they could be 
more easily maneuvered. He repackaged the machine to be more accessible to someone 
who had not built it themselves as Schultz had done for Kirby and his team.204 In 1972, 
the team outlined their new infant ventilator in a groundbreaking publication, and called 
the new device the Baby Bird Ventilator. According to Kirby’s team, the Baby Bird “cost 
                                                            
203 I attempted to contact the current company who previously were known as Bournes. They denied having 
records related to their manufacturing of their neonatal ventilators. I also tried to contact Dr. Bird 
with no success.  
204 Ibid. Null. Oral History interview. Pt 1, 1-3. 
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less than $1,500 and was extremely simple to operate.”205 They believed their new 
pediatric ventilator for use with neonates was an inspired solution to a drastic problem.  
In the team’s article, they outlined the mechanical specifics to their prototype 
going so far as to provide a list of parts required for assembly of the machine’s system 
and where to obtain the parts.206 This footnote provides interesting insight into the team’s 
perception of the emergency nature and need of the device. As Dr. Donald Null later 
remembered, “if that baby was doing poorly [use of the Baby Bird prototype ventilator] 
was considered a life saving treatment.”207 Babies died of respiratory distress every day, 
and these men felt that if someone needed the machine before it could be made available 
from the Bird Corporation, then that person should obtain the right to build it himself 
using the same parts Jimmy Schultz used initially in 1969. The machine would not be 
widely available for purchase by hospitals for another two years, and even then the cost 
did remain high.  
The prototype to the Baby Bird Ventilator initially incorporated the continuous 
positive pressure ventilation suggested by Gregory in his 1971 article in the New England 
Journal of Medicine. Gregory and his team built on previous observations that infants in 
respiratory distress who exhibited grunting had higher oxygen levels.208 They concluded 
                                                            
205 Robert Kirby, Elmo Robinson, Jimmy Schultz, and Robert deLemos. “A New Pediatric Volume 
Ventilator,” Anesthesia and Analgesia 50, no. 4 (July 1971): 533. 
206 Ibid. Kirby, Robinson, Schultz, and deLemos. A New Pediatric Volume Ventilator. 533-7.  
207 Ibid. Null. Oral History interview. Pt 1, 2-3.  
208 This seminal ‘grunting’ observation was published by Harrison, Heese, & Klein in South Africa in 1967. 
They observed infants in respiratory distress who exhibited grunting quickly deteriorated when 
intubated with an endotracheal tube (ET tube). After intubation, they observed cyanosis despite 
increased levels of oxygen in these infants but noted improved color when the ET tube was 
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that continuous positive airway pressure, or CPAP, would be the answer to this problem. 
Until the Baby Bird, no ventilator incorporated this aspect into the equipment. After 
DeLemos, Kirby, and Schultz developed their ventilator with Dr. Bird they proceeded to 
push the bounds of their work with the device, continuing research with their new 
machine. In 1973, they published the results of their work detailing the importance of the 
Baby Bird Ventilator arguing the Baby Bird was successful because it used PEEP and 
CPAP to treat infants with RDS resulting in decreased mortality rates. Of paramount 
importance to their work was their conclusion that PEEP should be individualized for 
each patient in coordination with blood pressure monitoring, chest X-rays, and blood gas 
measurements. All aspects of monitoring developed in tandem with the Baby Bird 
allowing for optimal use of the ventilator.209 The adoption of the Baby Bird did not occur 
without challenges and constant attempts to create better ways to monitor the patients and 
use the ventilator in the most therapeutic ways for the newborns. This process was not a 
linear march forward, but one where other types of tools emerged in tandem with the 
ventilator. 
As the Baby Bird developed, so did the assessment tools and machines that 
contributed to assessment techniques related to whether or not the machine was being 
used appropriately for the patient. One such example, developed by a fellow under 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
removed and the infants resumed crying; V.C. Harrison, H de V. Heese, and M. Klein. “The 
Significance of Grunting in Hyaline Membrane Disease,” Pediatrics 41, no. 3 (March 1968): 549–
559. 
209 Ibid. Kirby, Robinson, Schultz, and deLemos. A New Pediatric Volume Ventilator. 533.; Ibid. Null. Oral 
History interview. 
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DeLemos during the development of the Baby Bird ventilator, tackled a tandem issue for 
premature infant care: the inability to obtain noninvasive blood pressures. Nurses and 
physicians could not measure blood pressure with the traditional stethoscope and 
sphygmomanometer because newborn arteries were difficult to auscultate. Among larger 
infants, and their adult counterparts, indwelling catheters could be placed, but the right 
size catheter for very small premature infants did not exist. Dr. Gary McLaughlin 
developed a Doppler ultrasound device to measure blood pressure indirectly.210 This non-
invasive device provided more consistent blood pressure monitoring to determine basic 
vital signs for critically ill ventilated neonates. The use of this measurement was critical 
in understanding the changing intrathoracic pressure resulting from the PEEP of positive 
pressure ventilation and its affects on cardiac output.211 Dr. deLemos recognized, using 
this measurement combined with the blood gases and x-rays that more PEEP was not 
always better and use of the machine needed to be coupled with intensive monitoring and 
care. This is where the nursing staff continued to play important roles in the incorporation 
of ventilators as well as providing continued highly valued patient care.  
In an oral history interview with Dr. Null, he credited the physicians with 
adjusting the parameters of the machine but he recognized the role the nurses played in 
monitoring the patients.  Blood pressure monitoring, blood work or blood gasses, and 
general assessment of vital signs and patient condition was the role of the nurses. They 
                                                            
210 Gary McLaughlin, Robert Kirby, William Kemmerer, and Robert deLemos. “Indirect Measurement of 
Blood Pressure in Infants Utilizing Doppler Ultrasound,” Journal of Pediatrics 79, no. 2 (August 
1971): 300–302. 
211 Ibid. Null. Oral History interview.Pt 1, 1-2.; Ibid. Null, Yoder, and Geronimo. Early Neonatal Research 
at Wilford Hall. S22. 
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gathered the data and knew how to combine that with the patient’s general assessment to 
determine if the machine worked for the patient and to know when something was 
wrong.212 Dr. Null remembered them as central members of the team of healthcare 
providers that made the NICU and the development of the Baby Bird a success. He 
asserted, “that’s why we were successful: because [the nurses] they put their time into it 
and moved forward with it.”213 According to Dr. Null they participated in the changes to 
patient care plans; their focus was on their tiny patients even when the machines came 
and went and changed.214 Nurses continued to keep the patient at the center of a 
whirlwind of medical research, expanding assessment practices, and changing machines. 
While the Baby Bird Ventilator was not the only ventilator that was used, 
practitioners who worked with the newborn population remember it as a turning point in 
newborn respiratory care. While it did not have the monopoly, other manufacturers of 
newborn ventilators such as the Bourns Company did not compete for the market and did 
not feel, based on contemporary data, that there was a market for increased production of 
                                                            
212 I attempted to contact a nurse who worked with Dr. Null but was unable to reach her for an oral history 
interview. 
213 Such a comment raises the question of whether or not the nurses ever acted in ways that were subversive 
to the physicians’ instructions. Scholars who have interviewed adult ICU nurses who practiced 
during this time period recognized nurses did sometimes alter the machines without “permission” 
and did not always work with physicians in happy and respectful relationships. While I suspect 
this is probably true of nurses who worked in NICUs during my time period, I currently have no 
data to make such claims. The nurses I interviewed so far have not commented on this in their 
memories. As I continue to collect data, perhaps this theme will emerge, but as of now it is 
speculation on my part.  
214 Ibid. Null. Oral History interview. 
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newborn ventilators.215 Many factors influenced why the Baby Bird became the standard 
of care in the memories of so many practitioners, but its emergence required key 
components.  Based on a population of neonates who would benefit from such a machine, 
a team of (in this case) men took the risk to invent the machine and find out if it worked. 
Once they had garnered evidence collected by female nurses that their new invention did 
work and influenced survival rates of neonates, they worked hard to find an engineer and 
subsequently a company who would take the risk to mass produce it.  
Even once the Baby Bird was produced and hospitals began to buy the machine, 
not all nurses and physicians completely trusted it. One nurse expressed her memories of 
the machines not always working well and a subsequent mistrust of them: “I remember 
those Baby Birds…always being nervous about them malfunctioning. We knew how to 
take them down and put them back together again, but we would learn how to do that and 
often they were very persnickety…not functioning the way you wanted them to.” She 
went on to talk about how they used to listen to certain noises the machines made and 
then problem solve if they did not trust that the machine was working correctly.216 While 
the Baby Birds did eventually become the most remembered neonatal ventilator, some 
nurses remember them specifically as having glitches in the early years of their use.217 
The Baby Bird’s rise to fame did not happen suddenly but over the course of years. There 
is no evidence that the machine immediately became the “go to” ventilator for NICUs 
                                                            
215 I attempted to contact the current company that took over the Bourns Company and they do not have 
records related to the initial infant ventilators. This would be a fascinating work to do, but for the 
purposes of this work the data was not available.  
216 Ibid. Barnsteiner. Oral History interview. 11.  
217 See also: Shannon Perry. Oral History interview by Briana Ralston, December 12, 2012. 
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across the country, but nurses and physicians remember it while other models have not 
been so resilient in the collective memory.218 
The story of the Baby Bird Ventilator placed within the context of attempts to 
battle respiratory distress in neonates provides an example of why nurses were so 
important. They provided the critical assessment, communicated with physicians as team 
members, and worked with drastically changing systems of equipment and personnel to 
give the best possible care for their patients. The machines were game-changers, but only 
when coupled with the intensive care delivered in these units by nurses who had the 
knowledge and skills to make the machines work for the babies and to recognize and take 
action when they were not working.  Nurses were the ones providing the most intensive 
care available. They provided a hub of communication and were a constant presence for 
physicians and other healthcare providers. As they provided foundational and central 
assessment skills to the rest of the healthcare team, they also tweaked and made the 
equipment they had on hand work for their patients. They delivered the best care they 
could with the resources available to patients who needed not only their skill and 
ingenuity but their ability to determine minute yet significant changes in each patient’s 
condition. 
                                                            
218 While I have attempted to give an overview of the emergence of what is often remembered as the 
standard of neonatal positive pressure ventilation, I by no means claim to have given a thorough 
analysis of the history of this piece of technology. It was a piece of the technological system I 
consider the NICU and thus is addressed in this dissertation, but not the primary focus of my 
work. Future scholars might choose to focus solely on this apparatus and its history as a piece of 
technology, but such focus is beyond the scope of this work and considered a possibility for future 
scholarship.  
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Expenses and cost-effectiveness: Financial challenges of a new technological system 
 
 The equipment and manpower needed to run these units did not come without a 
significant financial cost. Historian Rosemary Stevens argued the 1960s dawned on a 
period in American medicine where the creation of private insurance as third-party payers 
“encouraged hospitals to respond o the market incentives of increased demand by 
providing more, more expensive, and better care, in areas that were most likely to be 
reimbursed.”219 By 1960 Blue Cross and other insurance plans covered almost two thirds 
of non-governmental hospital expenditures. By 1966, Medicaid roared into action, a form 
of insurance that covered newborn in hospital care and proved to be incredibly expansive 
as hospitals incurred increasing expenditures only to receive financial reimbursement 
through the 1970s; in the face of what came to be considered as extensive spending in 
hospitals, the system was eventually changed in the early 1980s as part of audits to 
control increased spending.220  
 Within this expansion of hospital-based services and the financial restructuring of 
American medicine, neonatal intensive care became a focal point for cost-effect analysis 
as part of a medical system-wide analysis, Implication of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of 
                                                            
219 Rosemary Stevens. In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). 257.  
220 Ibid. Stevens. In Sickness and in Wealth. 256-284.  
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Medical Technology.221 This study identified neonatal intensive care as one of the most 
expensive reasons for patient hospitalization exceeding neoplastic and circulatory 
diseases as well as end-stage renal disease and coronary bypass surgery (all among the 
most expensive adult in-patient areas). The report cited a range in NICU care from 
$1,800 to $40,000 per patient with average determinable expenditures to fall around 
$8,000 per patient. Such expenditures resulted in national expense of $1.5 billion in 1978 
alone.222 The study’s authors to break down expenditures within hospitals due to the 
changes in the ways hospitals charged insurance plans for patient care in the 1960s.223 
Among studies that analyzed payment practices, third party payers (private and federal) 
paid the highest percentage of costs, between 80-85%. Direct costs from individual 
payers accounted for about 5% of payments received. The remaining 10-15% were 
uncollectible. Of the fifteen percent of patients in NICUs on Medicaid, they accounted 
for 51% of the uncollectible or write-off funds.224  
  The study cites challenges to determining actual cost per patient and per 
procedures due to multiple factors. Though NICUs did function as unique units, they did 
not function as separate cost centers when billing and charges were negotiated with the 
costs often being reported in tandem with adult ICUs. In the rare cases when the NICUs 
could be separated out, ancillary costs (laboratory tests, x-ray, and physician fees) were 
                                                            
221 Budetti, Peter, Nancy Barrand, Peggy McManus, and Lu Ann Heinen. Case Study #10: The Cost and 
Effectiveness of Neonatal Intensive Care. The Implications of Cost-Effective Analysis of Medical 
Technology. San Fransisco, California: University of California, August 1981. 
222 Ibid. Budetti, Barrand, McManus, and Heinen. Case Study #10. 27.  
223 Ibid. Budetti, Barrand, McManus, and Heinen. Case Study #10. 19-26. 
224 Ibid. Budetti, Barrand, McManus, and Heinen. Case Study #10. 24. 
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not included. Due to both formal and informal regionalization, hospitals often transferred 
patients between institutions and thus complicated the billing process. While the details 
were hard to tease out, three consistent findings emerged: 1) total costs for survivors are 
higher than for non-survivors; 2) as birth weights decreased, costs increased; and 3) total 
costs increased with complications such as hyaline membrane disease (HMD). 225 The 
study cited the changes in hospital billing procedures such as “cross-subsidizing”226 and 
changes in Medicaid and insurance reimbursement.   
 While specific challenges did create problems with breaking down particular 
costs, the study ultimately reinforced NICU care as the most expensive type of care 
delivered in hospitals by the early 1980s. The cost-effectiveness of using such an 
expensive technological system to care for patients drew incredible scrutiny, particularly 
as it related to issues of long term care for some of the neonates that survived but with 
chronic medical conditions and some dependent on technologies such as ventilator 
support. The financial cost could not be separated from the moral and ethical questions 
regarding whether or not the ICU model of care should be used even at such an incredible 
financial cost.  
                                                            
225 Ibid. Budetti, Barrand, McManus, and Heinen. Case Study #10. 30.  
226  “Hospital charges for neonatal intensive care are often not fully reimbursed by Medicaid or by 
insurance plans that pay only for “allowable” costs. This situation creates incentives for hospitals 
to adjust charges to cover their expenditures by cross-subsidizing among payers. Moreover 
because it is difficult to adjust charges continuously with varying levels of care, expected revenues 
often are below costs at the beginning of a stay and exceed costs at the end, allowing for cross-
subsidies based on variations in the length of stay. Problems created by cross-subsidies include 
encouraging NICU admission of infants with less serious problems and extending stays after 
treatment when it would be adequate to continue care in a lower level and less costly setting.” 
Ibid. Budetti, Barrand, McManus, and Heinen. Case Study #10 32.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Historians of technology consistently ask why one tool became the standard of 
care while another possibility did not. An understanding of the role nurses played in 
premature infant units provides us with insight as to why the units themselves, as 
technological systems, formed and grew as they did. Premature infant units were a 
dominant forerunner to the models of care we find in NICUs today and the nurses who 
worked in these units provided very similar types of care their premature infant unit 
nurses did before. Perhaps sick newborns could have been simply cared for grouped 
together with well newborns, or premature infant units might have remained standard 
throughout the latter half of the 20th century, but they did not. Neonatal intensive care 
units became standard technological systems where sick newborns specifically received 
care and had round-the-clock access to laboratory and diagnostic equipment. The 
changing nature of increased social expectation of families to save their babies in the post 
war society combined with changes in insurance and third-party payers found newborns 
in the perfect place to reap the benefits of social value, medical tenacity, and 
technological advances.  
 NICU nurses found themselves doing many of the same things their adult critical 
care counterparts did, including developing close professional relationships with the 
physicians and other members of the healthcare team, garnering greater responsibility as 
sicker patients stayed longer in their units, and working with new equipment that became 
commonplace in these units. They also built on skills that were central to the care nurses 
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in premature infant units gave. As equipment changed and the physiological and 
psychosocial needs of newborns (and their families) were better understood, NICU nurses 
sometimes needed to make the tools and treatment devices work for their tiny patients as 
it took time for manufacturing companies to produce equipment small enough for 
newborns and then for hospitals to allocate financial resources to purchase such 
equipment.  
While neonatal intensive care units became the focal point for the intersection of 
data collection and research, and new equipment for the treatment of disease, nurses 
functioned as the hub of a complex system of patient care. Whether working at the 
bedside assessing the patient and gathering data to document the patient’s condition, 
working with the families and physicians, or making the equipment work to fit their 
patients these nurses garnered a great deal of power. They became the center of a 
complex and dynamic system where their observation skills, ingenuity, and knowledge 
about the patient’s condition meant they were needed and valued. The physicians 
recognized this and worked with these nurses to push the boundaries of NICU care.   
The next two chapters will provide case studies of two particular neonatal 
intensive care units and specific instances where these units were established and 
developed. While this chapter has focused on the ways nurses worked in intensively 
caring for sick newborns, the next two chapters will give particular examples of how 
units formed and were influenced by particular contexts, people, and communities. 
Understanding why these units formed where and when they did will also aid analysis of 
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why alternative ways to care for sick neonates did not become standard and why NICUs 
emerged as the spaces where care is delivered today.  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: 
 
“We needed a place to put the babies…”: 
Infant Intensive Care and The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia 
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“We needed a place to put the babies…”: Infant Intensive Care and The Children’s 
Hospital of Philadelphia 
The eight person surgical team waited at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia 
on the morning of August 27th, 1959 prepared to receive baby Anthony born just two days 
earlier without a connection between his mouth and stomach, a condition known as 
esophageal atresia. In order for Anthony to survive, he needed immediate surgery. The 
team worked together to ensure their patient survived the surgery where his esophagus 
would be reconstructed and the upper esophageal segment would be connected to the 
lower segment allowing nutrients to enter the stomach when swallowed.227  
After the surgery, Anthony’s diminished coughing reflexes and inability to clear 
his own throat of mucus and secretions put him at increased risk for choking. He needed 
someone else to help him keep his airway clear. The physicians saw Anthony on an 
average of every 20 minutes, but the nurses took Anthony’s vital signs and stayed at his 
bedside adjusting the temperature in his isolette around the clock, “minute by minute care 
twenty four hours a day” for the next two weeks.228 The hospital released photographs of 
baby Anthony at the end of his hospital stay in their 1959 annual report. In these 
photographs, a nurse in her starched white uniform cradles tiny Anthony. He gazes up at 
her and she, instead of looking at the camera, gazes back at him presenting him to the 
audience with a Madonna and child-like aura. Infants like Anthony required constant 
                                                            
227 [Children’s Hospital Annual Report, 1959] Box 4, Folder 7, MSS 6/0013-01, Children's Hospital of 
Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library. 
228 Ibid. CHOP Annual Report, 1959. 
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nursing care and a space where that care could be given. While CHOP apparently 
provided intensive nursing care to newborns prior to the establishment of a separate ICU 
devoted to newborns specifically, hospital administrators, researchers, and healthcare 
staff believed a unit needed to be formed as a place where such intensive nursing care 
could be consistently given. This belief influenced the allocation of space, financial 
resources, and research projects supported by visual representations of the new unit and 
nursing workforce who worked there in hospital publications.   
In this chapter, I argue the infant intensive care unit (IICU) at CHOP formed out 
of the necessity for a distinct place where essential resources were allocated and 
particularized nursing care could be given in tandem with the rise of the hospital’s 
surgical department. Nurses contributed to the organization of the environments where 
they practiced, supported by the trust and confidence of hospital administrators and 
physicians, and they became a focal point in the visual representation of the unit that 
communicated the human component of intensive care and the consistent presence of 
nurses. CHOP’s public relations department and administration used the nurses as the 
face of the infant intensive care unit, an increasingly complicated technological system 
that included patient care, complicated equipment, and progressive surgical and medical 
treatment. In an attempt to allocate precious intensive care resources, including good 
nursing care, the unit at CHOP eventually functioned within a network of units that 
reflects a complex technological system of care. By the early 1980s, the broader social 
and medical dialogue relating to who should receive care and to what extent intensive 
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care should be allocated became a focal point for IICU nurses and physicians reflecting 
dialogue about unintended consequences of highly complex and skilled care.  
 
  
  A city, a hospital, and the development of a surgical department 
 
Upon his 1842 visit to Philadelphia, famous author Charles Dickens remarked of 
Philadelphia, “It is a handsome city, but distractingly regular…Philadelphia is most 
bountifully provided with fresh water…[and] There are various public institutions. 
Among them a most excellent hospital…”229 He spoke of Pennsylvania Hospital founded 
by Benjamin Franklin in 1751.  The hospital, considered the nation’s first hospital, was 
just one of the many that emerged within the city limits as Philadelphia grew. Just years 
after Dickens’ visit, the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia was established in 1855 as 
the nation’s first hospital devoted specifically to the care of children.  
Francis W. Lewis, a physician at Pennsylvania Hospital, visited London’s 
Hospital for Sick Children on Great Ormond Street during his travels abroad before 
returning home to the city of Philadelphia where the mortality rates for infants and 
children were abysmally high. With fellow physicians T. Hewson Bache and R.A.F. 
Penrose, he campaigned and eventually established the Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia that opened its doors in 1855, treating 63 patients in its first year. During its 
                                                            
229 Charles Dickens. Charles Dickens: American Notes (New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1996): 129-
130. 
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early years CHOP served the city of Philadelphia’s poor and impoverished children as 
was standard of many hospitals during that time period.  The charter specified that the 
hospital opened for “…children suffering from Acute Diseases and Accidents” who 
would receive care free of charge.230 The hospital’s first patient, James Boyle, came to 
the hospital suffering from what was called ‘hip-joint discourse.’ The three-year-old boy 
received the care he needed free of pay and was discharged home ‘cured.’231 
 Prior to the transformation of the hospital into what historian Rosemary Stevens 
refers to as the “modern scientific institution,” many hospitals served only the poorest 
populations who lacked the financial and family resources to receive in home care.232  
With the post Civil War principles of scientific charity that held economic self-reliance as 
the standard, particularly in hospitals, patients were expected to pay whatever they could 
whenever possible. By 1879, the hospital administration expressed concern over the 
appropriate usage of the institution and the abuse of its resources by what were labeled as 
unworthy people. The January 1879 Manager’s Report echoed concern over the misuse of 
the hospital’s resources by members of the community who were not poor enough, and 
thus considered ‘unworthy’ to receive care paid for by the community, who consisted of 
private citizens, donors, and businesses.233  
                                                            
230 The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia in Perspective: 1855-1974 (Philadelphia, PA, 1974). Printed 
for the dedication observance of the Children's Hospital and Guidance Center Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania May 6, 1974. Children's Hospital Of Philadelphia School of Nursing records, 
Barbara Bates Center for The Study of The History of Nursing, University of Pennsylvania.  
231 “World’s Famous Physicians Gather Here in 3-Day Meet,” Philadelphia Tribune. May 21, 1955. 
232 Rosemary Stevens. In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). 17.  
233 Ibid. The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia in Perspective: 1855-1974. 
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 The first building to house CHOP, located on Blight Street (currently known as 
Watts street), quickly proved to be too small and by 1866 the young hospital moved into 
its second building on 22nd street between Walnut and Locust.234 Over the next few 
decades, the hospital grew and expanded, adding a new physician residency program as 
well as establishing the Ingersoll Training School for nurses by 1895. This program 
became one of the most prominent nursing programs in the country for nurses 
specifically interested in training for the care of children. By 1916, the hospital had again 
outgorwn its facility and moved to a third building at 18th and Bainbridge Streets. Such 
growth reflected the general trends in hospital expansion at the turn of the century as 
hospitals grew and began to compete to attract patients within changing social 
considerations of the role of hospitals at the time. The move also reflected the social 
focus on health issues faced by children such as malnutrition, disease, and (as it related to 
infants) clean milk supplies that would have impacted a focus on children’s healthcare 
more broadly including hospital care for those who needed it.235 By 1917, the hospital 
reflected the developing model of cleanliness, efficiency, and expertise valued at the time 
and aimed at the care of children.236 
                                                            
234 “150th Celebration Timeline: The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia,” Accessed December 11, 2013. 
http://www.chop.edu/flash/150-year-timeline-2005.html.  
235 For more see: Charles King. Children’s Health in America: A History (New York: Maxwell MacMillan 
International, 1993).; Alexandra Stern and Howard Markel, eds. Formative Years: Children’s 
Health in the United States 1880-2000 (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2004).; 
Richard Meckel. Classrooms and Clinics: Urban School and the Protection and Promotion of 
Child Health, 1870-1930 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2013). 
236 Ibid. Stevens. In Sickness and in Wealth. 
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The great migration: The changing face of Philadelphia and the health of it’s smallest  
 
By the 1920s, the “great migration” brought hundreds of thousands of southern 
families – both white and black – who moved into northern cities in search of work. This 
“Southern Diaspora,” as historian James Gregory calls it, transformed the American 
social landscape across the country.237 Most obviously affected were the large cities of 
the north like Philadelphia. By the 1950s, the transformation of the Philadelphia social 
and economic landscape by these migrants positioned it as an important center for the 
northern civil rights movement.  
Between 1940 and 1950, the Black population in the city of Philadelphia 
increased by 50%. In 1940, the city noted 251,000 Black residents, but by 1950 those 
numbers had grown to over 376,000. Toward the end of World War II, the government 
invested $131 million in the expansion of defense plants in Philadelphia that brought 
thousands of jobs to the city. Philadelphia’s black workforce experienced all too common 
discriminatory hiring practices. White workers still unofficially had greater opportunity 
and held precedence when it came to filling the job market. Blacks also faced 
discrimination in the housing markets and education opportunities.238 Inequality in civil 
rights, labor, socio-economic status, education, and healthcare all affected access to care 
                                                            
237 James Gregory. The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of Black and White Southerners 
Transformed America (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2005). 
238 Thomas Sugrue. Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New 
York, NY: Random House, 2008).; Ibid. Countryman. Up South. 
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and health disparities. All strata of life – infants, children and adults-- faced the effects of 
socio-economic and healthcare issues.239 
Differences in infant mortality rates revealed unequal access and treatment not 
only  in Pennsylvania, but across the country as well. The national neonatal mortality rate 
in 1960 hit 18.9%. Although mortality rates were high, Philadelphia’s white newborns 
fared better than the national average with a mortality rate of 17.7%. Their non-white 
counterparts240 experienced a higher, 29.5% mortality rate.241 Pennsylvania was one of 
fourteen states that failed to show any decrease in neonatal mortality for either white or 
nonwhite newborns between 1958 and 1961.242, 243 In 1961, in the US congenital 
malformations, ranging from issues such esophageal atresia to cardiac malformations, 
comprised almost 40% of neonatal deaths reported, second only to prematurity and 
respiratory distress associated with premature birth.244 These numbers reinforced the need 
to focus attention and resources on the development of better care for sick newborns, 
particularly newborns needing surgical treatments for congenital malformations. 
                                                            
239 Matthew Delmont. The Nicest Kids in Town: American Bandstand, Rock ’N Roll, and the Struggle for 
Civil Rights in 1950s Philadelphia (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2012). 
240 Neonates are considered infants within the first 40 days of life. Infants broadly defined as less than one 
year of age.  
241 Vital Statics of the United States, 1960. (Washington D.C.: US Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, 1963): Section 3, Table 3-F.  
242 Eleanor Hunt and Stanley Goldstein. Trends in Infant and Childhood Mortality, 1961. Children’s 
Bureau Statistical Series. (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health 
Service National Institutes of Health, Children’s Bureau, 1961). 12, 45.  
243 Please note, that while race is an important part of the story of Philadelphia’s newborn healthcare, after 
much research I did not ultimately choose to address how race played out in these units. This is an 
important piece of the story that should be addressed in future scholarship.  
244 Ibid. Hunt and Goldstein. Trends in Infant and Childhood Mortality. 28. 
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Physicians in Philadelphia recognized the need to do more for infants born with complex 
problems that required complex treatments.  
Over the previous two decades, surgical treatments for some common congenital 
malformations had been pioneered and physicians, such as C. Everett Koop at CHOP, 
argued the importance of good pre- and post-operative care. Such advances coincided 
with increased hope that infant mortality rates related to congenital malformations could 
indeed decrease infant mortality rates further. The story of how pediatric surgery came to 
CHOP and the particular ways surgical care for newborns developed at this institution 
illustrates the hope that these mortality rates could be decreased.  
Pediatric surgery and neonates at CHOP 
 
The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP) responded to the need to lower 
the mortality rate for infants born with congenital malformations by making changes in 
the care of newborns who specifically required surgical intervention and subsequent 
intensive care.  The hospital proposed important and innovative changes as they further 
expanded on good nursing care, and challenged current models of postoperative care 
particularly for infants born with life threatening congenital malformations. Physicians 
and hospital staff at CHOP sought to create adequate spaces where such care could be 
given and the particular needs of post-operative and medically fragile infants could be 
researched and better understood. 
Prior to the innovation of better surgical technique and a better understanding of 
neonatal post-operative needs, many infants born with malformations received what we 
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would consider today as palliative care - physicians and nurses made the newborns as 
comfortable as possible until they died.245 Prior to the development of particular surgical 
methods to correct malformations, a thorough understanding of what constituted good 
post-operative care, and units where post-operative newborns could receive care from 
staff trained in newborn physiology and care needs, very little could be done to 
consistently ensure better outcomes or change the mortality rates for infants born with 
congenital malformations.  
In the 1940s, pediatric surgery and training for physicians still remained in their 
infancy. Boston Children’s Hospital, under the guidance of Dr. Robert Gross, shone as 
the epicenter of pediatric surgical training in the US. Gross’s textbook The Surgery of 
Infancy and Childhood, published in 1953, became the seminal training manual for 
physicians interested in surgical interventions specifically related to children and infants. 
It provided foundational knowledge on surgical treatment of problems such as esophageal 
atresia, intestinal obstructions, surgery on premature infants, and new material on the 
heart and great vessels. In 1953, Dr. Gross described the field of pediatric surgery as 
having few delineated boundaries, lacking in appropriate training, and in need of 
development and formation in the ways already seen in adult surgical specialties.246  
                                                            
245 J. Randolph. “Notes on the early development of pediatric surgery in the United States,” Journal of 
Pediatric Surgery 47 (2012): 10–16.; John Raffensperger. “Pediatric Surgery Comes of Age” in 
Children’s Surgery: A Worldwide History (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company Publishers, 
2012). 
246 Ibid. Raffensperger. Pediatric Surgery Comes of Age.  
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Needs for equipment that ‘fit’ the smaller patients became a primary challenge, 
particularly for surgeons who operated on newborns.247 For example, the development of 
intravenous catheters for smaller patients and better protocols for providing intravenous 
fluids for infants needed to coincide with emerging surgical technique. Physicians and 
nurses also demanded better ways to provide post operatively ventilator support for 
infants. Equipment better suited for newborns needed to be developed in tandem with 
education and development of assessment skills for the practitioners who cared for these 
infants. Both the education and training lacked formal channels in organized programs, 
and happened in a more apprenticeship fashion. Surgeons operated on their pediatric and 
newborn patients in operative suites in hospitals across the country while they attempted 
to determine the best surgical technique and care despite the fact that scholarly journals 
devoted to the generation of new knowledge did not exist.248 These challenges did not 
mean physicians and nurses failed to see the need for better surgical technique, care, and 
tools. They did, and they attempted to meet those needs in innovative ways that included 
pushing vehemently to change the current system when necessary.     
 Dr. C. Everett Koop, founder of the pediatric surgical department at CHOP, 
credited nurses for bringing the pediatric surgical department to the Hospital of the 
University of Pennsylvania and subsequently to CHOP. In an interview Koop recalled the 
story of a child admitted to the Children’s Hospital by one of the hospital’s medical 
                                                            
247 This is a recurring theme in the literature and in the oral history interviews. For more on this see Ch 3.  
248 John Raffensperger. “Pediatric Surgery Comes of Age” in Children’s Surgery: A Worldwide History 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company Publishers, 2012). 
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residents. The resident examined the child and determined his symptoms of abdominal 
pain, distension, and bloody stools as evidence that the child suffered from 
intussusception.249 He determined the child would need surgery, but like many early 
children’s institutions, the Children’s Hospital had no surgical team. The resident called 
the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania’s surgeon on call. Despite repeated calls to 
Penn’s surgical service, the surgeon on call did not arrive to CHOP to examine the child 
until the next morning but by then, “the child had already died with a surgical problem 
unattended by a surgeon on the wards of the oldest children’s hospital in America.”250  
 At the time, Ms. Francis Clyde was CHOP’s head nurse. She came to Philadelphia 
from Boston Children’s Hospital and had worked in Boston’s operating room with the 
physician considered the father of American Pediatric Surgery, William Ladd. According 
to Koop, she was furious that the child had not received the surgical care he needed, care 
she knew he could have received if he had been seen by a surgeon in a timely manner. 
She went to Joseph Stokes, the Physician in Chief at the Children’s Hospital and the 
Bennet professor of Pediatrics at the University of Pennsylvania, demanding that CHOP 
take the steps necessary to install a pediatric surgical service. If he failed to do so, “…she 
and her staff would leave and she further emphasized this by saying, ‘And when I say my 
                                                            
249 This condition occurs when part of the intestine slides into another similarly to the way parts of a 
telescope slide into one another when collapsed. This can result in intestinal obstruction requiring 
immediate surgery and, if not treated, can be fatal.  
250 C.E. Koop. Interview with Dr. CE Koop, June 11, 2002. Private Collection.; This account is also 
published in Koop’s memoir and should be understood as his remembrance and one account. 
Nonetheless, this story as he remembers it reiterates his overall value of the nursing personnel.  
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staff, I mean all of us.’”251 Upon being presented with the ultimatum of losing his entire 
nursing staff, Stokes took the matter to I.S. Ravdin, Chief of Surgery at the Hospital of 
the University of Pennsylvania, and Joseph Stokes, Physician-in-chief of CHOP, who 
determined that they needed to send a surgical resident to Boston for training and that this 
could significantly contribute to a solution for their problem – a solution that required 
both surgical knowledge and a system that enabled that knowledge to be put into practice; 
in short, a surgical department at CHOP. Knowing Boston Children’s Hospital had a high 
reputation for pediatric surgery, Stokes sent the only resident who would accept the 
position, Koop, to Boston in 1946. There Koop studied under pediatric surgical pioneers 
William Ladd and Robert Gross who had the sole training program for child surgery in 
1946.252 
 Koop remembered that four other residents were offered the opportunity to go to 
Boston to study with Ladd and Gross in return for a guaranteed position of chief of 
surgery at CHOP upon their return. They all turned down the position as the 
consideration of ‘limiting’ your surgical expertise only to children undermined their 
training as general surgeons. Koop felt that knowing how to perform excellent surgery on 
                                                            
251 Ibid. Koop. Interview, June 11, 2002. 
252 William Ladd and Robert Gross. Abdominal Surgery of Infancy and Childhood (Philadelphia: W.B. 
Saunders Company, 1941).; J Randolph. “Notes on the early development of pediatric surgery in 
the United States,” Journal of Pediatric Surgery 47 (2012): 10–16.; In 1941, Boston surgeons 
William Ladd and Robert Gross published what became the national standard for pediatric 
surgical procedure for decades to come. While Ladd and Gross authored their textbook with the 
surgeon in mind, they provided great detail regarding pre and post-operative care in addition to 
detailed surgical procedural directions. Such detailed directions involving post-operative care 
outline detailed feeding instructions and medication administration that would have fallen to the 
responsibility of the nurse based on what we know of nursing roles related to pediatric and infant 
care elsewhere in the hospitals at the time. Nurses would have been involved in complex patient 
management and post-operative care of infants and children.  
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the smallest patients would only make him a better adult surgeon if the position and long 
term offer at CHOP fell through.253 While adult surgical skill was valued during this time, 
the importance of trained surgeons who knew how to work with pediatric patients had yet 
to become a widespread value among surgical circles.  
Dr. C. Everett Koop: Bringing newborn surgery to CHOP 
 
  Upon his return to Philadelphia in 1946, now fully trained, stepped into his post 
as the surgeon in chief at CHOP and head of what was then known as ‘child surgery’. He 
considered his new specialty at CHOP pediatric surgery and began to call it such, though 
he never claimed to invent the term. Pediatric surgery was not a recognized specialty at 
the time and the Journal of Pediatric Surgery would not be published until 1967.  
 Despite his newly appointed position, skills, and desire to move pediatric surgery 
forward, he encountered several challenges during the beginning years. Koop 
remembered resistance to his new subspecialty and resistance of other physicians to 
relinquish their patients to his service.254, 255 For example, Stokes made it very clear to 
Koop on his first day back that he retained all diagnostic rights and would refer his 
                                                            
253 C. Everett Koop. Koop: The Memoirs of America’s Family Doctor (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan 
Publishing Company, 1992): 104-106. 
254 Koop recounts in his memoir that he had been neither IS Ravdin’s (Chief of Surgery at the Hospital of 
the University of Pennsylvania) nor Joseph Stokes’s (Physician-in-chief of CHOP) top candidate 
for the position. 
255 The infrastructure at CHOP seemed to be that there were no pediatricians who specialized in surgery at 
this time. The Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania had an adult surgical department where 
surgical pediatric patients from CHOP would be treated. The idea that CHOP would have it’s own 
pediatric trained surgical personnel was revolutionary at CHOP and probably in general as many 
hospitals lacked pediatric surgical departments. The only hospital that would have had pediatric 
surgical specialists at this time (to my knowledge) would have been Boston, where they sent Koop 
to study under Ladd and Gross.  
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patients only to the care of Koop for the surgery itself, after which the patient would 
return to Stokes’s care. Koop insisted and mandated that he retain responsibility for 
patients from diagnosis through follow-up care after discharge from CHOP. Stokes 
agreed to Koop’s terms only after a call to Ravdin made it clear that he supported Koop’s 
mandate.256 Other physicians in the hospital also resisted relinquishing their patients to 
Koop and, as he remembered, made it very clear they neither desired his presence nor felt 
he and the pediatric surgical department were needed.257  Resistance probably related to 
financial loss as physicians were paid for the patients under their care, and to sign their 
surgical patients over meant losing those payments. Koop was also a young and relatively 
new physician who had yet to gain respect from the long-standing house staff at CHOP 
(though he did eventually establish himself and garner such esteem).   
 After nine months as head of pediatric surgery at CHOP, Dr. Koop received an 
office and moved into a small cubical found for him on the fifth floor (Koop’s first office 
consisted of a table in the hospital library – no walls and no support staff).258 He shared a 
waiting room and secretary with five other physicians. Koop’s lack of an office and 
adequate support staff reflects the lack of focus on pediatric surgery from hospital 
administration. Koop worked as surgeon-in-chief and accomplished the leg work for 
starting his department without expansive support to achieve the goal with which he had 
been tasked. Without established protocols, a scholarly community producing knowledge 
                                                            
256 Ibid.  Koop. America’s Family Doctor. 104-106. 
257 C.E. Koop. “Pediatric Surgery: The Long Road to Recognition,” Pediatrics 92 (1993): 618–621. 
258 Ibid.  Koop. America’s Family Doctor. 105.  
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and research, basic administrative resources, or appropriate equipment physicians such as 
Koop and his staff exhibited a great deal of tenacity and fortitude to push ahead 
regardless and worked with what they had.  
 As Koop began to perform surgeries on smaller patients into the early 1950s, he 
recognized many infants could be saved with surgical intervention made possible by his 
training, the homemade equipment he and his team made, and good nursing care. Dr. 
Koop placed increasing focus on newborns and their responses to surgery. Not only did 
he lack administrative space and resources, he and his team lacked some of the necessary 
pre-made equipment to perform their surgeries on their newborn patients. As mechanical 
ventilation for newborns was not yet a standard practice, endotracheal tubes used with 
mechanical ventilation would not have been easily on the market in the 1950s. Thus 
Koop and his team needed to make such equipment for their smallest surgical patients:   
There was no equipment to be bought; we made our own. The night before 
surgery, we would fashion endotracheal tubes out of red rubber catheters, file the 
edges with emery boards to prevent injury to the tracheal mucosa, boil them over 
bent wire…and then begin to experiment with anesthetic gases as well as 
preoperative medication.259  
 
In the early 1950s, the pediatric surgical department at CHOP began at a time when few 
resources existed. The lack of scholarly literature, textbooks, adequate training programs 
for physicians, and major research programs all contributed to a fledgling beginning. 
Programs to train nurses in the specific care of post-operative newborns also did not 
exist. The ability to make some of their own tools solved one problem, but Dr. Koop 
became convinced very early in the process that right-sized equipment was not enough - 
                                                            
259 Ibid. Koop. The Long Road to Recognition. 620.  
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he needed specialized nurses to care for these neonates. CHOP’s nurses, as was common 
in other hospitals at this time, often cared for patients all over the hospital and traveled 
through the wards on rotation where needed. Student nurses also provided much of the 
nursing work supervised by graduate nurses at this time. The hospital hired private duty 
nurses on occasion to care for some patients who needed more intensive care. Koop 
pushed back on this idea. He believed that the best post-operative care could not save his 
patients without the expertise of good nurses who knew how to assess the patients for 
post-operative complications and use the home made equipment effectively.260 Koop and 
his staff performed surgeries, refined the tools they needed, and worked to determine 
what the best post-operative care looked like for their neonatal and pediatric patients. 
While Koop was one of the early pediatric surgeons concerned with neonatal surgery, he 
was not the only physician working in this area. Another surgical resident from England 
spent time studying under Ladd and Gross training in the 1940s; his name was Peter P. 
Rickham (also known as P.P. Rickham). 261 
Following his five years of training in Boston, Rickham returned to his native 
England to pursue the development of scientific approaches to the care of post-operative 
surgical neonates. In 1953, he established a neonatal surgical intensive care unit at Alder 
Hey Children’s Hospital in Liverpool, England where he operated and conducted the 
research he needed to determine a scientific basis for newborn post-operative care. In 
                                                            
260 Ibid.  Koop. America’s Family Doctor.  
261 Peter P. Rickham. “Thoughts about the Past and Future of Neonatal Surgery,” Journal of Pediatric 
Surgery 27, no. 1 (January 1992): 1–6. 
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1957, Rickham published a textbook on the metabolic responses of newborns to surgery. 
He reflected on operative mortality and believed the declining operative mortality rates 
could not, “be ascribed to improvements in the actual surgical technique, as there [were] 
few technical advances during the last ten years. It should be credited, rather, to more 
efficient pre- and post-operative management.”262 Nurses provided such pre and post-
operative management to Rickham’s patients.  
Rickham’s nursing staff oversaw patient assessment263 and worked with the 
Oxygenaire surgical incubator.264 The nurses devised methods for urine collection, the 
development of charting forms specifically for this research, intravenous and oral intake 
methods, and the use of gastric suctioning. The nurses made the equipment work for the 
patient and then organized the relevant data for doctors and nurses to use in decisions 
related to the progression of care.  Rickham acknowledged many members of the medical 
laboratory staff regarding the study, but paid particular attention to the nursing staff, 
                                                            
262 P.P. Rickham. The Metabolic Response to Neonatal Surgery (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1957). 1.  
263 For more on the nurse’s role in newborn assessment at this time, see Chapter 3.  
264 The Oxygenaire surgical incubator was an incubator that particularly allowed for optimal humidity 
temperature conditions so that post-operative surgical neonates could be watched through a clear 
partition that enclosed the infant and allowed for the newborn to wear only a diaper as needed. 
There was a place where x-ray plates could be slid under the newborn without maneuvering the 
patient. A built in scale was used that allowed for weight to be taken without removing the infant 
from the incubator. Rickham believed that the incubators made for premature infants were not 
suitable for surgical neonates and so he and his team modified a Mark IV Oxygenaire incubator. 
Based on his article published in 1960, nurses would have needed to know how to assess their 
patients, weigh, position, provide basic newborn care, feed, and aid in procedures while never 
removing the infant from the incubator. More research into this particular machine and those who 
used it would be a fascinating vein of study, but beyond the scope of this work. For more see: 
Rickham, P.P. and Jean Jenkins. “Incubator for Infants Undergoing Surgery,” Archives of the 
Diseases of Children 35 (1960): 71–75. doi: 10.1136/adc.35.179.71. 
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I should like, however, to mention with gratitude the devoted care given to the 
patients by the nursing staff of the neonatal surgical unit of the hospital; without 
their conscientious attention to detail in the pre- and post-operative treatment, this 
investigation would have been impossible.265   
 
While this was a hopeful time for newborn surgery, Rickham’s study highlighted the 
continued need to differentiate newborns from their older counterparts – infants, children, 
and adults.  Growing scientific evidence noted newborns’ different physiology and 
metabolic responses to the stresses surgery places on the body. Building on the work of 
surgeons like William Ladd and Robert Gross who laid the foundation for pediatric 
surgery, Rickham and other surgeons of the time gradually learned to respond to and 
identify and respond to the unique needs of post-operative newborns.266  
 Rickham published his groundbreaking findings in an article in the Lancet in 1960 
arguing the need for good nursing personnel as well as the need for broader infrastructure 
that included pediatricians, anesthesiologists, lab workers, and researchers needed to 
influence and grow the field – in short, he recognized the need for a system of support for 
the unit itself. While Rickham acknowledged that surgical infants could receive good 
care in general surgical wards, he argued these types of neonatal surgical intensive care 
units provided a place to focus the research as well as train physicians and nurses to care 
for these infants particularly. Koop would likely have known of the work done on 
Rickham’s London unit.267 The groundbreaking article in the Lancet gave great detail 
                                                            
265 Ibid. Rickham. The Metabolic Response to Neonatal Surgery. viii.  
266 Ibid. Raffensperger. Pediatric Surgery Comes of Age. 121.  
267 Isabella Forshall and P.P. Rickham. “Experience of a Neonatal Surgical Unit: The First Six Years,” The 
Lancet 261, no. 7153 (October 1960): 751–54.; While I have no evidence that Koop knew of or 
referenced Rickham’s work early on in the process, I think it unlikely that Koop would have not 
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about the type of care, necessities, and methods used in the unit by Rickham and his staff. 
Koop’s assertion that highly skilled nurses and round-the-clock intensive care were 
needed coincides with Rickham’s statements. While there is no evidence the two ever 
spoke nor any tangible indication of the degree to which Rickham’s work influenced 
Koop, both physicians shared common themes in the care of post-operative neonates 
including the cornerstones of good nursing care, the need for proper equipment, and the 
creation of separate spaces where this care could be focused and given. 
 
 
 
Koop’s vision and a strong nursing workforce.  
  
The forerunner to the formal infant intensive care unit at CHOP consisted of three 
incubators set along a wall in one of the children’s units that were reserved for sick 
infants. The hospital staffed these initial beds with private duty nurses hired by the 
hospital to care for these infants.268 Koop believed there was a better way to provide 
nursing care to this population.  Beginning in 1956, Dr. Koop started to gather 
preliminary data related to improving outcomes for post-op surgical neonates, and then 
set out to obtain funding to continue his research and establish a separate space where he 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
known the current literature (in lieu of the lack literature) related to the surgical neonate. I believe 
he would have, at some point, known of Rickham’s work as it only slightly pre-dated his own and 
Rickham published as Koop was seeking funding, and would have been cutting edge at the time.  
268 Erna Goulding. Personal conversation by Briana Ralston with Erna Goulding, March 2007.; Ibid. Koop. 
America’s Family Doctor.  
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could provide better care with specially trained nursing personnel.269 He spent a great 
deal of time convincing the hospital administration to allow him specific specialized 
nurses to provide specific care and arguing that he needed a designated space where his 
post-operative neonatal patients could receive this care. He wrote three grant applications 
before one was funded, finally allowing him to establish his neonatal surgical intensive 
care unit and progress research. 270 
With this funding, received from the United States Children’s Bureau in 
Washington, D.C. as well as the Department of Public Health of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, CHOP launched a five-year pilot study beginning in 1957. This study271 
was based on the premise that in ideal conditions the survival rates of newborns could be 
improved with a focus on five particular types of surgery regarding congenital 
malformations.272 The Children’s Hospital received $375,000 over a five-year period to 
pay hospital costs associated with the demands of providing care, including nursing care, 
for medically fragile post-operative newborns and to develop a prearranged formula to 
determine staffing needs for nursing and for the hospital allocated nurses particular to this 
                                                            
269 Koop states in his memoir that he opened a unit in 1956, though the hospital documents present the 
IICU as opening in 1962. Koop was probably referring to the three incubators the hospital had 
prior to the grant-funded unit that included a greater number of beds and specific nursing staff.  
270 This information is primarily from secondary sources particularly Koop’s memoir and publications. 
Neither the Children’s Bureau nor the Commonwealth of PA have archives that contain old grants. 
None of the Koop papers (at the College of Physicians, the NLM, or at Wheaton College) contain 
primary documents.  
271 I contacted both the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania archives and the National Library of Medicine 
where the Children’s Bureau archives are held but was unable to determine the name of the study 
or any copies of the original grant. Neither Koop’s personal papers from this time period at he 
College of Physicians nor the CHOP archives contain them to my knowledge.  
272 Ibid. Koop. America’s Family Doctor.  
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unit.273 The hospital labeled the unit their infant intensive care unit and it is also 
commonly also referred to as CHOP’s neonatal surgical intensive care unit in the 
literature today, as Dr. Koop used the terms interchangeably in subsequent publications 
and interviews over the following years.274   
Dr. Koop remembered “learn[ing] very early that the best surgery would 
accomplish little without proper postoperative care…Great technical surgical skill would 
come to nothing without the complete dedication of the nurses charged with the care of 
our tiny patients.”275 In his memoir he fondly reminisced on his relationship with the 
nurses who he credited as vital to his surgical work. He remembered one nurse in 
particular, Erna Goulding, who would later work with him to establish the hospital’s 
groundbreaking IICU as CHOP’s chief nursing officer at the time.  
After an initial period, CHOP publically delineated particular characteristics to be 
true of their IICU nursing staff:  a consistent nursing staff – when nurses had no other 
responsibilities elsewhere in the hospital and could devote themselves to the expertise of 
this particular patient population, when the same nurses worked with the same patients 
over the course of the patient’s stay, and when this exclusivity existed, the morale of the 
healthcare team could be bolstered in allowing for interrelationships in which constant 
                                                            
273 [“The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia”] Box 84, Folder 3, MSS 6/0014-01, Children's Hospital of 
Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library.; 
The archive does not specify what factors influenced this “formula.” 
274 The documents in the archives themselves as well as the nursing personnel interviewed refer to the unit 
as the infant intensive care unit, or IICU.  
275 Ibid. Koop. America’s Family Doctor.  
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teaching and learning and comradery could occur. During this time nurses were more 
generally staffed rather than being assigned to particular units, so having a specific 
nursing staff would have been an important distinction in considering these IICU nurses 
as a strength of the unit.276 
Dr. Koop emphasized that post-operative care was just as important as good 
surgical technique and echoed the assertions of earlier pioneers in newborn care such as 
Julius Hess, Evelyn Lundeen and Geddes. All agreed that nurses were vital to good care 
for critically ill newborns. In the midst of a time when the biggest and newest machines 
and groundbreaking medical techniques were given great weight in changing American 
medicine, these physicians never shied away from championing the foundational need for 
good nursing care. Koop emphasized that nurses were able to ‘keep all the balls in the 
air,’ in an environment where intense concentration was mandatory.277 As Koop and his 
surgical residents performed the surgeries and followed up with their tiny patients, they 
worked in close proximity with the nurses who constantly stayed at the bedside. Koop 
based his care on consultation with the nursing staff and relied on them to physically 
assess the patients, collect data, and manage the bedside equipment at all hours of the day 
and night. In this way, the nurses participated in the data collection that determined care 
for each patient. For physicians like Koop, the need for skilled nursing care informed and 
influenced resource allocation of space, nurses, and the infrastructure of a separate unit.  
                                                            
276 [CHOP Press Surgery/Transplants] Box 84, Folder 3, MSS 6/0014-01, Children's Hospital of 
Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library. 
277 Ibid. Koop. America’s Family Doctor. 135.  
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“We needed a place to put the babies!”278: The IICU at the Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia 
 
Dr. Koop performed many high profile surgeries and his desire to push the 
boundaries and discover better models of care for newborns fit with CHOP’s long-
standing focus on research that included nurses as an important part of a broader cadre of 
healthcare personnel in conjunction with pediatricians, anesthesiologists, and respiratory 
pathologists and therapists. Though the care providers were not limited to nurses and 
physicians, these nurses served a unique function at the bedside that situated them as a 
crucial component of the system necessary to intensive care.279 No one doubted the need 
for nurses in patient care at this time, but this grant and the subsequent space it allocated 
for a distinctive unit focused in on the foundation of good nursing care, the question of 
what that meant for patients, and the expectation that these nurses were part of the team 
in ways unique to intensive patient care at the time. No matter what the nurse staffing 
was like elsewhere in the hospital, the grant provided that the unit’s nurse to patient ratio 
would never fall below one nurse to four patients (with a higher nurse to patient ratio 
when patient acuity increased in the unit).  
Nurse Jane Barnsteiner remembered a typical day involved many components of 
patient care, preparation and time management, and collaboration with other nurses and 
                                                            
278 From a personal conversation with Erna Goulding, RN who was the Chief Nursing Officer at the 
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia when C.E. Koop established his post-surgical neonatal 
intensive care unit. March 2007. Philadelphia, PA. I asked her why they opened the IICU, and her 
reply was an emphatic: “Well, we needed a place to put the babies!”  
279 [Children’s Hospital Annual Report, 1962] Box 4, Folder 7, MSS 6/0014-01, Children's Hospital of 
Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library. 
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physicians. Before entering the unit, each nurse was required to scrub in280 and don an 
isolation gown in an ante chamber outside the unit; this chamber provided a space where 
those who were not involved in patient care were forbidden, and where physicians, 
nurses, and (on rare occasions) family members could prepare for entering the unit. 
Nurses read the charts and became familiar with their patients’ medications, gathered 
supplies, and drew up any medications needed before receiving the patient report from 
the previous nurse. Upon receiving report, each nurse performed a detailed patient 
assessment that included assembling vital signs, daily weights, and general patient 
condition, and then continued with needed surgical dressing changes, hanging any 
intravenous fluids or medications, and assisting any physicians in procedures as 
needed.281 This type of environment required consistent communication among the 
nurses and physicians. Barnsteiner remembered, “Well, we really had to trust each other 
and develop a level of respect.”282 Not only did the nurses work closely with each other 
in the space, but they also worked closely with the physicians on a level that requird the 
same high level of two-way communication. Nurse Jane Barnsteiner remembered that 
physicians communicated with her and the nursing staff in a way that she felt was 
different than elsewhere in the hospital:  
They had to depend on us and they had to communicate. They had to work with 
us as team members. So it set up a different kind of working relationship that I 
                                                            
280 To ‘scrub in’ meant to follow strict hand washing procedures akin to what would be required before 
entering an operating room. Anyone who entered would have had to wash with particular soap up 
to the elbows and do so for a set amount of time.  
281 Jane Barnsteiner. Oral History interview by Briana Ralston, January 9, 2014. 
282 Ibid. Barnsteiner. Oral History. 5.  
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think…[was]a different kind than they might have had on a different unit…they 
encouraged us to call them if anything came up…I know what they [pediatric 
surgeons C.E. Koop and Harry Bishop] were like…they were not like that 
working with us in the IICU. They treated us with the utmost respect and as 
equals.283 
 
Such working relationships, consistent with the oral history themes from newborn 
intensive care nurses who practiced during this time (see chapter 3), supported both the 
transfer of knowledge, the building of trust as the nurses were valued and continued to be 
highly valued in the unit, and as such intensive and critical care emerged as uniquely 
effective at CHOP.  
When Dr. Koop opened the grant-funded unit in 1962, the neonatal surgical 
intensive unit contained eight beds located in a large open room surrounded by windows, 
with a smaller two bed isolation room off to the side. Infants with potentially contagious 
diseases were cared for in a side room where they could be kept in isolation from the rest 
of the newborns. The initial unit was ‘close quarters’ as one nurse remembered. The 
patient beds, largely isolettes, were sometimes only a foot or two apart. She recalled the 
ability to stand in the middle of the unit and be able to see all the babies, as well as the 
ones in a small side room reserved for isolation cases.284 Such an allocation of resources, 
particularly space - to neonatal surgical patients emphasizes the growing importance of 
caring for sick newborns, and might also have been related to Koop’s success in the field 
as well as his growing power in the institution as he obtained outside grant funding. At a 
                                                            
283	  Ibid. Barnsteiner. Oral History. 13. 	  
284 Dr Barnsteiner commented this room had the feeling of an old closet but was used for patient care when 
needed. Despite its ‘separate’ situation the nurses could still see inside the room when standing in 
the middle of the unit.  
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time when hospitals were growing, subspecialties expanding, and bigger and more 
complex medical equipment became more commonplace, the importance of creating a 
space to care for vulnerable newborns carried a great deal of significance.  
In 1962, when the unit opened, photographs released in hospital publications 
reveal a room with a mixture of isolettes and bassinettes for infants at different stages of 
recovery and with varying physiologic needs. While the impetus for the unit’s existence 
in the 1950s was the need for better surgical care for newborns, medically fragile 
newborns with a wide range of needs were also treated in the unit beginning in its early 
days.285 The hospital portrayed this unit and the care nurses gave there in their annual 
reports and hospital publications between 1955 and 1975.  
Nursing care in black and white: CHOP’s images of their IICU and good nursing care 
 
When the unit was opened in 1962, the hospital presented it to their funders, 
patrons, and the medical community with a multi-page spread in that year’s annual report 
showing the hospital’s pride in the unit and their value of these newborn patients. These 
images would have been taken by a hired photographer and sanctioned by the public 
relations department for publication. The photographs of the unit that opened in 1962 did 
not reveal a room overtaken with machines as we often see in neonatal nurseries today. 
Though nurses and physicians worked together and used isolettes and ventilators with 
some of the patients, the early unit more closely resembled the well baby nurseries that 
were commonplace in hospitals by 1960. The pictures of nurses in CHOP’s annual 
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reports from the early 1960s were if woman who actively participated in developing a 
system of care, shown in the spaces where that care was given, as they exercised 
incredible skill and were part of a trusted team of healthcare providers. These women 
were depicted as a vital part of a new technological system – a system we know as the 
hospital’s infant intensive care unit. These nurses stand at the forefront of the many 
points in healthcare where patient care and increasingly complex equipment intersected. 
The hospital’s sanction and publication of images highlighting nurses in the infant 
intensive care unit in their annual reports reinforce Koop’s assertions that the nurse 
played an important role in this environment and the care given there. The way the nurses 
are positioned indicate that the equipment was not the initial driving force behind the 
establishment of the unit. Instead, the nurses represent a very human factor in the care of 
newborns. Over time, the machines became a much more dominant aspect of the 
photographs, as the hospital showed images of nurses working with larger and seemingly 
more complex machines while delivering patient care. By the mid-1970s, the 
photographs revealed nurses focusing on their tiny patients while manipulating the 
machines – pumps, tubing, ventilators, and infant bed warmers – necessary for the care 
they delivered. Even so, the machines do not overshadow the nurses in these images. The 
nurses continue to be shown delivering patient care while working with the machines, 
and they continue to be a dominant human presence in the increasingly mechanical and 
technological system that makes up neonatal intensive care and the units where it was 
delivered. Even as the machines and equipment became more complex, the mandatory 
foundation is still good nursing care. The photographs visually build on the writings the 
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hospital released at the time describing the everyday occurrences of the unit by 
measuring and detailing how nurses specifically cared for the patients.  
In one photograph of the unit, the audience looks over the nurse’s shoulder as she 
walks into the unit. Your gaze cannot miss her starched white uniform and cap. Her arm 
is outstretched both to hold open the door for you and lingers as if to remind you that you 
may not dart around her into the environment beyond. She will lead you in. This is her 
space. Beyond her you can see the isolettes lining the glass walls and a cluster of 
bassinettes. Three nurses work diligently with their tiny patients – none of them seem to 
be distracted by your entrance. The patients are their focus. In this particular photograph, 
there are no physicians present, only the nurses. While this photograph might have been 
only one snapshot of a point in time, it does reinforce the assertions of Dr. Koop and the 
hospital administration:  the nurses were vital to the care delivered in this space. The 
administrators could have focused their visual portrayal on the machines – the incubators, 
ventilators, and feeding tools – that would have been used in this unit. The PR 
department could have shown the physicians and introduced their audience to the 
architecture of the space. Though these tools and the physicians do appear in the 
photographs, when they are taken as a whole we see nursing as a consistent presence and 
the nurses as key figures in each image.286  
 That the nurses and their patients are the focal point of the photos and coincides 
with Koop’s account of his value of the nursing personnel as well as what we know of the 
                                                            
286 The photographs included the way the unit was laid out, there are numerous photographs of Dr. Koop 
holding his patients, and we see pieces of the machines, isolettes, and other tools the healthcare 
staff would have used. 
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role nurses played in caring for critically ill and prematurely born infants in hospitals 
across the country during the 1950s and 1960s. Though the unit only had a small 
percentage of the total number of beds in the hospital, it reflected increasing resource 
allocation devoted to newborns as a particular patient population in need of intensive care 
given by specially trained nurses.  
Growing and changing 
 
Both the hospital and the infant intensive care unit continued to grow. By 1972, 
CHOP was in the middle of preparations to move from their building on Bainbridge 
streets to a new location, where the hospital still stands to this day, at 34th and Civic 
Center Boulevard in the part of Philadelphia now known as University City. The new 
building more than tripled the hospital’s space, increasing it from 240,000 square feet to a 
spacious 800,000 square feet. Since WWII, subspecialties in medicine have grown at 
incredible rates and specialists and subspecialties for children emerged as well. By the 
mid 1970s, pediatric specialty certificates were available in cardiology, hematology, 
oncology, nephrology, and neonatal and perinatal medicine.287 With advances in medical 
treatments and technologies as well as broader trends in hospital organization, care for 
children who required particular treatment in hospitals contributed to hospital expansion.  
The new building, a mahogany toned glazed brick included bronze-tinted glass 
and a twelve foot overhang protecting the front entrance. A spacious entry way and large 
                                                            
287 Sydney Halpern. American Pediatrics: The Social Dynamics of Professionalism, 1880-1980 (Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1988). 110-1.  
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landscaped courtyard reaching 134 feet to a glass enclosed roof provided a sunny and 
luxurious atmosphere to children and their families entering through the front doors. 
Teaching and research facilities increased greatly as did the numbers of beds across the 
hospital. The move allowed for an additional 108 beds, bringing the hospital’s full 
capacity to 262 beds.288 The infant intensive care unit also dramatically increased in size. 
A new infant intensive care unit was built on the fourth floor adjacent to the surgical 
suite. The old unit held 12 infants at full capacity, and averaged approximately 10 
patients at a time, but the unit in the new hospital had space for up to 20 infants. 289 The 
new unit included a waiting area that opened into a gowning room where visitors would 
wash and apply gowns before entering. From the nursing station, all isolettes could be 
seen in the ward-like single room.290  
The infant intensive care unit also expanded as sicker patients occupied the 
hospital beds. As more critically ill patients filled the units, the considerations for who 
required the most intensive ICU care changed. Patients who might have been the sickest 
just a decade earlier no longer held the delineation of the sickest and thus in need of the 
most intensive care. CHOP created ‘step down’ units, where patients who still required 
more intensive care than they would receive on general floors but were less medically 
                                                            
288 [“The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia Fact Sheet: 1972] Box 21, Folder 11, MSS 6/0014-01, 
Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia 
Historical Medical Library. 
289 [Section 1: Nursing hours per patient per day (cont). CHOP, August 31, 1973] Box 48, Folder 10, MSS 
6/0013-01, Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of 
Philadelphia Historical Medical Library.  
290 [Memorandum from Martha Walters to Warren Falberg, August 31, 1973] Box 48, Folder 10, MSS 
6/0014-01, Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of 
Philadelphia Historical Medical Library. 
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fragile, might transition out of the IICU into a less critical part of the unit. This transition 
and patient placement allowed for the IICU to function as a unit devoted only to the 
sickest and most medically fragile patients.  
The hospital changed how they billed their ICU patients in ways that coincided 
with longer-term stays for previously acute patients who still needed to be in the hospital, 
but might not need the ICU beds devoted to the sickest newborns. Historian Rosemary 
Stevens argued that medical insurance impacted the ways hospitals billed patients and 
removed considerations of cost constraints from the ways hospitals chose to bill based on 
each patient.291 President Johnson signed the Medicaid legislation into action in 1965, 
and the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed an expansion of services and increasingly 
long term in-patient hospital care that also occurred in step down units. CHOP’s creation 
of step down units occurred at a time when they realized they needed to reserve their ICU 
beds for their sickest patients, so they created step down units during the 1970s as places 
where chronically ill patients could still receive more intensive (but not as intense) 
nursing care that could be billed to insurance payers (government and private).  
These patients in step down units did not require the nurse to patient ratios and 
level of care the IICU had, and thus were staffed and managed accordingly. In this way, 
the infant intensive care unit became a piece of a much larger system of care as some of 
these infants became chronic patients and required both intensive and chronic care 
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beyond the neonatal period.292 Infants needing greater levels of long term care such that 
they could not be discharged home or to the general wards across the hospital, 
necessitated the creation of different types of units where they could be cared for by 
nurses and healthcare personnel trained to care for their specific needs. While the IICU 
became the place for the sickest newborns in the hospital, it simultaneously became a part 
of a broader inter-hospital system of intensive care units devoted to newborn care 
throughout the city and local regions.  
 
Beyond the IICU’s walls: The NICU as a focal point for a regionalized system of care. 
 
Regionalization of newborn critical care became an important aspect of the 
development of neonatal critical care and the units in which it was delivered. Since the 
turn of the century physicians and hospital administrators struggled with the expense of 
caring for sick newborns; these units were expensive as they were nurse intensive, 
equipment intensive, and the beds were specific to a very niched group of patients such 
that that overflow from other units where older children were cared for could not take 
these IICU beds. To mitigate this, many smaller areas coordinated their own networks of 
care in the 1940s and 1950s, transporting prematurely born infants from smaller 
                                                            
292 As infants became triaged throughout the hospital as to who was sick enough to remain in the IICU and 
who could move to what was called a ‘transitional unit’ for patients who still needed particular 
care, but did not need it as acutely.  
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community hospitals to larger ones that had centers for premature infant care.293 While 
these attempts were grassroots in nature, the formalization of regionalized care was not a 
revolutionary idea unique to sick newborn care. In 1965, the Regionalized Medical 
Programs signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson, created funding for a system 
of cooperative arrangements among medical schools, research institutions, and hospitals 
to further education and patient care related to three key areas: heart disease, cancer, and 
stroke. 294  
Despite the history of more informal forms of regionalization for newborns, some 
physicians and healthcare administrators were hesitant to make this practice widespread. 
George A Little, a neonatologist in New Hampshire, remembered, “people needed to be 
convinced about applying care in a regional fashion. It was not the way acute care was 
practiced.”295 While some communities formed regional networks for premature infant 
and acute newborn care complete with transportation systems, others expressed hesitancy 
to formalize such an approach when facing new unfamiliar models of acute care and 
uncertainty about who would pay for it.  
In 1972, The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia started an emergency 
transportation system to move sick infants from outlying hospitals that did not have 
                                                            
293 New York and Chicago were two such places that established successful transportation systems between 
smaller hospitals and larger medical centers equipped to care for the sickest premature infants. For 
more information see: G.M. Oppenheimer. “Prematurity as a Public Health Problem: US Policy 
from the 1920s to the 1960s,” American Journal of Public Health 86, no. 6 (1996): 870. 
294 “The Regional Medical Program: Brief History.” U.S. Library of Medicine, 2013. 
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/RM/p-nid/94.  
295 Marguerite Holloway. “The Regionalized Perinatal Care Program” in To Improve Health and 
Healthcare 2001: The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Anthology. Accessed November 7, 2013. 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/web-assets/2001/01/the-regionalized-perinatal-care-program.  
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newborn ICU’s to meet the needs of their sickest patients. CHOP had long been one of 
the largest children’s hospitals in the area and by 1973 had garnered recognition for their 
expertise in the care of sick children and infants (though St. Christopher’s Hospital would 
join CHOP within the next year as another local hospital devoted solely to the care of 
children). Philadelphia pediatricians296 and the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia met to 
discuss the ways CHOP could help meet the needs of area children. Physicians at the 
meeting identified the need for a regional transportation system so that newborns and 
children at area hospitals could be transferred to CHOP for aid during the most acute 
stage of illness when community hospitals were unable to provide the acute services 
some newborns needed. CHOP worked with a local ambulance company to establish a 
Regional Infant Intensive Care Program. This made CHOP’s unit the central hub in a 
broader connection of hospitals that enabled all infants born in an eight county 
concentration to have access to the level of acute care they needed. By 1974, St. 
Christopher’s Hospital for children also had resource services to dispatch an ambulance 
with equipment and personnel to transport sick newborns and receive them in their own 
infant intensive care unit. 
 The general outline of the program consisted of three main pieces: the notification 
process at CHOP for transfer, the equipment and tools needed to transport the newborn, 
and the establishment of criterion for the need of this program. CHOP’s goal was to 
transfer the infants for treatment at CHOP until their need for acute care had passed upon 
                                                            
296 Archival documents do not specify exactly which local physicians were present at this meeting but they 
were a group of local pediatricians practicing in the Philadelphia area.  
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which they would be transferred back to their hospital of origin. The service covered 
eight counties including Philadelphia, Chester, Bucks, Delaware, and Montgomery in 
Pennsylvania and Burlington, Camden, and Gloucester in New Jersey.297  
 CHOP agreed to open their unit as the center and arrangements were made with 
an ambulance company that transportation between outlying hospitals and CHOP would 
be carried out. The ambulance would cost the parents a flat fee of $30 for hospitals within 
the city limits, with out of city transports costing an additional $1.00 per mile. Upon 
notification for need for transportation, the ambulance would drop by CHOP to pick up 
the necessary equipment and the personnel needed: a physician and nurse team “prepared 
for any contingency affecting the baby.”298 The physician and nurse worked together and 
both would have needed to understand emergency resuscitation, how to run and 
troubleshoot any problems with the equipment used during transport, as well as any 
issues related to newborns that might arise due to medical complications. The nurse 
would have been trained in the equipment and life-saving measure that might be needed 
en route. The equipment loaded into the ambulance included an electrocardiogram 
machine, resuscitation equipment, heart rate monitor, and an incubator designed for 
emergency transport creating what CHOP referred to as the infant’s own carefully 
regulated mini-environment. Infants suffering from ten different medical and surgical 
                                                            
297 [General Outline of Transportation Program, March 3, 1972.] Box 46, Folder 11, MSS 6/0013-01, 
Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia 
Historical Medical Library.  
298 [General Outline of Transportation Program, March 3, 1972, page 2] Box 46, Folder 11, MSS 6/0013-
01, Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia 
Historical Medical Library 
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categories could be transferred including low birth weight infants, infants with respiratory 
distress infants and infants with suspected surgical problems.299 The range of both 
medical and surgical patients was broad, but their classification as neonates unified them 
all.  
After an initial pilot period of one year, St. Christopher’s Hospital joined the 
partnership and served as another center where physicians, nurses and a transport team 
would be located.300 Newspaper articles lauded the program as a solution to the problem 
of scarce resources in the region for critical care for extremely sick neonates, labeling the 
regional transport program as having incredible “life-saving potential.”301 This put the 
infant intensive care unit at CHOP at the center of a broader matrix of hospitals and 
patients who needed treatment and could be transferred to one of the city’s two children’s 
hospital to receive it. Newborn critical care did not function as individual units in the 
                                                            
299 [Philadelphia Medicine, Critical Care Nurseries for Optimal Care of the High Risk Neonate, June 5, 
1971] Box 79, Folder 1, MSS 6/0013-01, Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The 
College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library.; The list included: “…any 
neonate who presents with diagnostic or therapeutic problem, low birth weight infants requiring 
intensive care, low birth weight infants or full term infants with respiratory distress, infants with 
hyperbilirubinemia, infants of diabetic or pre-diabetic mothers, infants with cardiac problems, 
infants with seizures, infants of heroin addicts or drub abusers, infanst with suspected surgical 
problems, infants with infections…”  
300 [Press Release: Sunday February 11, 1973] Box 46, Folder 11, MSS 6/0013-01, Children's Hospital of 
Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library.  
301 [Newspaper clipping: Infant Intensive Care is Saving Newborns by Patricia McBroom] Box 46, Folder 
11, MSS 6/0013-01, Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of 
Philadelphia Historical Medical Library.; [Newspaper clipping: Children’s, St Joseph’s Hospitals 
share infant transport] Box 46, Folder 11, MSS 6/0013-01, Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 
1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library.; [Newspaper 
clipping: Hospital starts program to save stricken infants] Box 46, Folder 11, MSS 6/0013-01, 
Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia 
Historical Medical Library.; [Newspaper clipping: Mobile care system saves lives of many 
critically ill infants] Box 46, Folder 11, MSS 6/0013-01, Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 
1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library. 
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separate hospitals. Physicians and hospital administration transferred sick newborns 
between each location when neonates needed care that could not be given at a particular 
institution. Thus NICU care became a system of care that was broader than just the 
individual units, but functioned as a network of units that shared resources. Considered 
one of three infant intensive care units in Philadelphia at this time, CHOP was poised as a 
hospital with trained personnel, beds for the most critically ill, and advanced equipment 
and technologies to care for these newborns 
“Keeping infants alive is only half the battle…”302: 
Ventilator-dependent pediatric patients and the chronicity of unintended consequences 
 
By the late 1970s, both the accomplishments of intensive care for newborns as 
well as unintended consequences emerged in tandem with increased attention on the cost-
effectiveness of such highly technological environments. While more critically ill 
newborns survived, they did not always make full recoveries and some remained 
dependent on certain technologies their entire lives. As physicians and nurses 
progressively saved sicker patients, they contributed to the growing issues of chronicity 
as these patients survived but, in some cases, never left the units. Wayne Hayman was 
one of those children. Newspaper articles described him as a vibrant and special little 
boy. Wayne was born with VATER syndrome (also known as VACTERL syndrome).303 
                                                            
302 [“Keeping infants alive is only half the battle”, Philadelphia Inquirer, September 24, 1978] Box 84, 
Folder 5, MSS 6/0013-01, Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of 
Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library. 
303 Benjamin D. Solomon. “VACTERL/VATER Association.” Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases 6 
(August 16, 2011): 56. doi:10.1186/1750-1172-6-56.; VATER syndrome is used to define the 
presence of at least three congenital malformations that include, but are not limited to, vertebral 
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Little Wayne underwent 30 life-saving operations before turning three years old. He 
never left the NICU, though he eventually graduated to the pediatric intensive care unit. 
By his fourth birthday he had a tracheostomy, was ventilator dependent, had a colostomy, 
and required a feeding tube to help him eat. Surgical intervention had saved Wayne’s life, 
but he still required intensive medical and nursing care.  
Wayne had no family to care for him, so he was made a ward of the state of 
Pennsylvania and local newspaper columns describe the physicians, nurses, and social 
workers that cared for him during his tenure at CHOP as “the closest thing he had to a 
family.”304 Wayne’s chubby cheeks and bright eyes set him apart from the other patients 
at CHOP, particularly when coupled with his spunky and joyful attitude. The nurses 
remembered him as a bit of a jokester, stealing their supplies and playing tricks on them 
when he could. Due to his tracheostomy, Wayne could not speak, but communicated 
through American Sign Language and knew over 300 signs that he used to convey his 
wants, emotions, and needs. Wayne was the longest continual patient CHOP had ever had 
up until that point. The surgical and daily care over his short life totaled over $2 million 
dollars, an unprecedented amount at that time for the children’s hospital. By his sixth 
birthday, Wayne had become the focal point of a discussion about the worth of using 
technology to save lives.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
defects, anal atresia, cardiac defects, trachea-esophageal fistula, renal anomalies, and limb 
abnormalities. Due to the nature of the congenital abnormalities, surgical intervention is almost 
always required during infancy.  
304 “Little Wayne Gets Pauper’s Grave at the End of His Tragic Life.” Associated Press. February 27, 1985. 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1985/Little-Wayne-Gets-Pauper-s-Grave-At-End-Of-His-Tragic-
Life/id-7f974143319ac5687fbf564195a4a3d9.; “The Only Family He Knew: Hospital Staff 
Mourns Boy’s Death.” Observer Reporter. February 28, 1985. 
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The consequences of more invasive and intense medical interventions helped 
newborns survive but left children dependent on ventilators for their entire lives. These 
‘vent dependent’ kids became important aspects of the continual examination of the 
ongoing care newborn ICU’s delivered. Such scrutiny was not confined to the United 
States. Canada also experienced extensively long ICU stays as a result of better ability to 
save the lives of sicker patients and deliver more intensive care. One such example was a 
little boy named Kevin Keough, a nine year old who resided in the ICU at Winnipeg 
General Hospital and was ventilator dependent and a quadriplegic.305, 306  
The need to keep healthcare spending in check and ensure these units were cost-
effective rubbed up against the ethics of who could receive care, what kinds of treatment 
were offered, and to what extent treatment could go to save a life. Koop organized a 
national workshop in 1983 hosted by the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia to discuss 
national approaches to care for the growing number handicapped children, many of 
whom would not have survived prior to the establishment of neonatal intensive care and 
ICUs in hospitals.307 Though the workshop did not focus on NICU patients exclusively, it 
created a dialogue that considered intensive care for infants and children to be part of a 
multi-faceted approach to care, and it concentrated on vent-dependent children as an 
avenue to approach broader fiscal and ethical issues in care. Dr. Koop invited over 170 
                                                            
305 Brandi Vanderspank. “The Social Construction of Intensive Care Nursing, 1960-2002: Canadian 
Historical Perspectives,” PhD Diss. University of Ottowa, 2014. 
306 A quadriplegic is someone who by either illness or injury has decreased or no use of all four limbs.  
307 Surgeon General’s Workshop on Children with Handicaps and Their Families: Case Example: The 
Ventilator. Philadelphia, PA: The US Department of Health and Human Services, December 13, 
1982. http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBCGM.ocr. 
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people, including healthcare providers, legislative aides, financial executives, and parents 
and advocates from all over the country. Koop opened the meeting presenting a holistic 
approach:  
Our task at this Workshop is not an easy one. We are asking each other to deal 
with very complex issues as we keep in mind the many levels of complexity: the 
emotional and the moral, the medical and the technological, the social, the 
psychological, and the financial… When we talk about "cost-effective life-
support systems," we are implicitly putting some dollar value on a human life. So 
the moral and the technological and the economic do come together, whether or 
not we feel comfortable about it.308 
 
Koop rightly acknowledged the complexity of making decisions regarding care and 
allocation of resources. Medicaid spending had grown exponentially and by the 1980s 
both private and governmental spending on healthcare had increased drastically. Many 
aspects of healthcare spending came under scrutiny, including systems such as the 
NICU.309 One such governmental report, framed as a series of case studies examined the 
ethical considerations and cost-effectiveness of the NICU. The authors came to the 
conclusion that with the inability to clearly determine, “factual information, clearer 
concepts [of neonatal intensive care], and a firmer grasp of the values which public 
policy does and should promote” were needed to determine more clearly any benefit 
analysis of the NICU.310 
                                                            
308 Ibid. Surgeon General’s Workshop on Children with Handicaps.  
309 Peter Budetti, Nancy Barrand, Peggy McManus, and Lu Ann Heinen. Case Study #10: The Cost and 
Effectiveness of Neonatal Intensive Care. The Implications of Cost-Effective Analysis of Medical 
Technology. (San Fransisco, California: University of California, August 1981). 
310 Ibid. Budetti, Barrand, McManus, and Heinen. Case Study #10. 3.  
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The concerns surrounding technology dependent patients were not unique to 
Wayne Hayman nor to Philadelphia; it was a national debate that arose from a 
recognition that, “the price to pay for the miracles in the intensive care unit turned out to 
be simultaneous survival of a small number of infants and children who could not be 
removed from medical technology.”311 The invention of respiratory ventilator therapies 
for newborns contributed to increased survival rates, and some infants grew too old to 
inhabit units for neonates. The CHOP IICU sent some patients to the hospital’s Pediatric 
Intensive Care Unit (PICU) if required while sending others to step down units within the 
hospital where physicians and nurses knew how to care for their unique needs. By the 
mid-1980s, these units became places where families could be intricately involved in 
patient care learning skills, participating in management decisions, and providing care to 
their children with the possibility that if they chose to eventually take their child home, 
they could. Thus the IICU environment changed as it responded to broader trends in 
patient care. These units became places where the unintended consequences of saving 
critically ill babies raise the ethical questions of how far to go.  
Physicians and nurses and the team of specialists and hospital administrators 
learned how to save these babies in Philadelphia and the surrounding region, but they did 
not anticipate the continued dependence these infants might have on the technologies 
used in their care. Public opinion and debate in Philadelphia swelled on both sides of the 
                                                            
311 John Monagle and David Thomasma. Health Care Ethics: Critical Issues for the 21st Century (Sudbury, 
MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2005). 150.  
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issue.312  Stances that chose to focus on the value of these newborns and the hope that 
they could be saved and fully functional if they received excellent care lauded the units 
and those who cared for the tiny patients.313 Other writers questioned the long term 
effects on the newborns who could never successfully be weaned off the equipment and 
thus required extensive financial and support services for their long-term care.314 By the 
early 1980s, the unintentional consequences of a life-saving system of care became a new 
key discussion point surrounding the use and continuing development of neonatal 
intensive care and the associated commitment of resources. Whether or not the type of 
intensive care that saved lives needed to be allocated so intensely became increasingly 
scrutinized in the early 1980s, as the issue of technology dependent children became a 
more dominant theme in pediatric healthcare. 
                                                            
312[Donald Drake. “The Ethics of ‘Halfway’ Technology.” The Philadelphia Inquirer. September 26, 
1978.] Box 84, Folder 6, MSS 6/0013-01, Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The 
College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library.; Linda Herzkowitz. “A Gap in 
the Medical System.” The Philadelphia Inquirer. December 14, 1982.; [Marc Kaufman. “A 
Damaged Life in Intensive Care.” The Philadelphia Inquirer. December 5, 1983. and ———. 
Caring for the Impaired: Boy’s Death Highlights a Costly Caseload. Philadelphia Inquirer. March 
3, 1985, sec. C.] Box 84, Folder 7, MSS 6/0013-01, Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-
2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library.; Pat McKeown. “It’s 
a Child’s Life Machine and All.” The Philadelphia Daily News. December 14, 1982.; “The Only 
Family He Knew: Hospital Staff Mourns Boy’s Death.” Observer Reporter. February 28, 1982 
313 One such example: [Article “Life is precious to hospital staff, The Bulletin, D5(C), 1981. The Bulletin.] 
Box 79, Folder 1, MSS 6/0013-01, Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College 
of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library.; This article was published in the 
Bulletin, Philadelphia’s largest circulating newspaper between 1847 and 1982. The newspaper 
closed temporarily and is has now been reestablished. See also: “It’s a child’s life machine and 
all.” The Philadelphia Daily News, December 14, 1982.  
314 For an example of such an article: Article “Machine saves babies but then dooms them, Post Dispatch. 
St. Louis, MO, October 10, 1978.” Box 84, Folder 5, MSS 6/0013-01, Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library.; 
See also: “Baby’s breath: Life on a machine, Philadelphia Inquirer. September 26, 1978, 5-A” 
Box 84, Folder 5, MSS 6/0013-01, Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College 
of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library. 
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 Dialogue particularly focused on how the technology was used, on whom 
it should be used, when and for how long, and who paid for the expensive care 
surrounding its use. Interestingly newspaper and scholarly articles collectively 
speak to equipment, but they almost always contextualize it within the units, the 
ways we choose to treat particular patients, and the broader implications for the 
unintended consequences of how such care is delivered. Articles from 
Philadelphia’s newspapers, and others from across the state focused on ventilator 
dependent children but understood the ventilator as part of a broader approach to 
care. In short, the debate surrounding the long term effects of extensive measures 
to save newborns overlapped with a growing number of infants who survived 
critical illness and were living longer lives as chronically ill older children who 
were very expensive to maintain. This reflects the complexity of a the system of 
neonatal intensive care, and is just another check point as the 20th century 
progressed where society questioned their choices of intervention and investment 
with sick infants who previously would not have survived.  
 The IICU at CHOP began as a unit that grew in tandem and, in some 
ways, out of the development of a surgical specialty. As it grew, the unit became 
part of a network of other hospitals and units that provided intensive care for 
newborns though a regional transportation system. By the 1980s, the ethical 
repercussions came into question for the newborns that grew into childhood and 
continued to require costly treatment and support. Though beyond the scope of 
this work, the unintended consequences of ICU care for newborns emerged in the 
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literature and influenced the development of infrastructure as the need for step 
down units and systems to support the care of some of these children in their 
homes grew  
 In some ways, Wayne Hayman’s story at CHOP shows how costly intensive care 
was for newborns and children, but Wayne was also in a unique place in the debates as he 
lacked a family to care for him at home. The social workers at the Children’s Hospital 
worked diligently to find Wayne a foster family that could handle his particular needs. 
After months of searching, they finally found a retired practical nurse, Ms. Betty Lamar, 
who would take in the little boy. The hospital staff felt it could be risky to send Wayne 
into a Foster home, due to his distance from the hospital setting. But they knew he could 
not stay in intensive care, so they agreed to train Ms. Lamar to handle his care. Though it 
had taken a team of physicians and nurses to provide care to Wayne for five years, they 
hoped he could have a better quality of life outside of the hospital setting. On December 
5th, after a year living in foster care with Ms. Lamar, the tracheostomy tube through 
which the little boy breathed clogged. Despite Ms. Lamar’s immediate instigation of 
CPR, Wayne fell into a coma, and after six weeks died at a pediatric nursing home in 
New Jersey. His case raised questions about the very personal nature of the growing 
problem of chronically ill children who had survived the neonatal period to live life 
dependent on complex and intense care. Wayne needed intense resources that, in his case, 
highlighted the complexity of caring for children like him. A reporter for the Philadelphia 
Inquirer posed the questions:  
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Was it worth it – financially, emotionally and in terms of Wayne’s own suffering 
– to keep him alive so much longer than we would have without medical 
technology? Should the same be done for the Wayne’s of the future? No one 
knows what Wayne would say, but those closest to the case clearly think so.315 
 
Wayne’s life and death, the memories of this little boy, and the city’s financial 
commitment to his care, brought meaning to this boy’s story for the city of 
Philadelphia.  CHOP founded their neonatal intensive care unit particularly to 
care for post-operative infants, like Wayne, who received initial surgical care. As 
Wayne grew, he became part of a growing population of children who survived 
previously fatal congenital conditions only to become patients with chronic health 
issues. Some children, like Wayne, became ventilator dependent never able to 
fully be weaned off of the machines. His life and story raised questions about 
ethics and newborn care as well as questions about the increasingly complex 
system of support required to keep him alive.  
 While similar questions occurred in adult units, those who debated the 
decisions of life and death in newborn intensive care units often had to do so 
without any direct information about what the long-term consequences would be. 
Newborns could have 60 to 70 years as productive members of society should 
they survive intact, but unlike particular determinants for adults, including 
knowing the wishes of the adult, there were no immediate measures to determine 
quality or longevity of life for neonates. Until the Baby Doe case in 1981, 
                                                            
315 [Marc Kaufman. “Caring for the Impaired: Boy’s Death Highlights a Costly Caseload.” Philadelphia 
Inquirer. March 3, 1985, sec. C.] Box 84, Folder 7, MSS 6/0013-01, Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia, 1855-2006, The College of Physicians of Philadelphia Historical Medical Library. 
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government and legislative officials had largely left the decision-making process 
regarding patient care and life support to physicians, nurses and the families. With 
the introduction the Baby Doe cases in the early 1980s, the government passed a 
law known as the Baby Doe law that began debates about who could and should 
be saved and who decided what potentially lifesaving treatments to give.   
 The reality of the extent that neonates born with particular congenital 
abnormalities or at very low birth weights could survive had been proven to some 
extent in the NICUs of the 1960s and early 1970s. The Baby Doe cases became 
the public and legal arena for debates about whether or not the newborns should 
be saved and who made that decision.316 One Baby Doe in particular, a little boy 
born in Indiana in 1982, greatly influenced the debates. Baby Doe was born with 
Down’s Syndrome and a trachea-esophageal atresia. His parents, in conjunction 
with their obstetrician, believed that even if the baby boy received lifesaving 
surgical correction of the trachea-esophageal atresia, he would have little quality 
of life and food; water and surgical intervention were withheld until death. The 
baby died when he was six days old. Legal debates as to the degree that the 
parents could decide to withhold ‘life saving treatments’ were initiated but not 
completed prior to the infant’s death and eventually reached the Surgeon 
                                                            
316 Jon Tyson. “The Baby Doe Regulations in the United States: A Controversial and Uncertain Legacy,” 
Low Birth Weight 5, no. 1 (Spring 1995). 
http://futureofchildren.org/publications/journals/article/index.xml?journalid=60&articleid=380&se
ctionid=2566&submit.  
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General’s office.317 This case, in conjunction with other legal cases heard at both 
the state and federal levels throughout the 1970s and early 1980s placed the 
intensive care units for newborns in the middle of intense and complicated 
debates about who should receive care and who could make those decisions.318 
Physicians, nurses, and families at CHOP, as one of 600 NICUs in the country,319 
entered the 1980s facing these legal and ethical questions.  
Conclusion:  
 
 As lifesaving medical and surgical techniques expanded for the newborn 
population, so did the variety of healthcare professionals, equipment, and systems needed 
to change the mortality rates. Koop knew he needed expert and skilled nurses to work 
with his surgical patients, but Koop’s recognition of good nursing care would not have 
been revolutionary in and of itself. He understood that these nurses could better care for 
the babies if they were supported by creating a dedicated space, given consistent and 
adequate staff, supplying appropriate tools, and giving them the authority to make 
decisions and “do something” to protect and care for these infants. A highly technological 
system developed that not only included pediatric surgery and a space to put the infants 
post-operatively, it involved decisions that affirmed nursing care as central to patient 
survival. This assumption of good nursing care, among other factors, fueled the creation 
                                                            
317 John Britton. “‘Baby Doe’ Rulings: Review and Comment,” West Journal of Medicine 140, no. 2 
(February 1984): 303–7. 
318 I acknowledge this to be true and a book end to my time period of interest, though the ethical debates 
and implications are beyond the scope of my work to be addressed further here.  
319 Ibid. Budetti, Barrand, McManus, and Heinen. Case Study #10. 4.  
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of an infant intensive care unit where the sick and surgical newborn patients could 
receive the care they needed. The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia serves as an 
example of the growth a neonatal ICU heavily influenced by the development of a 
surgical specialty, and demonstrated the value of an infrastructure that supported good 
nursing care and expertise. Regionalization of neonatal intensive care in the Philadelphia 
area meant that the hospital and its healthcare staff transported and cared for infants from 
around the region providing sophisticated care that many hospitals could not afford to 
provide. Like their adult counterparts in adult ICUs, the neonatal nurses proved central to 
the idea of intensive care as well as to the care these infants needed as they became 
chronically ill.  
 The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia highlights the ways nursing influenced 
the need to establish an infrastructure for caring for a particularly vulnerable population. 
Good nursing care was widely acknowledged as needed, but a dedicated space at CHOP 
was implemented so that the nursing care could be optimized. Once the IICU was 
established and grew, physicians and nurses began to discover that though many 
newborns “graduated” from the unit without significant chronic impairment, a growing 
population of ventilator dependent chronically ill children became part of the IICU 
legacy. Society lacked resources for their long-term care and there were no long term 
plans for paying for the extensive and expensive therapies these children needed. As the 
early 1980s dawned, the use of highly complex treatments and technologies came under 
scrutiny as the Baby Doe cases raised questions about the ethical use of machines and 
technology.  
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 While CHOP clearly highlights the ways intensive care for newborns arose in one 
hospital as a way to meet the need for surgical patients, the establishment and evolution 
of newborn care at Boston Children’s Medical Center shows a very different story of how 
their unit formed. In the next chapter, I will explore how another children’s hospital in a 
large northeastern city met the need for particularized care for critically ill newborns.  
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Chapter 5:  
 
 
Complex roots of influence:  
Nursing and the NICU at Boston Children’s Hospital 
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Complex roots of influence: Newborn ICU care at Boston Children’s Hospital 
On August 8, 1963 a cadre of presidential physicians and secret service personnel 
rushed Jacqueline Kennedy to Otis Air Force Base where she gave birth to her second 
son, Patrick, born five and a half weeks early.320 Immediately following his birth, 
physicians diagnosed Patrick with respiratory distress syndrome and transferred him by 
ambulance to Boston Children’s Medical Center (BCMC)321 for treatment. Chief of 
Pediatrics at Boston Children’s Medical Center, Dr. James E Drorbaugh, accompanied 
the baby for the one and a half hour ambulance ride.322 By the time Patrick arrived at 
BCMC, the pediatrics team who transferred him knew something was seriously wrong.323 
Physicians and nurses admitted him to the hospital’s newborn intensive care unit placing 
him in an Isolette and providing intensive care and support. 
 Despite skilled care, Patrick’s condition did not improve, so the medical team 
decided to offer him a new form of treatment known at the time as hyperbaric medicine. 
They placed him in the hospital’s hyperbaric chamber where he experienced an 
                                                            
320 “August 7, 1963 – Press Secretary Peirre Salinger announces the birth of Patrick Bouvier Kennedy” 
YouTube video. :32, posted by “HelmerReenberg,” February 26, 2013, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dU7z7KOeizM.   
321 The hospital was originally referred to as Boston Children’s Hospital, but for clarity and flow I will 
consistently refer to it by it’s current name that was used upon it’s establishment as a “medical 
center” in the annual reports in the 1950s. Subsequent abbreviations for Boston Children’s 
Medical Center will appear as BCMC.  
322 William Blair. “2nd Son Born To Kennedy’s Has Lung Illness; Child Transferred to Boston After Birth 
at Cape Hospital,” New York Times, August 8, 1963. ProQuest.; “Kennedy’s Baby Taken Ill: 
Kennedy’s Baby Born Prematurely, Taken Ill,” Los Angeles Times. August 8, 1963. ProQuest.; 
Laurence Burd. “Newborn Kennedy Son Ill: Name, Baptize Infant Suffering Lung Ailment,” 
Chicago Tribune, August 8, 1963. ProQuest.; “Kennedy Baby Dies at Boston Hospital; President 
at Hand,” New York Times, August 9, 1963. ProQuest.; Lawerence Altman. “A Kennedy Baby’s 
Life and Death,” New York Times, July 29, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/health/a-
kennedy-babys-life-and-death.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
323 Ibid. Burd. Newborn Kennedy Son Ill: Name, Baptize Infant Suffering Lung Ailment. 
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atmospheric pressure environment up to four times greater than normal.  The physicians 
believed that this change in environmental pressure allowed for an increase in the 
newborn’s tissue oxygen levels. Unfortunately the treatment did not work. Patrick 
succumbed to respiratory distress and died the morning of August 9, 1963.324,325  
 The American people adored the Kennedy family. When the Kennedy’s second 
son Patrick died, that admiration intensely focused the nation’s value of newborns, and 
the need to improve mortality rates associated with respiratory distress. Patrick 
Kennedy’s story resonates in the memories of many Americans as one of the major 
events that drastically affected not only the Kennedy family but the nation. As previously 
noted the post-war 1950s was built partly upon the framework of the importance of the 
family; thus the grief and loss experienced by the President’s family resonated with all 
families and reinforced the need to battle the devastating effects of RDS. BCMC chose to 
offer a highly experimental form of treatment that few other babies experienced– 
hyperbaric medicine - to baby Patrick, perhaps in an attempt to save the baby’s life when 
nothing else worked. Though the chamber was located outside of the newborn intensive 
care nursery, it was an extension of the desperate attempts to treat RDS and care for 
medically fragile and prematurely born infants. The story painted a broader picture of 
neonatal intensive care and its possibilities as a technical system beyond the unit as a 
                                                            
324 “Press Conference at 04:26 a.m., Friday 8/9.” Children’s Hospital Medical Center, June 4, 1964. 
Celebrity Files. (AC 1) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 12.5, 
folder 188.; “Kennedy Baby Dies at Boston Hospital; President at Hand.” New York Times. 
August 9, 1963. 
325 “High Hopes for High O2 Therapy: Medical World News, March 13, 1964.” Facilities Planning. (AC 
10) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 10, folder 23. 
 
 
	  
169	  
focal point for care. In this chapter I will argue that newborn intensive care at Boston 
Children’s Medical Center emerged because the hospital administration made decisions 
to allocate space and nursing personnel based on the value of caring for all critically ill 
newborns, and with the impact of emerging technology and therapeutics - particularly 
skilled nursing care. These influences did not result in the immediate establishment of an 
ICU at BCMC, but influenced the creation of units that over time laid the foundation for 
what became the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit.  
Boston, premature newborns, and the shared mission of two hospitals 
 
 
 BCMC’s neonatal intensive care unit grew out of the approach the hospital had 
previously taken to care for sick newborns. Boston Children’s Medical Center had a 
critical care unit for newborns by the 1960s, and the unit had roots deeply embedded in 
the hospital’s premature infant nursery, established at their sister institution Infants’ 
Hospital, in the 1930s.  Between BCMC’s1889 establishment and the 1950s, the hospital 
did not care for infants less than two years of age. Eventually recognizing the need to 
encompass newborns and young infants, the hospital chose to form a relationship with the 
Infants’ Hospital in in 1922 in an attempt to share limited financial resources, skilled 
manpower, and precious hospital space to extend hospital care to sick infants.326 To allow 
for closer proximity and sharing of resources, Infants’ Hospital sold their original 
property and moved into a new building adjacent to the Children’s Medical Center. The 
                                                            
326 “The Children’s Hospital and the Infants’ Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts. By Kenneth Blackfan” 
Infants Hospital (AC 3) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 7, 
folder 90.; “Infants Hospital Annual Report, 1922” Internet Archive. Retrieved from 
https://ia600706.us.archive.org/7/items/infantshospital33140infa/infantshospital33140infa.pdf. 
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two hospitals shared nursing staff and administrative organization with the intention of 
allowing Infants’ Hospital to function more economically, for BCMC to have access to 
medical and nursing care for newborns and infants, and to improve efficiency for both 
institutions.327  
A Premature Infant Unit 
 
 As early as the 1930s BCMC and Infants’ Hospital recognized the need to group 
prematurely born newborns together to provide specific care for them. According to 
national and state census data for 1925, the mortality rate related to neonatal prematurity 
was by far the highest cause of death for infants less than one year of age. More infants in 
the state of Massachusetts died of prematurity than all the other causes of death in early 
infancy combined.328 By this time, decreases had been made in many causes of death for 
older infants, but prematurity did not experience a significant similar decrease in 
mortality rates. In light of national attention on premature infants and a recognized need 
to lower premature infant mortality (see chapter 2 for discussion of national trends) 
                                                            
327 One data source suggests the discussion might have been broader than resources. Despite the unified 
administration an administrative manager at the Children’s Hospital denied that these attempts at 
efficiency and more fiscally wise management of resources did not lead to financial savings as, 
“…the better a hospital, the more it costs; and these costs, dependent…on ever increasing 
demands for…studies and more intensive nursing, far outweigh the saving in unified 
administration.” For more see: Clement Smith. “The Children’s Hospital of Boston: Built Better 
than They Knew” (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company, 1983). 5-7. 
328 Mortality Statistics: 1925. Washington D.C.: Department of Commerce and Labor Bureau of the 
Census, 1925. 200. http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsushistorical/mortstatsh_1925.pdf. 
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particularly within the state of Massachusetts, Boston Children’s Medical Center and the 
Infants’ Hospital collaborated to open a Premature Infant Nursery in 1932.329   
 The Infants’ Hospital opened its unit just prior to the initiation of a broader public 
health movement in 1937 aimed at creating an infrastructure to address the needs of 
premature infants in the state of Massachusetts that included: establishment of premature 
infant centers (units) in 48 hospitals across the state, the development of educational 
materials for physicians and nurses (both premature infant unit nurses and public health 
nurses), and the passing of a “Premature Infant Law” aimed at eliminating economic 
barriers families might have faced in transferring their babies to the hospital.330 As part of 
a push to get newborns born prematurely at home into hospitals for the care they needed, 
Massachusetts created centers in hospitals that could receive and care for the newborns. 
The state Board of Health developed educational materials for public health nurses 
related to the appropriate care of premature infants prior to transfer and follow-up care 
once the infant returned home, and created ‘institutes’ for the training of nurses by other 
nurses. This program was not the only program of its kind in the United States at this 
                                                            
329 Though the premature unit is credited as established in 1932 by hospital historians and secondary 
sources, the hospital’s annual reports did mention care of premature infants as early as their 1896 
annual report though no details are given as to how and where they cared for these infants.; “West 
End Nursery, Annual Report, 1896.” Retrieved from 
https://archive.org/details/infantshospital31421infa. 
330 Florence McKay. “Massachusetts State Program for the Care of Prematures,” American Journal of 
Public Health 31, no. 1 (January 1941): 72–78. 
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time as other large cities such as Chicago and New York also published their attempts to 
create citywide infrastructures to battle the problem of prematurity.331 
 In 1937, Massachusetts initiated their premature infant program due to their belief 
that premature infants who received hospital care had higher survival rates that those 
born and cared for at home. The program was based on the tenent of transferring 
premature infants from home into the approximately 50 hospitals in the state to receive 
care in these specialized premature infant units. Hospitals that opened these units 
provided their own financial and spatial resources.332 Infant’s Hospital was one such 
premature infant center, and most likely one of the largest.  
 Physician and historian Clement Smith333 described the premature infant unit of 
the Infant’s Hospital as a separate unit enclosed within the larger hospital where both 
mechanical complexity and the unit census grew steadily throughout the 1930s and into 
the 1940s.334 The unit, distinct from the other areas of the hospital, organized care 
primarily around prematurely born infants defined as “weighing less than 5 ½ 
pounds.”335, 336 As the hospital did not have a maternity service, all patients were 
                                                            
331 G.M. Oppenheimer. “Prematurity as a Public Health Problem: US Policy from the 1920s to the 1960s,” 
American Journal of Public Health 86, no. 6 (1996): 870.; Helen Wallace, Margaret Losty, and 
Samuel Wishik. “Prematurity as a Public Health Problem: Administration of a Public Health 
Program for the Care of Premature Infants,” American Journal of Pubic Health 40 (January 1950): 
41–47. 
332 Ibid. McKay. Massachusetts State Program for the Care of Prematures, 72–78.  
333 Clement Smith is considered by many to be the father of modern neonatal medicine in the United States. 
He published prolifically between 1950 and 1980. 
334 Ibid. Smith. Built Better than They Knew. 121.  
335 For more on discussions regarding prematurity defined by birth weight rather than gestation at this time, 
see Chapter 2.  
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transferred from homes or other hospitals, and nursing staff kept careful records upon 
patient intake as to demographic data, from where the infant was transferred, diagnosis, 
and referring physician.337  
 Both administration for Boston Children’s and the Infant’s Hospital weighed in 
on the building of the premature infant unit. The hospital built the unit with a focus on 
basic tenents of thermoregulation needed for newborn infants. The initial unit consisted 
of two air-conditioned rooms one above the other. Kenneth Blackfan, Physician-in-Chief 
of the Children’s Medical Center, believed air maintained at particular temperatures 
would help with the temperature regulation critical to the care of premature infants, a 
primary concern for nurses and physicians caring for prematurely born infants. Since the 
unit was divided between two separate floors, nursing staff often had to walk through 
other wards when traveling between the two parts of the unit, thus increasing potential for 
bringing infection into the premature infant nursery. Dr. Stewart Clifford, head of the 
premature infant service, remembered the unit’s arrangement was sound from a technical 
point of view as it made the engineering of the space more efficient when considering the 
process of pumping temperature controlled air into the unit; but he bemoaned the medical 
repercussions as this arrangement did little to prevent the spread of infection, and perhaps 
enhanced the spread, as the nurses and aids had to travel elsewhere through the hospital 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
336 As patient records are kept confidential and not accessible by the CHOB archives, I cannot comment on 
race or class issues based on this data. I do know from where infants were transferred generally 
speaking, and will comment on this phenomenon later in the chapter.  
337 “Infants’ Hospital Patient Forms.” Infants Hospital (AC 3) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, 
Massachusetts. Box 7, folder 92. 
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should they need to enter the other half of the divided unit.338 As infection risk was one of 
the most important considerations in the premature infant units, particularly because all 
of their patients were admitted from other hospitals or home births, the control of 
infection remained paramount to the prevention of the spread of disease. 
Infection Issues:  
 
 Hospital-acquired infectious disease was a long-standing problem particularly for 
maternal and newborn hospital wards. Outbreaks of staphylococcal infections in 
hospitals, both in adult wards and in newborn nurseries - well baby nurseries and 
premature infant units - arose as a major health problem. Hospital-acquired staph 
infections manifested ranging from skin lesions filled with pus in areas where skin folds 
occur to pneumonia and septicemia.339, 340 Many medical practitioners and researchers 
tried to understand how to prevent the spread of disease among hospital patients, 
particularly newborns, and their case studies and essays fill the disciplinary literature well 
into the 1960s.341 Sulfonamides, and later antibiotics, for children and adults were 
                                                            
338 “Report on Premature Infant Services: Report by Steward Clifford, MD., 1955” Infants Hospital (AC 
3) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 8, folder 107.3. 
339 Septicemia, also known today as sepsis, is a complication of widespread infection that can result in that 
patient going into shock and ultimately death. Newborns are particularly prone to shock and can 
deteriorate very quickly requiring intense support.  
340 Thomas Shaffer, Robert Sylvester, Jack Baldwin, and Melvin Rheins. “Staphylococcal Infections in 
Newborn Infants,” American Journal of Public Health 47 (August 1957): 992-3. 
341 For examples see: Ibid. Shaffer, Sylvester, Baldwin, and Rheins. Staphylococcal Infections in Newborn 
Infants, 990-994.; Dean Clark, William Altemeier, C.P. Cardwell, Maxwell Finland, Horace 
Hodes, Martha Johnson, and Alexander Langmuir. “The American Hospital Association’s Report 
on ‘Prevention and Control of Staphylococcol Infections in Hospitals,’” American Journal of 
Public Health 48, no. 8 (August 1958): 1071–74.; Heinz Eichenwald and Henry Shinefield. “The 
Problem of Staphylococcal Infection in Newborn Infants,” Journal of Pediatrics 56 (May 1960): 
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developed and used throughout the 1930s and 1940s, but physicians did not have sound 
guidelines for dosing children, much less sick newborns or premature infants.342 Even a 
decade later into the late 1950s, reports and research focused on the prevention and 
control (versus treatment) of infection when it appeared in newborn and premature infant 
nurseries.343 According to historian and physician Clement Smith, The Infant’s Hospital 
attempted to decrease infection rates by preventing the spread of infection. One way they 
attempted to address this issue was to change the premature infant unit’s physical layout 
to provide each patient with his own incubator. The hospital also changed policies 
requiring nurses to put on special gowns before handling patients. Special gowns for 
nurses and physicians who cared for premature infants had been used for years and 
commonly appear in photographs of early premature infant units.344  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
665–74.; Horace Gezon, Donovan Thompson, Kenneth Rogers, Theodore Hatch, Russell 
Rycheck, and Kenneth Yee. “Control of Staphylococcal Infections and Disease in the Newborn 
through the Use of Hexachlorophene Bathing,” Pediatrics 51, no. 2 (February 1973): 331–44.; 
Louis Gluck and HF Wood. “Effect of an Antiseptic Skin-Care Regimen in Reducing 
Staphylococcal Skin Infections in the Nursery,” New England Journal of Medicine 265 (1961): 
1177–81.; Guy Lavoipierre, Kenneth Newell, Margaret Smith, and Dorthy Le Blanc. “A Vaccine 
Trial for Neonatal Staphylococcal Disease,” American Journal of Diseases of Children 122 
(November 1971): 377–85.; E.A. Mortimer, P. Fischer, N. Jenkins, and D. McGirr. 
“Staphylococcus in the Nursey,” The American Journal of Nursing 61, no. 10 (1961): 56–59.; 
Thomas Shaffer, Robert Sylvester, Jack Baldwin, and Melvin Rheins. “Staphylococcal Infections 
in Newborn Infants,” American Journal of Public Health 47 (August 1957): 990–94.; Margaret 
Thomas. “Nursing Procedures in the Management of Staphylocococcal Infections,” American 
Journal of Public Health 50, no. 4 (April 1960): 497–503. 
342 Cynthia Connolly, Cynthia, Janet Golden, and Benjamin Schneider. “‘A Startling New 
Chemotherapeutic Agent’: Pediatric Infectious Disease and the Introduction of Sulfonamides at 
Baltimore’s Syndenham Hospital,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 86 (2012): 66–93. 
343 Dean Clark, William Altemeier, C.P. Cardwell, Maxwell Finland, Horace Hodes, Martha Johnson, and 
Alexander Langmuir. “The American Hospital Association’s Report on ‘Prevention and Control 
of Staphylococcol Infections in Hospitals,’” American Journal of Public Health 48, no. 8 (August 
1958): 1071-4.  
344 “Sixty second annual report: Report of the Physician and Chief” Infants Hospital (AC 3) Boston 
Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 6, folder 77. 
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 Dr. Clifford reported that in 1945, the unit had a mortality rate of 60% among the 
premature infants admitted, with a large number of these deaths due to infection. Clifford 
and Charles Janeway, Physician-in-Chief of the Infants’ Hospital, considered advising the 
hospital trustees to close the unit all together due to the high mortality rates, believing 
that these newborns could not be safely cared for together in one room. Malfunctioning 
air conditioning equipment in 1946 forced the institution’s hand, and instead of repairing 
it, the unit relocated to a larger unified (single room) nursery isolated from all other units. 
With the addition of a steam autoclave and individually air-conditioned incubators, as 
well as changing their gowning policies, the hospital implemented multiple strategies to 
decrease their mortality rates.345  
 Initially, the hospital chose to prevent the spread of infection by reserving the 
right to refuse admissions to premature infants who might have been an infection risk. 
Almost all of the infants the hospital received were transferred from other institutions or 
homes as the children’s hospital had no maternity service. The physicians originally 
believed that some of these transfers from other hospitals or homes increased the risk of 
introducing the healthy premature infants to potentially fatal infections and thus 
complications. This issue was not just in the premature infant unit, but also seen across 
the hospital wards as well. In an attempt to curb broader hospital problems with the 
spread of infection, hospital policy mandated that all nursing personnel wear gowns over 
their nursing uniforms. Hess and Lundeen outlined this gowning practice in great detail in 
                                                            
345 “Report on Premature Infant Services: Report by Steward Clifford, MD., 1955” Infants Hospital (AC 
3) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 8, folder 107.3. 
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their 1941 textbook, explaining the procedure for putting the gowns on and taking them 
off; such education probably reflected either the belief that this practice should be 
common, or that it already was common in newborn units around the country.346, 347 Each 
gown was left next to each patient’s bedside under the belief that when gowns were worn, 
infection could not be easily spread on the clothes of nurses and physicians. Not all 
physicians were happy with the practices and pediatric surgeon, Robert Gross, weighed in 
on the issue when he wrote to Dr. Clifford,  
… the gowns which hang in the cubicles are the surest method of spreading 
infection from one patient to another! I do not believe it is possible for a number 
of individuals – nurses or doctors – to get in and out of a single gown without 
getting everything pretty much smeared up with whatever germs are on the 
gown... 348  
 
The hospital changed their gowning policy and, effective June 1951, all nurses 
wore simple aprons over their nursing uniforms when caring for patients coupled 
with standard practice of rigorous hand-washing techniques. Within two years, the 
infection rate had indeed decreased, proving to Clifford and Smith, head of 
Infants Service at the Infant’s Hospital, that with careful attention and simple 
protocol changes, and proper infectious control practices, newborns could be 
cared for in wards together with other newborns without spreading infection 
                                                            
346 Julius Hess and Evelyn Lundeen. The Premature Infant: Its Medical and Nursing Care. (Philadelphia: 
J.B. Lippincott Company, 1941). 
347 Despite the common appearance of gowning in early photographs of premature infant units, publications 
in the scholarly literature (other than Hess and Lundeen’s 1941 textbook) do not evidence any 
research or common protocols related to gowning. Gloves were never mentioned in articles or 
textbooks and seem to not have been common practice in premature infant units of the time.  
348 “Letter to Dr. Clement Smith from Dr. Robert Gross, June 24, 1950.” Infants Hospital (AC 3) Boston 
Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 8, folder 107.3. 
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rapidly among the patients.349 Such evidence reinforces the notion that highly 
technological strategies, though absolutely profound, do not undermine or 
overshadow the importance of faithful adherence to simple strategies and problem 
solving.  
 Nurses played a role in this decrease in hospital-acquired infection rates as 
they vigilantly worked at the bedside with the patients, providing care and critical 
assessment and surveillance as well as monitoring who had access to the patients 
and when. When nurses did not follow proper technique, they risked spreading 
infectious disease throughout the units. In their textbook, published in 1942, 
Julius Hess and Evelyn Lundeen350 credited the nursing personnel with, “the fact 
that the responsibilities for infections occurring in the nursery rests with them. 
They must constantly be alert for breaks in technique…the nursing standards must 
be carried out during the entire 24 hours.” While the hospital documents do not 
blame the nursing staff for issues in infection outbreak, they make it clear that 
nurses functioned within broader policies and infrastructure to achieve and to 
oversee proper infection control. Clifford and Smith sought to support the nursing 
personnel and provide the best possible nursery arrangements (broadly speaking) 
so that proper technique could be consistently practiced. Proper technique 
                                                            
349 “Report on Premature Infant Services: Report by Steward Clifford, MD., 1955” Infants Hospital (AC 
3) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 8, folder 107.3. 
350 As referenced in Chapter 2 and 3, Hess and Lundeen were the physician and nurse team who established 
the most famous premature infant unit in Chicago’s Michael Reese Hospital and published the 
first seminal textbook on the nursing care of premature infants.  
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included vigorous hand washing351 before and after contact with the patient (or 
donning the gown, as some hospitals still did), and included considerations about 
when and where to care for a baby that might be infectious.352 Hess and Lundeen 
did not consider keeping isolation patients in the same room as non-infectious 
patients inappropriate as long as nurses were careful to follow technique. Proper 
technique included wearing the appropriate protective gear such as gowns and 
masks as well as washing hands, keeping the patients’ belongings and equipment 
clean, and making sure each patient had his or her own supplies and equipment.353 
Based on the hospital’s decrease in hospital-acquired infection, particularly in the 
premature infant unit, Smith pushed back against the notion that infants with any 
consideration of infection should be excluded; he argued that with good nursing care, 
correct hand washing and appropriate use of anti-bacterial scrubbing agents, and careful 
attention to unit policies that spelled out infection control, the spread of infection could 
be avoided.354 The hospital’s ability to combine infectious and non-infectious patients in 
                                                            
351 The documents specify anti-bacterial scrubs that might have included early formulations of what is now 
known as phisohex, but I am unsure the particular antibacterial agent used and thus cannot specify.  
352 Interestingly, the discussion of the use of gloves when caring for patients does not appear in the 
literature or textbooks of the 1940s and 1950s. I cannot comment that this was or was not a part of 
the protocol, but recognize that it does not appear in the literature or documents.  
353 Ibid. Hess and Lundeen. The Premature Infant: Its Medical and Nursing Care.; “Proceedings: Fifth 
Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Pediatrics. June 7, 1935,” Journal of Pediatrics 8, 
no. 1 (January 1936): 104–21.; Ethel Dunham. Standards and Recommendations for Hospital 
Care of Newborn Infants, Full-Term and Premature. United States Dept. of labor, Children’s 
bureau, 1943. 
354 This stance is supported in two separate documents: “Letter from Dr. Stewart Clifford to Miss Vesey, 
Head of Nursing Service at the Infants’ Hospital, June 28, 1955.” Infants’ Hospital (AC 3) The 
Children’s Hospital of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts, Box 8, folder 107.3.; “Conclusions reached 
on Procedures for Newborn Nursery – Infants’ Hospital, Children’s Medical Center, June 7, 1955” 
Infants’ Hospital (AC 3) B 8, folder 107.3.  
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one unit proved to be critical to the future formation of spaces were all neonates could be 
cared for in one unit.  
An expensive unit to run… 
 
As the units saved lives, costs also rose.  Premature infant centers incurred great 
costs for hospitals and the Infants’ Hospital unit was no exception. The increased costs of 
equipment, such as incubators,355 rose in the years just after World War II and, coupled 
with increases in wages for hospital employees, including nurses, combined to create one 
of the most expensive units in the hospital, contributing heavily to deficits in the 
hospital’s operating budget by the late 1940s. With hospital-wide costs increasing, the 
incredible financial resources needed for the premature infant nursery became more 
prominent in the hospital administrative records.  
 To help alleviate the cost of overall increased hospital overhead the ‘incubator 
patients’ in the premature infant nursery were charged $15.00 per day, almost twice that 
of the $8.00 per day patients in other areas of the hospital were charged. Hospital 
Director Dr. Charles Branch referred to the disparity being due to, “the exceptional nature 
of the care required and given in the Premature Nursery.”356 Such exceptional care 
encompassed the particular nursing care required as well as the equipment such as 
                                                            
355 While I do not have exact data pertaining to the cost of incubators during this time period, articles were 
published that articulated the specific requirements of incubators and articles that included 
instructions how to build them. Instructions on how to build portable incubators also appeared in 
the literature. One possible interpretation here is that the incubators were expensive enough to buy 
that makeshift ones could be assembled by hospitals who might not be able to afford the ones on 
the market.  
356  “The Infant’s Hospital: Report of the Director for the year 1946.” Infants Hospital (AC 3) Boston 
Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 6, folder 77. 
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oxygen systems, medications, and incubators needed for each newborn in the unit. 
Financial costs related to the establishment of premature infant units encompassed the 
initial cost of construction, the ongoing reservation of space for those beds when other 
paying patients might fill them, and the cost to purchase and repair and equipment 357 in 
addition to the 24 hour a day concentrated nursing care the patients received.  
  Dr. Smith commented, “Many hospitals held back from establishing adequate 
nurseries for their premature infants because of the great cost to the hospital in providing 
care for these infants…,” but he added, “…two factors have now made the hospital 
willing to assume this risk.”358 These two factors addressed payment issues.  The first 
was the growing membership in Blue Cross Insurance group. Blue Cross plans were a 
third party payment plan developed in the 1930s to address the increasing costs of 
hospital care that the majority of patients were unable to afford. Such programs were 
intended to alleviate financial stress on individuals and families in times of sickness and 
fill the hospitals with more paying patients. Historian Rosemary Stevens particularizes 
that such payment plans were not meant to provide hospital access to everyone, as 
eligibility for obstetrics took one year to go into effect and the plans did not include 
payment for mental health services.359  While more people were insured and the Blue 
Cross programs did provide certain funding to pay for services, Massachusetts also 
                                                            
357 Ibid. Wallace, Losty, and Wishik. Prematurity as a Public Health Problem, 41–47. 
358 “Report on Premature Infant Services: Report by Steward Clifford, MD, 1954-1955” Infants Hospital 
(AC 3) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 8, folder 107.3.  
359 Rosemary Stevens. In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century. 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). 185-188. 
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enacted a law in 1949 that made the local Board of Health financially responsible for the 
care of infants born below 4 ½ pounds.360 Such funding made the hospital administration 
willing to keep the unit open because they believed they could cover the costs, but 
reimbursement only came when patients were admitted to the unit.  
During the 1950s, many smaller hospitals opened or expanded existing premature 
infant units as premature infant care became more commonplace and Massachusetts 
funding laws covered premature infant care. Dr. Clifford and his team determined that as 
outlying hospitals opened premature infant units and were able to care for the less acutely 
ill premature infants, they would only transfer the sickest, and most expensive to the 
Infants’ Hospital premature unit. According to one report, fifty-two hospitals transferred 
premature infants needing longer term and more critical care to Infants’ Hospital in 1954, 
in addition to the premature infants received from home deliveries.361 Infants’ Hospital 
became the main support for smaller community hospitals without the expensive 
resources needed to care for smaller premature infants who developed complications. The 
Infant’s Hospital was important not only to the city of Boston, but the provision of its 
resources also reached beyond the city limits into four neighboring states.362 This also 
meant that the more expensive patients requiring more complex care ended up at Infant’s 
                                                            
360 “Report on Premature Infant Services: Report by Steward Clifford, MD, 1954-1955” Infants Hospital 
(AC 3) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 8, folder 107.3. 
361 “Report of the Premature Infant Unit Service Hospital, Children’s Medical Center, 1955.” Infants’ 
Hospital. (AC 3) Boston Children’s Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 8, folder 
107.3. 
362 This is an example of a type of non-formalized regionalization commonly seen in premature infant care 
in the 1950s as regionalized neonatal care networks would not formalize until the early 1970s. 
This regionalization is discussed further in chapter 3.   
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Hospital thus saving the suburban hospitals the higher costs of patient care. Between 
1951 and 1954, Infant’s Hospital census remained consistent at approximately 100 
newborns admitted each year with a high patient acuity, meaning the hospital admitted 
the sickest patients and provided the most intensive and expensive care to them.363 More 
stable patients who would have been less expensive to care for remained in their hospitals 
of birth; during the 1950s specialized training was becoming more common for 
physicians and nursing staff and smaller hospitals would have been more likely to have 
physicians and nurses who knew how to care for more stable premature infants as well as 
sick full term infants.364 Despite the consistency of higher acuity patients admitted to the 
Infant’s Hospital, the census remained too low to make the increasingly high cost of care 
financially feasible for the hospital. 
“Incubator patients” and a broader newborn population: Ideas for a newborn nursery 
 
The Infant’s Hospital did not have the resources to continue allocating skilled 
nursing personnel and precious hospital space with fewer beds filled on average; thus the 
need to determine how best to provide particular care to premature infants became an 
important issue for the administration who oversaw both BCMC and the Infant’s Hospital 
(as they still shared administrators and staff). While the Infants’ Hospital boasted 
successful care and decreased premature infant mortality during the early years of the 
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364 Articles appeared with greater frequency in the literature and textbooks began to be published in the 
1940s that encompassed the premature and sick infant.  
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1950s, both administrators at Infant’s Hospital and Boston Children’s Medical Center 
recognized a dire lack of resources. As the Infant’s Hospital functioned at its capacity to 
provide care to premature infants, they searched for a better solution to the high costs of 
care.  
The cost of nursing personnel was one of the highest costs in critical care units 
during this time period. Unlike many of the general units, these intensive care facilities 
required full graduate nursing personnel around the clock.365 While students might have 
provided some care, they always needed to be supervised by a graduate nurse who 
monitored their technique and practice very closely. Worried about the costs, Clement 
Smith conducted a study to understand where the expenses were concentrated and 
analyzed the arrangement of nursing personnel in respect to per capita occupancy. His 
results showed that the premature infant unit required at least three graduate nursing 
personnel - in addition to any nursing students assigned to the unit -for each 24 hour 
period, and covered eight to twelve premature infants at any given time (though the 
census rarely filled the 12 beds isolettes available). Smith identified the periods when 
only a few babies occupied the premature infant nursery as time when the hospital 
experienced “wastage of valuable nursing skill.”366 He considered the skill the premature 
infant nurses demonstrated mandatory to premature infant care as well as beneficial to the 
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broader neonatal population. These nurses were too precious a resource to use elsewhere 
in the hospital. 
Unlike elsewhere in the hospital, only nurses particularly trained to work in the 
premature infant unit could work there, unlike the rest of the hospital where nurses 
generally could work in any of the units as needed as patient census increased or 
decreased. Clement Smith recognized, “a staff of nurses particularly skilled in the care of 
premature (and, therefore newborn) infants must consistently be assigned to the 
Children’s Hospital Premature Nursery.”367 On the one hand, nurses established in the 
intensive and expert care required for premature infants had skills that enabled them to 
provide quality care to a broader patient population of newborns; but this skill and 
expertise also earmarked them as unique to this unit.  
With the shortage of nurses and of space, and the inefficiency of operative far 
below capacity, and with the technical improvements brought about principally by 
the Isolette, the question arises whether the care of prematures in the Infants’ 
Hospital could not be consolidate with the care of sick infants so as to make more 
effective use of space and manpower. A tentative proposal would be to place the 
Isolettes on one side of Infants’ Upper and make this area for care of premature 
and newborns infants.”368  
 
The physicians and hospital administrators valued the ways the premature infant nurses 
might meet broader demands throughout the hospital and, in an attempt to prevent 
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wasting expensive and valuable nursing skill, responded with changes to their premature 
infant unit. Ultimately the hospital reached an ingenious solution to their problem: they 
recognized specialized skills in the premature infant nurses and enlarged the population 
of the units thus broadening the types of patients for whom the nurses could provide care. 
A Time of Transition to the Newborn Nursery 
 
On June 29,1955, the hospital closed their premature nursery and opened a 
“Newborn Nursery” with the purpose of providing more economical and practical 
intensive patient coverage to all newborns, premature as well as full-term sick and 
surgical neonates. 369 This occurred after a committee met and drafted a report to Dr. 
David Rubenstein, head of department services that concluded the premature infant unit 
was too costly to maintain. The committee, consisting of two physicians and one nurse, 
recommended that the hospital reorganize their approach to newborn care to use limited 
resources to the most efficient advantage. Sick newborns already occupied the premature 
infant unit as well as filling beds throughout the rest of the hospital. Correspondence 
between Smith and Rubenstein provides insight into the possible ways the hospital could 
continue to provide specialized and skilled round-the-clock intensive care to their 
newborn population.  
The hospital admitted increasing numbers of sick and surgical newborns that 
required intensive care beyond the more traditional premature infant care. Smith 
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proposed the formation of a new nursery that could include any newborn patient who 
needed a particular kind of intensive care. Smith believed that by combining both 
premature infants and sick full-term infants, they could use their nursing staff more 
efficiently and maximize precious space to keep costs down for the hospital. 370 Smith 
articulated,  
I have agreed that a change in our nursery arrangements would allow much more 
efficient use of nurses’ time… An increasing proportion of the babies on these 
wards are newborn ones, with erythroblastosis,371 respiratory distress syndrome, 
congenital malformations, and so forth.372 
 
While premature infants occupied a particular unit, newborns with congenital 
malformations, blood disorders, and respiratory distress syndrome were admitted to other 
parts of the hospital. By 1955, the surgical endeavors of Gross and Ladd on smaller 
infants meant that occasionally surgical newborns would be shuffled off to post-operative 
units elsewhere in the hospital as they initially would not have been considered 
                                                            
370 “Report on Premature Infant Services, 1954-1955” Infants’ Hospital. (AC 3) Boston Children’s Hospital 
Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 8, folder 107.3. ; “Conclusions reached on procedures for 
Newborn Nursery – Infants’ Hospital, Children’s Medical Center, June 7, 1955.” Infants’ 
Hospital. (AC 3) Boston Children’s Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 8, folder 
107.3.   
371 Erythroblastosis fetalis, or hemolytic disease of the newborn, occurs when an Rh positive mother’s 
blood crosses the placenta and mixes with her Rh negative baby’s blood resulting in neonatal 
jaundice and high bilirubin levels that can cause severe damage to the brain and internal organs. 
The result can be fatal. Much scholarly literature came out during the 1950s as researchers sought 
to decrease mortality rates related to this condition; the treatment of choice at this time included 
complete blood transfusions of the infants.  Much more could be said about this disease and its 
implications, but is beyond the scope of this particular work. 
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candidates for beds in the premature infant unit (as they were not premature but surgical 
infants).373  
 According to hospital memos, the new unit located in the Infants’ Hospital would 
be a general newborn nursery that was set to occupy half of the second floor ward space 
of the Infant’s Hospital. The nurses that occupied the positions in the premature unit 
became the nucleus of the nursing staff on the new newborn unit. Nurses were added to 
their numbers so that the nursing staff that worked in the newborn nursery did not have 
responsibilities elsewhere in the hospital and other nurses would not need to be brought 
in to cover during times of higher unit census.374 The hospital chose to use particular 
nurses who had specialized skills to care for this now broadened patient population. 
With the goal of keeping a census at approximately 12 infants (and more if 
possible), the patient population encompassed any infant less than one month of age not 
suffering from diarrhea.375 The four priority patient populations included (in order of 
priority of admission): prematures, erythroblastotics,376 congenital heart disease,377 and 
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non-infections medical cases. General priority for admission was given to infants with 
more chronic conditions most likely with the intent that they ensured adequate census 
(and thus filled the beds) and had higher survival rates than their more medically fragile 
and ill counterparts.378 Interestingly, this consideration of who would be allowed into the 
unit reflects both the recognition of who could be saved and the focus on who was 
valued, but also took into consideration how the hospital would meet their census 
requirements and remain financially viable.   
A series of memos among hospital administration, physicians, and nursing staff, 
established regulations and suggestions to shape the organization of the newborn 
nursery.379 These matters of policy included the organization and assignment of space, 
nursing practices, admission regulations, the use of various pieces of equipment 
necessary to the medical care, and defining patient population. The committee developed 
policies and protocols that restricted entrance to The Newborn Nursery to nursing and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Erythroblastosis Fetalis,” JAMA Pediatrics 89, no. 5 (1955): 544–52.; “Hemolytic Disease of the 
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(February 16, 1952): 332–39.; Patrick Ongley, Alexander Nadas, Milton Paul, Abraham Rudolph, 
and George Starkley. “Aortic Stenosis in Infants and Children,” Pediatrics 21, no. 2 (1958): 207–
21.; Congenital heart disease still remained a leading cause of death in babies, but as Gross and 
Ladd (among others) pioneered better surgical methods for smaller patients great strides were 
made in the treatment of some congenital heart defects. 
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hospital staff assigned to the unit, effectively sealing off the unit to the curious, while 
also establishing the particular domain of the realm of sick newborn care. House officers 
and medical staff rounded on the newborn patients first before rounding on any other 
hospital ward. Anyone wearing street clothes was required to don a hospital gown over 
their clothing and adhere to vigorous hand washing protocols prior to entering the unit.380 
 The new nursery was located in the South Wing of the Infants’ Hospital and only 
accessible via the set of small side doors past the sinks. A general sketch of the potential 
set up of the unit reveals aspects of the unit that the committee considered important, 
including Isolettes and oxygen setup, the unit’s strict entrance and exits, and the 
possibility of rearrangement of space should the census exceed 12 patients at any given 
time. The large double doors that were to remain closed distinctly separated the unit from 
another area designated for procedures such as weighing, supply storage, and treatment 
procedures as well as separating the unit from the rest of the hospital. The area itself was 
46’ by 20’ for a total of 920 square feet. The side door where physicians and nurses 
entered the unit opened to a separate small room with its own sink, presumably for the 
hand washing procedures laid out in the committee’s initial report.381 This arrangement 
provided flexibility of space arrangement, selected access, and the use of particular 
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equipment and machinery including incubators and oxygen equipment for basic 
respiratory support. 
 During the 1950s, hospital construction moved toward more private rooms or 
smaller wards as patient privacy and hospital amenities became a bigger driving force 
behind where patients chose to go for care. Elsewhere in the Infants’ Hospital, patients 
occupied cubicles where each patient would have an area set apart. While this practice 
reflected trends in broader hospital construction, it also contributed to the hospitals’ 
attempts to prevent infection by separating patients from each other. The Newborn 
Nursery had a ward layout where the nurses could see all of the patients throughout the 
room at any given time, as it still does today. According to the hospital’s plans for the 
newborn nursery, the Infants’ Hospital did not feel the need to create private spaces for 
each newborn, though the emphasis on the use of Isolettes delineated more ‘privatize’ 
space for each infant within a mini-environment that separated each from his or her 
neighbors.382  
 Nurses had complete visual access to their patients, but did not have unlimited 
physical access to their patients. They learned to perform their skills through small 
portholes in the sides of the Isolettes.383 One of the more common incubators used at the 
time, the Isolette, incorporated a Plexiglass box with holes on the side of the incubator 
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through which a nurse could put her hands to provide care. Photographs from hospitals 
across the country beginning in the 1940s reveal the act of nurses caring for their patients 
while separated from them by Plexiglass. The nurses learned to provide an incredible 
amount of care through these ‘portholes’ and would have done everything from changing 
diapers and weighing the patient, to learning to reposition the patient for assessment. 
Even today, this practice is a hallmark skill learned by new NICU nurses; the experience 
can be cumbersome initially but it served (and still does) to maintain a temperature and 
humidity regulated environment for each patient. This porthole policy reinforced the 
careful intentionality of safe practices for avoiding hospital-acquired infections, as well 
as dictated how the nurses could provide care. Hospital administration valued the skill the 
nurses who worked in premature infant units brought to the intensive care.  
 Even as the Boston Children’s and the Infants’ Hospital consolidated the care of 
sick newborns, the institutions still struggled to meet the rising expenditures of patient 
care, and for the fiscal years 1961 and 1962, the hospitals experienced deficits in their 
annual budgets across the hospital. They shifted their focus to increasing occupancy384 in 
a healthcare world where patients could choose where they wanted to go and hospitals 
were only paid for the beds they filled.385 By 1963, the hospital made drastic changes in 
their infrastructure by closing of the Infants’ Hospital. The newborn nursery was 
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completely moved into Boston Children’s Medical Center (BCMC) and within two years 
of this shift BCMC was referring to the unit as their neonatal intensive care (NICU).386  
 While what we label a space matters, it might not necessarily clearly define points 
when a particular type of care was given. The care provided in the Newborn Nursery in 
the Infant’s Hospital reflected early tenents of what we consider ‘intensive care’ today. 
Fairman and Lynaugh argue that although “critical care” is a more modern concept, its 
roots lie in established and older practice that sick patients be grouped together with hope 
of survival. While the label critical or intensive care defines what we consider to occur in 
ICUs today, the concept of a place where skilled caregivers “kept watch by intensive 
observation” evolved in settings that included a variety of names.387 The newborn 
nursery’s move into the hospital’s main building and the renaming of the unit as an ICU 
reflect the degree of value placed on this particular patient population. There is no 
evidence in the hospital archival documents that any significant changes occurred during 
the transition from “Newborn Nursery” to NICU – the equipment, though it continued to 
grow and change, still included the same basic machines, the specialized nursing staff 
continued to provide intensive constant care, and the hospital continued to keep space set 
apart for their newborns. Both the premature infant unit and the newborn nursery were 
intensive care units in their own right, and delivered particular types of care that were 
intensive in nature. The transition to NICU reflected the emerging state of intensive care 
medicine that had already been labeled in adult units beginning in the 1950s. By 1963 
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and the birth and transfer of Patrick Kennedy to BCMC, the unit was introduced as a 
“neonatal intensive care unit” establishing importance and garnering confidence in the 
public eye.  
Diving Babies: Critical Care and Hyperbaric treatments 
 
In 1963, President John F. Kennedy’s son Patrick arrived at Boston Children’s 
Hospital from Cape Cod, Massachusetts suffering from severe respiratory distress 
secondary to his prematurity. He was so ill the neonatal specialists offered him a 
treatment still considered highly experimental: hyperbaric oxygen therapy.388 Hyperbaric 
oxygen therapy had proven in some studies to be of value when oxygenating tissue as 
well as for treating ‘the bends’ - a common problem among SCUBA divers. 389  
Hyperbaric oxygen therapy was based on a limited body of research suggesting its 
use with neonates requiring respiratory support. As of November 1962, the Boston 
Lying-In Hospital, a sister hospital of Boston Children’s, did consider the use of 
hyperbaric medicine for newborns and purchased “a small hyperbaric tank” the size of 
most incubators of the time for use in research related to hyperbaric medicine used for 
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neonates.390 The hospital used the chambers, produced by the Emerson Company, with 
newborn and prematurely born infants suffering from severe hypoxia.391 The basic 
premise suggested that since many infants struggled with oxygen intake, the hyperbaric 
oxygenation would allow for optimal oxygen transfer for these infants who often 
presented with severe cyanosis.392 Dr. William Bernhard, physician at Boston Children’s, 
considered hyperbaric medicine for use in studies related to long-term therapy for infants 
with hyaline membrane disease.393 Boston Children’s did not have the hyperbaric 
isolettes that Boston Lying-In had, but they used a large chamber on site that fit multiple 
adults and was used for broader research purposes.  
When Baby Kennedy arrived the physicians were desperate. The life of the 
President’s son was on the line and they were willing to do whatever they could, even if it 
was not a standard practice at the time, particularly since he was a famous baby; such 
treatments would probably not have been afforded to other less high profile patients 
admitted. While Baby Kennedy was treated in the hospital’s newborn intensive care 
nursery, the physicians made a critical decision to transport him through the hospital to 
                                                            
390 This information suggests that Boston Children’s was not the only hospital in the area thinking about the 
uses of hyperbaric medicine with neonates; though I came across this data in a document I have no 
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further research related to hyperbaric medicine and neonatal patients.  
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Boston, Massachusetts. Box 4, folder 22. 
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the facility’s hyperbaric chamber in a desperate attempt to save his life.394  When baby 
Kennedy entered the chamber, a cadre of specialists accompanied him, including two 
nurses.395 They aimed to increase his oxygenation with the hope that given extra time, his 
breathing could improve. Other researchers were doing studies on hyperbaric medicine 
and newborns in 1963; a seminal article published just a year later did achieve limited 
success using hyperbaric treatments with neonates.  
Researcher and physician James Hutchison and his team in Glasgow achieved 
limited success in newborn resuscitation by exposing asphyxiated newborns to greater 
atmospheric pressures.396 Using Perspex pressure chambers,397 designed by the Vickers 
Group Research Establishment, infants who did not respond to traditional positive 
pressure ventilatory interventions were placed in a small pressure chamber and immersed 
in pure oxygen at 2-4 atmospheres of pressure.398 Slightly over half of the infants who 
received this intervention survived; such statistics were comparable, if not slightly better, 
                                                            
394 “List of staff and personnel who participated in the care of Patrick Kennedy, August 13, 1963” Boston 
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396 J. Hutchison, M Kerr, K.G. Williams, and W. I. Hopkinson. “Hyperbaric Oxygen in the Resuscitation of 
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than contemporary modes of positive pressure ventilation used with neonates during this 
time period. Hyperbaric medicine did not carry the same risks such as pneumothorax399 
(though it carried other risks), and was based off of the concept of using the oxygen 
already in the blood stream to optimal effect.  
Hyperbaric Medicine and newborn physiology 
 
Hyperbaric oxygenation works on the physics of Henry’s Law. Hemoglobin, 
located in red blood cells, binds to oxygen in the blood that transports it to body tissue as 
needed, but oxygen can also be transported, though much less efficiently, when the gas is 
dissolved in the blood. At one atmosphere of pressure (the state we function in every day) 
not enough oxygen can be dissolved in the blood to meet body requirements. When the 
atmospheric pressure on the body is increased, greater amounts of oxygen can be 
dissolved in the blood and thus transported to the tissues. When the oxygen concentration 
in breathed air increases from 20.9% to 100%, the amount of oxygen dissolved into the 
blood increases proportional to the increase in atmospheric pressure.  
During the early 1960s, respiratory distress plagued newborn populations with no 
viable treatment methods or standards of care for newborns with respiratory distress as 
premature infants’ lungs are incompletely developed. Positive pressure ventilation had 
not yet become the standard of practice and in lieu of the abysmal survival rates for 
newborns with respiratory distress researchers attempted other ways to treat respiratory 
distress among newborns. Ultimately the goal remained the same: to get much needed 
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oxygen to the tissues of infants whose lungs did not work properly yet. Physicians and 
researchers at Boston Children’s Hospital focused their efforts and resources on 
hyperbaric medicine - a branch of therapy and medical specialty that some believed 
might be a viable approach to making strides in the treatment of hyaline membrane 
disease400 and respiratory distress. 
Hutchinson and his team were careful to articulate the importance of 
understanding his negative pressure resuscitation method not as a response to RDS, as it 
could not treat respiratory acidosis, but as a possible method of treating newborns for 
whom they could not establish initial breathing patterns.401 Hutchinson argued that 
placing an infant in a chamber might be a better alternative to positive pressure 
ventilation, as tracheal intubation as part of PPV “requires a degrees of skill not always 
easily at hand in smaller maternity units and in areas where paediatricians have far-flung 
commitments. Hyperbaric oxygen can be used by any doctor after a brief course of 
instruction.”402 Hutchinson believed this technological innovation required less skill than 
that required to intubate and establish positive pressure ventilation in newborns.  
The idea of treating patients under hyperbaric conditions was not new, but came 
as a piece of a larger general interest in hyperbaric medicine.403 Harvard School of Public 
                                                            
400 For more on this disease and it’s impact see Chapter 2.  
401 Ibid. Hutchison, Kerr, Williams, and Hopkinson. Hyperbaric Oxygen in the Resuscitation of the 
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Health owned a hyperbaric chamber available for research purposes. Newborns joined a 
long and varied list of the chamber’s occupants. Because the chamber existed as the only 
one of its kind at an academic institution in the United States, both governmental and 
private agencies used the chamber for an array of research.404 The U.S. Navy researched 
the physiological effects of high atmospheric pressure on the human body.405 In 
September 1962, the newborn surgical service at Boston Children’s received permission 
from the trustees at the Harvard School of Public Health to use the hyperbaric oxygen 
chamber to research on the effects of hyperbaric oxygenation on newborns undergoing 
cardiovascular surgery.406 Before July of the following year, they proceeded to perform 
21 successful cardiovascular operations in the chamber on infants less than 6 months of 
age who would have died without the procedures.407  
On August 5, 1963, just days before Baby Kennedy arrived to Boston for 
treatment, doctors at Boston Children’s successfully performed open-heart surgery on a 
baby who suffered from aortic stenosis, a condition in which the aorta carrying blood 
from the heart to the body is narrowed, preventing oxygenated blood from entering 
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406 “Letter from the Trustees of Harvard to Drs. William Bernhard and Leonard Cronkhite, September 5, 
1962.” Boston Children's Hospital Office of Facility Planning Records. (AC 10) Boston Children's 
Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 4, folder 22 
407 “Pamphlet: The Hyperbaric Chamber.” Boston Children's Hospital Office of Facility Planning Records. 
(AC 10) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 4, folder 22 
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systematic circulation and often leaving the heart overworked. Inside the chamber, the 
doctors proceeded to successfully repair the newborn’s cardiac condition under a pressure 
of 3.4 atmospheres (over three times the usual limit).408 Blue babies, a common name for 
a group of infants born with a complex cardiac malformation that impaired their blood 
oxygen levels leaving them severely cyanotic, comprised the largest group of infants who 
received surgical treatment in the chamber.  
According to a memo sent in 1962 from Murial Vesey, head of nursing at Boston 
Children’s at the time, nurses were not required to be present in the hyperbaric chamber 
during surgical procedures, though they accompanied the infant before the procedure. A 
team of nurses were trained to work in the chamber and often did, but were not always 
required. Documents specify that nursing roles were performed by one of the surgeons or 
physicians in the chamber: “Since there is no nurse in there [the chamber] as a rule, this 
would mean that either the surgeon or the anesthetist would have to take the 
responsibility…”409 Such a ‘rule’ highlights both a gendered and power tension as to who 
was important to enter the chamber even when a particular job needed to be done. The 
surgeons and other physicians would not have easily taken over the role of the nurse in a 
ward or unit setting during this time, but their power over the technology trumped their 
need for a nurse present and made them willing to perform a job otherwise not theirs.  
                                                            
408 “Press Release, August 5, 1963: The Children’s Hospital  Medical Center.” Boston Children's Hospital 
Office of Facility Planning Records. (AC 10) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, 
Massachusetts. Box 4, folder 4.  
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Another possible reason for nurse exclusion might have been related to the 
mechanics of how the chamber and pressurization worked. Each person who entered the 
chamber when it was in use would have been put at risk for the bends. The hospital took 
out an additional insurance policy for those staff that were trained and approved to work 
in the chamber, a costly addition to overall expenditures related to the chamber. In 
addition, each person who entered the chamber would have had to experience a period of 
decompression lasting from 15 to 45 minutes depending on the duration of time spent in 
the chamber; this would have meant anyone who entered the chamber would have not 
been available to care for patients for a significant amount of time.410 
Even so, Miss Vesey still participated in the preparation of the policies as the 
head of nursing by initiating memos outlining aspects of patient care and the process that 
traditionally would have fallen on nurses present in the surgical suit. We still might 
consider the chamber’s use as an extension of the care delivered in the intensive care unit 
even if it did not become standard treatment, and it is important to consider that the value 
placed on nursing staff in the units by the hospital did not fully translate to the chamber 
setting.  
The chamber itself had a separate and fascinating history that has yet to be 
explored in the scholarly literature. The hyperbaric chamber was just one treatment 
modality in the story of Boston’s NICU in the early 1960s affected by the intense search 
for a solution to the problem of RDS. The use of hyperbaric medicine with newborn 
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infants for both surgical and respiratory issues might have stayed a footnote in a letter 
buried in the archives were it not for its use with baby Patrick Kennedy. The willingness 
of his physicians to use this highly experimental form of treatment fits with what we 
know of the broader story of newborn medicine; traditional options of the time did not 
reliably work, so they were willing to try even a highly experimental treatment in the 
hope it would. There is no proof in the archives that BCMC placed any other prematurely 
born infants in the chamber or offered this care to other premature patients, so this 
treatment given to Baby Patrick raises a complicated dilemma.  
We usually consider those on whom extremely experimental treatments are 
performed to be the marginalized and vulnerable, but Patrick came from a powerful 
family and these physicians knew the entire country was watching what they did. On the 
other hand, these physicians and hospital team would have wanted to offer Patrick 
whatever they thought might benefit him, and consequently he might have had access to 
what they thought of as a life saving device (even if the chance of it working was small).  
An oral history with a neonatal physician Dr. Don Null411 who practiced in the NICU 
setting in the 1960s as part of the team working with the early prototypes of the BabyBird 
Ventilator suggests a broader theme. Null believed their early prototype ventilator was 
indeed a life saving device even if it was only a prototype. Null spoke of the process of 
putting the infants on ventilators and how the parents were approached (when possible) 
about the process:  “…if that baby was doing poorly, then it [using the ventilator] was 
                                                            
411 For more on Dr. Null and the BabyBird, see Chapter 3.  
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considered a life saving treatment just like you can in an emergency room today.”412 He 
articulated a thought process that considered life-saving treatments - even if they were 
still in the research and prototype stages - the only alternative to death and operated on 
the premise that these newborns could be saved. Perhaps the physicians caring for Patrick 
felt the hyperbaric chamber fell into the category of lifesaving treatment and chose to 
offer the state of the art therapy to him simply because it was available. In this sense, 
Patrick was both a research subject like many newborns during this time period and a 
patient for whom the most advanced and expensive therapies medicine had to offer were 
attempted.413 The Patrick Kennedy case fueled the impetus to save prematurely born 
babies and broaden NICU infrastructure across the country.  
 “One Nursery in Three Locations”: A Joint Neonatology Program 
 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s several factors contributed to the increases in 
numbers of newborns requiring intensive care as well as the patient acuity among those 
admitted to the units. The increased use of drugs and medications as well as the ability to 
treat infection and respiratory distress were just some of the larger factors contributing to 
the increased survival and acuity of the neonatal population. Beginning in the 1950s, the 
production of medications by the pharmaceutical industry increased drastically; 
Americans medicated to treat everything from slight discomfort and pain to infection and 
                                                            
412 Donald Null. Oral History with Briana Ralston, July 16, 2013. 
413 The concept of research and ethical considerations is beyond the scope of this work, but I acknowledge 
is an important facet of the broader story of newborn intensive care and therapies in the 20th 
century. This research vein would be an excellent study for the purposes of future research.  
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sepsis. Pregnant women also participated in this increase in medication use. By the 
1970s, America was overmedicated and the abuse of addictive drugs had become a 
growing problem particularly as it related to neonatology.414 
One such example cited by historian Murdina Desmond is Thalidomide, a 
sedative that gained popularity in the late 1950s whose use proved to be associated with 
malformations of the skeleton, external ear, heart and gastrointestinal tract. While the 
drug was eventually withdrawn from the market, extensive litigation ultimately resulted 
in monetary compensation to affected children and their families. This legal case laid 
precedence for a massive body of literature that emerged relating to perinatal 
pharmacology, and the NIH establishing a branch devoted to testing the effects of certain 
drugs during the perinatal period.415 While congenital malformations had always been a 
concern for those focused on decreasing infant mortality rates, the increased use of drugs 
for which physicians had little understanding of their fetal side effects played an 
increasing role in the emergence of congenital malformations that, if they did not prove 
fatal, had life-long side effects and implications. With increases in the numbers of people 
using ‘street drugs’ neonatal nurses had to learn to manage newborns suffering from drug 
withdrawal. These newborns required intensive monitoring and, if they survived, could 
have potentially drastic lifelong conditions. Drug effects emerged as a condition that 
contributed to morbidity and the need for critical care beds.416  
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 Advances were made in the treatment of neonatal sepsis and respiratory distress. 
The changes in surgical interventions for previously fatal neonatal congenital 
malformations also increased the numbers of newborns requiring intensive pre and post-
operative monitoring and management. During the early days of the use of sulfonamides 
and antibacterial agents, little was known about the effects of drugs developed for adults 
had on children, much less newborns.417 While sulfonamides and later antibiotics 
contributed to decreases in maternal infection and thus in neonatal mortality, they did not 
initially appear in the literature as a common treatment modality in early premature infant 
units or newborn nurseries. By the mid-1970s antibiotics such as ampicillin and 
gentamicin were used on sick newborns to treat sepsis and thus contributed to decreases 
in death due to infection.418 Both babies who contracted infections in the hospital as well 
as infants who were exposed in utero survived in greater numbers as antibiotics came 
onto the market and both medical and surgical patients would have benefitted from their 
use of antibiotics.419 By the 1970s, strides were being made in the treatment of respiratory 
illness for newborns. Infants who died of RDS just a decade before, had better chances 
                                                            
417 Cynthia Connolly, Janet Golden, and Benjamin Schneider. “‘A Startling New Chemotherapeutic Agent’: 
Pediatric Infectious Disease and the Introduction of Sulfonamides at Baltimore’s Syndenham 
Hospital,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 86 (2012): 66–93. 
418 Desmond. Newborn Medicine and Society. 198-201.  
419 While much treatment did help decrease deaths due to sepsis, treatments with some drugs such as 
Chloramphenicol, resulted in unintended consequences. Chloramphenicol caused grey baby 
syndrome when it reached toxic levels in the baby’s blood causing body limpness, ashen grey skin 
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for survival by the mid-1970s with the improvement of the understanding of newborn 
respiratory physiology and adoption of ventilators made for the neonatal population.420  
 With increases in the projected rates of sick newborns requiring care,421 Boston 
Children’s found their resources were inadequate to meet the need for the number of 
patients transferred to them. As intensive care units continued to be costly to hospitals, 
not all hospitals in the Boston area could afford to establish units. While some 
community hospitals did, they may or may not have had sufficient resources to care for 
the sickest infants born there and were unable to give the highest level of critical care. 
They would have kept the more stable patients that they could manage and transferred the 
sickest to BCMC for care as the numbers of more medically fragile newborns grew – 
those suffering from respiratory distress, infection, and requiring complex surgical 
treatments. With a limited number of NICU beds available across the state, the beds for 
the most critically ill, located at BCMC became important to the state’s ability to provide 
NICU care and decisions about how many beds were needed and who would fill them 
became critical aspects of the Boston Children’s considerations regarding their unit.  
 The state of Massachusetts only had eighty-seven NICU beds among its hospitals, 
far below the projected need for 141 NICU beds determined by the state’s department of 
public health. Boston Children’s Hospital refused beds to an average of five newborns a 
                                                            
420 For more on antibiotic use as well as RDS, see Chapter 3.  
421 “Division 30, July 1, 1975 – May 31, 1975.” Boston Children's Hospital Office of Facility Planning 
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week due to lack of space in their 12 bed unit.422 By 1976 the hospital applied for a 
certificate of need423 with the Public Health Department to add six beds to their NICU. 
They did not ask for additional beds added to the overall hospital census, but for the 
purposes of consolidating their newborn patients who were sent to other units throughout 
the hospital when the NICU could not accept further patients.424 The specialization of 
care for neonates again became an important factor in the creation of the NICU and space 
needed for these newborns to receive such particularized care from trained nursing and 
medical staff.  
 With lack of space in the NICU, infants occupied beds throughout the hospital 
necessitating they receive care from nursing personnel who might or might not 
understand their unique physiologic needs. Neonates were cared for in departments such 
as neurosurgery, cardiology, and surgery and such spreading of this patient population 
                                                            
422 “Memo to Ms. Elaine Shepard Ulliam, May 13, 1976.” Boston Children's Hospital Office of Facility 
Planning Records. (AC 10) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 3, 
folder 9 
423 Paul Starr. The Social Transformation of American Medicine. (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 
Publishers, 1982). 398-400.; Faced with rising healthcare costs, many states attempted to regulate 
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projects or other capital improvements applied for approval from the state.  Boston Children’s 
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424 “Children’s Hospital Medical Center Proposed Hospital Bed Redistribution.” Boston Children's Hospital 
Office of Facility Planning Records. (AC 10) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, 
Massachusetts. Box 3, folder 9. ; “Memo to Ms. Elaine Shepard Ulliam, May 13, 1976.” Boston 
Children's Hospital Office of Facility Planning Records. (AC 10) Boston Children's Hospital 
Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 3, folder 9. 
 
 
	  
208	  
was considered a problem by hospital administrative teams who believed the newborns 
received the best care when cared for in a unit by specialized nurses and physicians.425   
 Consolidating newborn patients throughout the hospitals while continuing to 
manage those transported to the hospital became a challenge for BCMC’s administration. 
Boston Hospital for Women, located less than a mile from the Children’s Medical Center, 
was one such hospital that sent their sickest newborns to BCMC. Their special care 
nursery lacked the resources to treat for the infants requiring the most intensive care such 
as those needing extensive ventilator support and between 1970 and 1972 they transferred 
an average of 21 infants annually to the Children’s Medical Center, mostly surgical and 
cardiac patients requiring advanced treatment and post-operative care426. Physicians and 
hospital administrators decided to form a Joint Program in Neonatology through 
collaboration among Harvard Medical School, Boston Hospital for Women, the Boston 
Children’s Medical Center, and Beth Israel Hospital.427 The three hospitals considered 
their program “one nursery in three locations”428 with the purpose of triaging infants 
needing care among three hospitals with varying degrees of intensive care capabilities. 
Infants needing general newborn care could be cared for in the general nursery at Beth 
Israel, while those who required more specialized care were transferred to Boston 
                                                            
425 “Memo to Ms. Elaine Shepard Ulliam, May 13, 1976.” Boston Children's Hospital Office of Facility 
Planning Records. (AC 10) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 3, 
folder 9. 
426 While this might not seem to be many transfer patients (averaging out to approximately 2 a month), this 
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427 “Report of Joint Program in Neonatology, July 1, 1974-April 1, 1975” Boston Children's Hospital 
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428 Ibid. Report of Joint Program in Neonatology. 
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Women’s Hospital that had a basic neonatal intensive care unit capable of providing care 
for more stable newborns that still required close monitoring. The sickest of the sick were 
transferred to Boston Children’s. This relationship allowed for the management of 
newborn care based on acuity and enabled the hospitals to allocate beds and resources – 
financial and personnel – to most appropriately and efficiently care for the greatest 
number of newborns. 
 A senior neonatologist with five neonatal fellows rotated through the units 
supervising and training residents. Dr. William Taeusch, Jr. served as the program’s first 
director. Within the first year, the program grew exponentially and required additional 
instructors and neonatal fellows before the end of the first year. The program served as an 
organization point for the training of fellows and opportunities for funded research 
project related to neonatal medicine. The National Institute of Health (NIH), and the 
American Thoracic Society funded the fellows during the initial year, and research 
money came from NIH as well as the Charles Hood Foundation.429, 430 The program 
attempted to provide efficient resource allocation in care of patients, but it also sought to 
provide intensive and quality education to a cadre of burgeoning neonatologists. As the 
specialty of neonatology gained momentum in the 1970s, demands for training programs 
grew in tandem with demands for care. 
  Despite this strategic combination of resources, by 1975 Boston Children’s faced 
serious challenges in caring for the numbers of critically ill newborns; advances in 
                                                            
429 Ibid. Report of Joint Program in Neonatology.  
430 The Charles Hood Foundation was established in 1942 to provide support to New England based 
researchers of pediatric medicine and healthcare. 
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respiratory treatments improved and surgical interventions for more complex congenital 
malformations became widespread, resulting in the survival of sicker patients. Initially 
the hospital did not have the equipment or nursing staff to adequately care for the 
numbers of infants who needed the highest levels of acute BCMC could give. In the 
month of June 1975, the census of the unit was at maximum with no room for more 
admissions. Over the summer months records were not kept, but by October, not only 
was space at a premium but inadequate number of nursing staff and respiratory 
ventilators also contributed to their inability to receive further patients even if beds were 
free in the event that the unit experienced higher acuity than its nursing staff could 
cover.431, 432 BCMC refused greater and greater numbers of patients.  Tausch recorded by 
date the reasons for refusal for patients applying to transfer to Boston Children’s, where 
the joining neurology program served the sickest of the infants. The reasons for refusing 
admission fell into two categories: lack of an adequate nursing workforce and 
technology.  
The analysis of expenditures for expanding BCMC’s neonatal intensive care unit 
covered a long list that still included the Isolettes and oxygen equipment, bilirubin lights, 
                                                            
431 “Memorandum, November 18, 1975.” Boston Children's Hospital Office of Facility Planning Records. 
(AC 10) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston, Massachusetts. Box 4, folder 37-39. 
432 Fairman and Lynaugh talk about the nursing shortage during this time period within the context of 
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one (Fairman and Lynaugh, Critical Care. 66-9). In addition to the national nursing shortage 
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and new EKG recorders, but also listed a variety of monitors now standard at each 
patient’s bedside. For the addition of six beds to the unit the hospital needed an additional 
$117,000 for equipment alone.433 Interestingly, even as nursing care remained one of the 
largest expenditures, it was not included in the lists of increased cost of care most likely 
because by this time, though the hospital documented increasing costs for new and 
complex equipment, the necessity of nursing staff was assumed and a non-negotiable 
expense. Though hospital documents do not reference nurses directly in the increased 
cost demands, they would have become a part of the assumed necessary infrastructure. 
The theme of resource allocation and the importance of grouping infants together to 
receive care required the hospital to make decisions about their unit and how to best 
organize it whether they were debating closing the premature infant unit, or creating an 
infrastructure of individual units connected by established programming for triage 
purposes.  
Conclusion 
 
The Neonatal Intensive Care Unit at Boston Children’s Medical Center emerged 
in the 1960s as the culmination of a series of decisions that established sick newborns as 
valued and in need of particular intensive care. The premature infant unit, established by 
BCMC’s sister institution in the 1930s, proved that care for prematurely born neonates 
could be given effectively, and influenced the creation of a broader space where the 
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hospital’s newborn population could receive the skilled and intensive care premature 
infants had previously received. The unit, named an ICU by the early 1960s, accepted 
Patrick Kennedy whose story highlights the aspects of a complex system of care that 
included a unit, advanced medical technology, and desperate attempts to save a baby who 
suffered from RDS. While the Baby Kennedy case shows us the complexities of a unit 
where intensive care could be given, it raises questions about the use of unproven 
methods of treatment and who could receive them. Newspaper clippings, press reports, 
and hospital documents do not highlight nursing as a foundational aspect of his care 
perhaps because nurses were understood to be necessary and foundational to NICU care 
and thus an assumed part of the infrastructure.  
Like the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, Boston placed importance on their 
nursing personnel when forming the unit; they consistently attempted to organize the 
patients together where specific specially trained nurses could give the care the newborns 
needed. Nursing was an incredible cost for these units and the hospitals made critical 
decisions to commit financial resources to ensuring the presence of nursing personnel. 
Once demand outpaced their ability to provide care to the many infants who needed it, 
like CHOP, Boston Children’s recognized the need to partner with other units to provide 
acute care to a the sickest of patients through a transfer agreement among hospitals. 
BCMC specifically focused on the multifaceted care they could give and formalized a 
program that also functioned to educate residents and nursing personnel as part of the 
partnerships among hospitals through their Joint Neonatology Program.  
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What BCMC uniquely shows us is the progression of the care models that 
eventually contributed to the establishment of an ICU. While adult ICUs might have 
progressed out of a grassroots movement, not all ICU spaces followed this model. 
BCMC’s NICU emerged as a premature infant unit, then a newborn nursery where 
similar care could be given to all neonatal patients, then was labeled an ICU by the mid 
1960s. Nurses played key roles that necessitated the allocation of spatial and financial 
resources so good nursing care could be delivered. This case study reminds us that 
premature infant units and the specific care newborns require contributed to the nuanced 
ways ICU spaces develop. These decisions are not necessarily made in a traditionally 
rational manner, but encompass complex combinations of values, external limitations and 
trends, and developing technologies.  
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Conclusion 
 Newborns are a unique patient population with particular needs and physiology, 
and thus require unique nursing care. Early models of intensive care in the 1960s built on 
the premise of special environments and particular nursing care. These factors were 
historically continuous as ideas about how and where to care for sick newborns formed 
and were broadened from premature infants to sick newborns in general. I argue the 
social value of newborns as a unique patient population fueled the establishment of 
premature infant units that in turn influenced the later development of neonatal intensive 
care units. Hospital administrators recognized the importance of particularly trained 
nursing workforce; the nurses and their skill both influenced how the hospitals grouped 
patients based on their need for nursing care as well as how they allocated space to units 
within the hospitals.   
 Nurses who worked in NICUs demonstrated similar skills the nurses in premature 
infant units did, but they built on those skills as increasingly complex equipment and 
more medically fragile patients filled their ICUs. The nurses in the early NICUs believed 
they knew when changes in care, treatment, equipment helped or hindered their patients 
and served as the gateways and gatekeepers to their severely ill patients. When the 
machines such as the ventilators did not work, the nurses were the frontline of defense 
communicating to the physicians and researchers what worked and what did not work for 
the patients. Nurses were integral to the formation of neonatal intensive care units at both 
the Boston Children’s Medical Center and the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia. 
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Nurses were not the only influential force in these developments, but they were ever 
present when everyone else was busy or went home.  
 Both Boston Children’s Medical Center and The Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia opened their intensive care units during a time when foundations had been 
laid for grouping newborns together to receive particular nursing care. Both hospitals 
received infants transferred from a broader network of NICUs, and thus they relied on 
these transfers to keep their beds filled. Both hospitals had hospital administration that 
valued good nursing care and made decisions about how to group patients in units based 
on the value of good nursing care particular to these patients. But the impetus for the 
formation of units at each hospital differed. BCMC had a unique track record of 
developing a unit rooted in past premature infant nursing care, influenced by economic 
decisions and the social value of sick newborns. CHOP formed their unit through Koop’s 
tenacity and a hospital administration that valued the nurses and used them to portray the 
human element of intensive care.  
Innovators who invent technologies do not solely determine if that technology 
works. Demonstration that the technology is valuable requires what historian Jeffrey 
Baker calls “system builders”434 who are people other than inventors that address 
barriers. They contribute to the process of growth. By the late 1970s, neonatal intensive 
care units had grown in part because hospital administrators, physicians, and nurses 
thought creatively and hospitals reflected the social value of the patient population. The 
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NICUs of the early 1960s did not emerge because of decisions made in the 1960s, but 
built on decisions made about the social value of newborns as early as the Progressive 
Era and the tenacity of physicians, nurses, activists and researchers who made a million 
small decisions along the way that influenced why NICUs emerged as they did and when 
they did.  
 Eugene Peters wrote, “Every complex problem has an answer that is clear, simple, 
and wrong.”435 The data does not suggest the nurses were the only reason the NICU 
worked. They were part of a system, a complicated system, and a system that this work 
has only begun to define; much more work is needed, but in the midst of the complexity, 
the data is clear that the nurses were vital contributors among other economic, social, and 
technological factors that influenced why the NICU worked and developed when it did.  
A nuanced view of the development of intensive care: 
 
This work builds off of the work of nursing historians Julie Fairman and Joan 
Lynaugh that outlined the ways that critical care for adult populations developed. My 
research on neonates, combined with Fairman and Lynaugh’s analysis, informs a history 
of critical care spaces in hospitals. In the development of adult ICU’s nurses made 
decisions about who required particular types of care and closer observation. The process 
did not happen the same ways for all patient populations and we must consider the 
newborn population as a unique population that had its own trajectory in how ICUs 
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formed to meet newborns’ particular needs. Spaces at the CHOP and BCMC formed, in 
part, because hospital administrators and physicians believed nurses were a critical piece 
of the system required for good patient care. Fairman and Lynaugh argue that nurses 
created grassroots influences within adult ICUs. The data related to newborn intensive 
care units reveals particular confidence of hospital administrators, researchers, and 
physicians in nursing staff that suggests NICUs involved significant administrative 
influence as they formed.  
Alternative possibilities: 
 
 The neonatal intensive care unit progressed to become the standard of care during 
a time when sicker patients could be saved with intensive care and more complex 
treatment. Other options could have become standard – surgical infants could have been 
cared for in general post-operative units or in available beds throughout the hospitals. 
Premature infant units could have remained the standard. But neither of these ways of 
caring for sick newborns remained standard. NICUs emerged, admitted sick newborns, 
either surgical or medical, and included premature infants in their ranks. How we group 
sick patients in hospitals today is not just based on social value placed on a particular 
patient population, the equipment and technology we have at our disposable, or the most 
fiscally efficient way to provide care. Our decisions about the creation of units where 
certain patients receive care and who has access to that care rest on the convergence of all 
of these factors. In a medical environment where healthcare costs were increasing, 
premature infant units such as the one at Boston Children’s Medical Center chose to 
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balance the increased costs of patient care in a premature infant unit where census did not 
always remain high enough, by grouping all newborns together. In this new unit, all sick 
newborns received the kinds of nursing care the premature infants had received. It 
worked because both premature infants and newborn infants had the unique physiology 
and required the same basic newborn care, and thus the nurses who had the knowledge to 
work with premature newborns could also easily transfer their knowledge (and build on 
it) to care for medically fragile full term newborns.  
Limitations to this study: 
 
 This work only speaks to general trends in the literature and the voices of 
particular people and is not meant to be a complete nor generalizable account of what 
happened in all NICUs across the country. My work only speaks to the broad trends in 
the scholarly literature, and to what was happening in two children’s hospitals on the east 
coast in the United States. Though race is an important factor when we ask any questions 
about systems and historical analysis, as I worked with scholars and mentors to ask 
questions about race, I did not ultimately choose to focus on it in this work. Though I did 
include families and the ways nurses worked with parents in the early units in this 
analysis, this work does not seek to expound upon the roles families played nor is it 
meant to be a critical analysis of family centered care throughout the 20th century. This 
work is based on an analysis of scholarly literature, general oral histories, and hospital 
archives that focus on administrative documentation and records and thus the data must 
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be understood to speak only to those arenas and not to the patient and family experiences 
that undoubtedly would be a rich vein of future work.  
Future work to be done: 
 
 This work has laid a foundation for future scholarship and the necessity to ask 
further questions to gain a broader picture. More work needs to be done to understand 
what influences played key roles in community hospitals. Since my work focuses on two 
children’s hospitals, more work should be done to understand how hospitals with 
maternity services worked out the challenges of establishing these units and what roles 
nurses played in those environments. More work needs to be done to understand more 
fully how hospitals elsewhere in the country formed their units and what key influencers 
converged in the establishment of NICUs in Denver, Seattle, and Dallas or other larger 
cities in different parts of the country.  
 This future work should include examining the relation of the development of 
neonatal care within the context of maternal and perinatal care. Due to the nature of my 
historical lens using the history of pediatrics as an influencing framework, I did not 
address the ways perinatal units emerged in the late 1970s nor the experiences families 
had with the care given in these units. This work would be critical to understanding a 
broader conception of the development of the NICU and the ways we formed what we 
know today as family centered care. 
 Further work also needs to be done to better understand the unintended 
consequences and how society, legislators, families, and physicians and nurses chose to 
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meet those concerns on the ground. While I acknowledged that important ethical issues 
emerged in the late 1970s, due to the nature of this work I chose to end my time period 
just prior to the Baby Doe legislation and the public, legislative, and broad ethical 
dialogue during the 1980s.  
 While I did begin to collect oral histories for this project, I believe more oral 
histories should be collected and a more encompassing oral history database of nurses 
and physicians who worked in these units, remember the environment, tensions, and 
decisions that were made. This would provide a strong historical database of experience 
from which future researchers could mine data and themes for further work.  
Informing our current understanding: 
 
Neonatal Intensive Care Units today still face many of the same issues the early 
units faced – increasing costs, infection rates resulting in sepsis, and nurse staffing issues. 
Infants requiring intensive care are among the most nurse-intensive patients in hospitals 
today. They require skilled nurses who know how to assess the patients, work with the 
plethora of increasingly complex bedside equipment, and function as collectors and 
communicators of vital patient data. Recent studies done by nursing researchers suggest 
that NICUs today are not staffed to guidelines and associate inadequate staffing rates 
with increased infection rates.436 Bedside nursing continues to be an important factor in 
                                                            
436 J.A. Rogowski, D. Staiger, T. Patrick, J. Horbar, M. Kenny, and E.T. Lake. “Nurse Staffing and NICU 
Infection Rates,” JAMA 167, no. 5 (March 18, 2013): 444–50. 
doi:10.1001/jamapediatrics.2013.18. 
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patient outcomes and remains a central aspect of the intensive care environment for 
critically ill newborns.437 
This work challenges us to think about how we develop systems of care for 
vulnerable patient populations and how we group patients with particular needs. In a 
healthcare system where specialization creates intensely fragmented and 
compartmentalized healthcare, we must be cognizant of how we group patients; highly 
trained nurses can be utilized in traditional and nuanced ways, and do make a difference. 
We also might think how we make those decisions based on the knowledge and expertise 
nurses have and how that might be used with particular patient populations to optimal 
effect within highly complicated technological systems that require extensive financial 
and caregiver resources. When we consider the NICU a technological system of care, we 
recognize a model that required complex equipment and broader infrastructure consisting 
of relationships among units. It also was influenced by economic factors, social values, 
and complex decisions made by an array of hospital administrators and influencers, as 
well as the nurses who functioned at the bedside at the heart of the system – next to their 
patients.  
With the recent edition of TIME magazine, on May 22, 2014 neonatal intensive 
care was once again thrust into the spotlight and America was introduced to a tiny baby 
boy named David.438 He was born 2 pounds 11 ounces at 29 weeks gestation (11 weeks 
                                                            
437 Douglas Staiger. “Association Between Hospital Recognition for Nursing Excellence and Outcomes of 
Very Low-Birth-Weight Infants,” JAMA 307, no. 16 (April 25, 2012): 1709. 
doi:10.1001/jama.2012.504. 
438 Jeffrey Kluger. “Saving Preemies,” TIME, May 22, 2014.  
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premature). He fought hard and took on the surmountable task of survival when, even by 
today’s standards, the odds were stacked against him; but this tenacious little baby boy 
was not alone in his fight.439 As we learn more and more about David, we learn about all 
of the pieces of equipment, the healthcare workers, the diseases and health issues he 
faced secondary to his prematurity, and the factors that influenced the kinds of care and 
medicine he received. Photographs of David include his parents and often the nurses, 
similar to those published by the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia just decades before. 
The nurses care for tiny David amidst a plethora of machines. They bring the human 
element to his story in a world where the equipment and intensity of his medically fragile 
state can sometimes seem overwhelming.  His story is familiar. Fifty years ago, we heard 
a similar story when Patrick Kennedy was born and his family experienced the early days 
of neonatal intensive care; now we marvel at a small ‘normal’ little boy benefits from this 
care. Both stories present the same infrastructure and both remind the American society 
of the how far we have come, but also about the challenges posed by that progress.  
On one hand, this patient population can be used as a case study to explore a 
plethora of healthcare problems today and challenge us to think in different ways. On the 
other hand we have not yet preserved the stories of these nurses, the technological 
systems where they worked, and the patients whose lives they played a role in saving. If 
we really do value the work they did, we must continue to value their stories, the meaning 
                                                            
439 Ibid. Kluger. Saving Preemies. “ David’s story began with an introduction to the baby himself: 
“…Immediately he began learning a lot of things – about bright lights and cold hands, needle 
sticks, and loud noises. He learned what it feels like to be hungry, to be frightened, to be unable to 
breathe.” 
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they gave their work, and the ways that work impacted the lives of countless newborns 
over the second half of the 20th century.  
 If we are to build on our current infrastructure of critical care for newborns, we 
must continue to think about the NICU as a technology and how it developed, grew, and 
changed over its short fifty-year history in the American healthcare system. We must 
understand its roots, how nurses have contributed to and played an important role in 
shaping it, and how it reflects our social values. We will continue to formulate care for 
vulnerable newborn patient populations in the midst of economic factors, social values, 
and increasingly complex medical conditions and treatments. The story of the NICU 
should also challenge us to think about broader patient populations and what influences 
the decisions we make that create and influence the technologic systems we create. We 
continue to value and care for infants like David, and we imagine his struggles and how 
we might contribute to the reduction of morbidity and mortality among critically ill 
newborns as well as other established and developing vulnerable patient populations. The 
NICU is a complex technological system composed of, ‘an army of people and a 
mountain of infrastructure caring for a pound of life,’ that has made a world of difference 
to our society’s tiniest babies.440  
                                                            
440 Ibid. Kluger. Saving Preemies. 
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